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Introduction 
The works that come to form the body of the  present dissertation share an 
underlying  motivation  to  investigate,  criticize  and  redefine  the  normative 
background  of  policy  making  in  the  field  of  climate  change.    This  choice  is 
justified by the observation that climate change is currently a very hot political 
issue and that it has important ethical dimensions.  The role of theories should in 
such circumstances go beyond explanation of the reality that we observe, and the 
scientist’s  effort  should  aim  at  offering  a  coherent  and  meaningful  basis  for 
planning our actions and for realizing changes in the real world.  The leading 
question behind this research therefore is not so much why prevention does or 
does not occur, but to which extent, why, and how, it could and should be put in 
place.   
It is possible to distinguish two economic approaches to climate change policy. 
A  branch  of  the  literature  focuses  on  general  equilibrium  analysis  and  is 
concerned with the design of mechanisms for the implementation of abatement 
targets
1. This issue is discarded in the present work, in which we have chosen a 
very abstract approach instead: we are here concerned with the general problem of 
defining the desirable abatement targets.  The motivation for this choice is that we 
see in the current political debate at the international level the need for giving 
proper “rational” foundation to the choice of abatement targets and climate change 
prevention.  Without such a foundation the political debate remains too much 
dichotomized, seeing the “environmentalists” on one side, and the industrial and 
financial lobbies on the other side. It is in such conditions impossible to find a 
common ground for further analysis and discussion, and even the implementation 
of cost-effective measures becomes impossible. 
The definition of “optimal” abatement targets relies on two main streams of 
economic literature.  On one side, there is a focus on decision making
2, which 
entails  questions  related  to  the  value  of  preventing  climate  change.    From  an 
economic  perspective,  the  value  of  prevention  is  a  variable  that  depends  on 
                                                 
1 See for example the papers collected in Carraro (2000). 
2 See for instance Heal and Lin (1997) 10      Introduction
   
 
several  assumptions  about  preferences,  damage,  and  the  attitude  towards 
uncertainty and towards discounting the future.  On the other side, several studies 
address  the  issue  of  international  environmental  agreements
3.    This  branch  of 
literature  is  of  a  game-theoretical  nature  and  stresses  the  role  of  strategic 
interaction:  cooperation  (or  the  lack  of  it)  poses  constraints  to  the  extent  and 
efficacy of prevention policies, in particular when prevention generates positive 
externalities. 
The literature on decision making and the literature on game theory are deeply 
correlated:  games  are  decision  problems  where  two  or  more  agents  interact.  
Whereas game theory generally takes payoffs as given, a part of decision theory 
analyses how such payoffs are perceived in the minds of players, describing and 
circumscribing their utility-maximizing behavior.  On the other hand, game theory 
is an instrument to decision theory, since it aims at identifying and predicting 
equilibrium  patterns  in  multi-agent  settings,  and  helps  selecting  strategic 
responses.  In the case of climate change, the perceived value of prevention for 
one  policy  actor  depends  on  the  feasibility  of  its  implementation  and  on  the 
expected reduction in damage, which in turn depend on the degree of coordination 
at the international level.  Similarly, the attractiveness of cooperation depends for 
each country on the perceived costs and benefits from prevention. 
Despite  such  deep  interrelation,  the  two  disciplines  have  been  following 
different paths in the past twenty years, for what concerns the methodologies and 
instruments used.  This divergence especially holds for the applications to climate 
change, probably also because of the intrinsic complexity of the issue.  For this 
reason the content of the dissertation suffers from some heterogeneity, and can 
therefore best be seen as split into two parts.  Part one is made up by chapters 1 to 
3 and it is dedicated to one-agent problems under uncertainty.  Part two to is made 
up  by  chapters  4  and  5  and  concentrates  on  multi-agents  models  useful  for 
analyzing the issue of international cooperation. 
In this introductory section I will outline the main points that are discussed 
more deeply in the rest of the book.  Before that, I give a general introduction on 
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the scientific facts concerning climate change and on the relevance of climate as 
an economic factor.   
Climate change: some 
background information 
The  basic  scientific  fact  concerning  climate  change  is  that  there  is  an 
unbalanced exchange of carbon between the atmosphere and other parts of the 
geophysical system of the Earth.  This is an established fact that results in an 
increasing concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other “greenhouse gases” 
(GHG) in the atmosphere: Figure 1 shows the records of changes in atmospheric 
concentrations of CO2, N2O, and CH4.   
The most accredited explanation for this fact is that the use of fossil fuels, like 
coal  and  oil,  for  industrial  use  is  disturbing  the  otherwise  balanced  cycle  of 
carbon.  As a matter of fact, fossil coal and oil reservoirs represent important sinks 
where  huge  quantities  of  carbon  have  stayed  sequestrated  for  very  long  time 
periods.  The industrial use of these materials consists of burning them as fuel, 
which means that their carbon component is suddenly liberated and ends up in the 
atmosphere,  at  such  a  fast  pace  that  it  cannot  be  reabsorbed  or  otherwise 
transformed  and  therefore  cumulates  in  the  atmosphere.    Figure  2  shows  an 
illustration of the main sources and sinks of carbon in the biosphere, and their 
exchange speed. 
Carbon dioxide is normally present in the atmosphere where it represents one 
of the phases of the natural carbon cycle.  Carbon is one of the main components 
of organic matter, similarly to water, and in a similar way it circulates among the 
several parts of the biosphere, which are therefore in a dynamic equilibrium of 
flows and processes involving carbon as a component.  The natural equilibrium of 
the biosphere in the times when life as we know it has developed and where the 
current ecological equilibria have established has been based on a carbon cycle 
where the fossil sinks stayed more or less unchanged. Similar considerations hold 
for  the  other  greenhouse  gases:  those  gases  that  contribute  to  regulating  the 
temperature  on  the  surface  of  the  Earth.    Therefore,  the  temperature  in  the 
biosphere stabilized within levels favorable to the evolution of life. 12      Introduction

























































Figure 1 Records of changes in atmospheric composition
4. 
 
                                                 
4 Source: IPCC (2001a) – p.36 of the Technical Summary Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    13




Figure 2 Fast and slow processes in the carbon cycle
5 
 
The  industrial  development  of  the  last  century,  based  largely  on  the 
exploitation of fossil fuels, is now threatening to change this old equilibrium.  The 
rapid emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases results in increased 
concentrations  of  these  gases  in  the  atmosphere,  leading  to  global  warming.  
There is evidence that “most of the observed warming over the last 50 years is 
likely to have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations”
6.  When 
the average temperature increases too much, it is expected to generate reactions in 
the ecosystems, and eventually affect them to very high extent. 
                                                 
5 Source: http://www.ipcc.ch/present/graphics.htm 
6 IPCC (2001a) – p. 61 of the Technical Summary 14      Introduction
   
 
A  lot  of  studies  have  been  and  are  being  conducted  in  order  to  try  and 
understand the full concatenation of reactions that may follow as a consequence of 
global  warming.    In  particular,  it  is  not  clear  if  there  are  self-regulation 
mechanisms that can lead the system to a new equilibrium compatible with life, or 
if the whole system risks to crash down completely.  Even if a new equilibrium is 
reachable, it is not known with sufficient certainty how fast the reactions occur, 
what changes they may imply, and how those changes may affect life in general 
and human life in particular.  There are reasons to be worried, if we consider that 
global warming is expected to affect more broadly the whole climate regime, on a 
global and local scale.  For instance the incidence and distribution of extreme 
weather events, like tornados, frost, very high temperature peaks, lightnings and 
floods may change significantly.  Besides, the sea level will rise as a consequence 
of higher water temperature and water dilatation, and because of ice melting at the 
polar caps.  It is not difficult to think of reasons why these changes represent a 
threat  to  many  human  activities,  including  the  most  fundamental  ones  like 
agriculture and farming. 
The relevance of climate change for economics 
One can think of many paths through which climate does affect various sectors 
the economy: tourism, transportation, outdoor recreation, agriculture, and farming 
are obviously and directly affected by weather conditions.  It is hard however to 
quantify the impact of weather as a productive factor.  A few studies actually 
address the well-established correlation between average temperature and income: 
warmer countries perform worse according to  economic indicators than cooler 
countries.  Explanations for this evidence can partly be found in institutional and 
historical  factors,  but  vector-borne  diseases,  which  are  much  more  present  in 
hotter climates also prove to play a role in slowing down growth and development 
by affecting labor productivity and the efficiency of social institutions like health 
care
7.  Climate change, involving an increase in average temperature may lead to 
the spreading of vector-borne diseases and maybe other factors that already in the 
past have induced higher poverty in hotter countries.  Besides, climate change 
                                                 
7 Horowitz (2002); Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    15
     
 
may affect income and growth also through capital accumulation, since expected 
damage  may  lead  to  lower  investment  rates,  something  for  which  developed 
countries might be even more sensitive than poorer ones
8. 
This is enough to state that economic analysis, especially when finalized to 
policy making, should take the risk of climate change seriously into consideration.  
The costs of adaptation, the costs of prevention, and finally the costs and the risks 
posed  by  damage  caused  by  climatic  change  should  be  accounted  for  when 
making  economic  predictions  and  when  advising  on  economic  and  welfare 
policies.  Also the financial sector, in particular insurance, investment, and credit, 
should be concerned, as climate change may affect the incidence of events like 
floodings or epidemics, which can involve large parts of the population at once.    
The relevance of economics for climate change 
Economics as a theoretical and applied science can help define the scope and 
means for climate change prevention and/or the most efficient paths to adaptation.  
Of course, it is not the economist’s job to judge on the scientific background 
information regarding climate change itself, which has to be taken as a set of 
given “facts” and predictions, in the most neutral way.  However, economics has 
the responsibility of producing tools that can be of help in: 1) understanding the 
possible impact of different natural events on the productive capability of human 
societies; 2) understanding and optimizing the cost structure of initiatives aimed at 
prevention, mitigation, and/or adaptation; 3) predicting the most likely responses 
that can be expected from the economic system and from society as a whole in 
different  scenarios;  4)  designing  policy  instruments  to  deal  with  the  special 
challenges faced; 5) evaluating the welfare effects of proposed interventions. 
It  is  one  of  the  tasks  of  economic  theory  to  judge  the  efficiency  of  policy 
instruments.  This is quite an ambitious attitude in the framework of an issue like 
climate change: the challenge faced is unique for a number of reasons.  First of 
all, climate change is an event for which there is no precedent in history, and this 
leaves  us  with  little  hard  evidence  to  build  and  to  test  theories  upon.    One 
consequence of this is that part of the theoretical work involves some science-
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fiction exercise: among others, thinking up catastrophic “worst-case scenarios” 
and  dealing  with  a  chance  of  facing  unpredictable  events.    Secondly,  the 
consequences of our actions today have effects lasting well beyond the duration of 
our  own  life.    So  we  are  in  a  difficult  position  when  trying  to  judge  their 
desirability: we take up the responsibility of defining priorities in the name of 
people who are not here to speak up for themselves, and whom we are not in state 
of compensating in case they turn out not to be happy about our choices.  Finally, 
the global dimension of the decision processes involved implies that it is rather 
difficult to define a homogeneous set of values and priorities even for the present 
generations involved.  The decision of bearing the costs of prevention and the 
choices needed to design the preferred kinds of intervention involve more or less 
all of the existing economic, cultural and political interest groups on Earth.  This 
means a huge variety of different points of view on the matter, all with equal a-
priori legitimacy.  All these groups are not necessarily endowed with the same 
technical knowledge, political influence, and economic stability. 
Economics as a discipline has the responsibility of finding ways to deal with 
those issues that do not immediately fit in the available trusted set of methods and 
assumptions: the situation is quite far from the ideal of a world where the subjects 
are rational and the property rights well defined.  In other words, even though 
climate change is a real-life issue, and a topic for applied research, it poses some 
serious  challenges  of  theoretical  and  methodological  nature.    This  dissertation 
deals  with  a  few  of  them,  related  to  the  attitude  of  decision  makers  towards 
uncertainty and to international cooperation. 
Climate change and uncertainty 
The first part of the dissertation, chapter 1 to 3, focuses on the behavioural 
aspects of dealing with uncertainty in the framework of climate change.  The aim 
is to work towards the development of a satisfactory methodology for evaluating 
the uncertain benefits of prevention, on the one hand; and on the other hand, to 
investigate  the  consequences,  in  terms  of  emission  targets,  of  using  different 
theoretical  approaches  in  the  evaluation  of  the  risks  involved.    This  effort  is 
justified by the underlying assumption that each policy should be evaluated by 
means  of  some  cost-benefit  analysis.    Policies  that  aim  at  the  prevention  or Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    17
     
 
mitigation of climate change pose some peculiar challenge to evaluation: among 
others, the very high degrees of uncertainty involved.  These need to be taken into 
account in the definition of abatement targets. 
Uncertainty  is  a  very  important  aspect  of  climate  change,  as  widely 
acknowledged  in  the  literature
9:  as  the  climate  affects  and  is  affected  by 
geological and biological systems, the sources of uncertainty are many and the 
understanding of their complexity requires the interdisciplinary contributions of 
many fields of science.   The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
is the most authoritative official source for data and information, which publishes 
in  not-too-technical  terms  in  its  Summaries  for  Policy  Makers  and  Technical 
Summaries.   In the most recent reports, the IPCC stresses that uncertainty about 
the quantitative and even the qualitative features of climate change in the near and 
further future is high.  Moreover, given that the relationship between climate and 
economic  systems  is  not  well  understood,  this  uncertainty  in  the  climate 
projections  translates  into  even  higher  uncertainty  about  future  states  of  the 
economies of the world. 
The evaluation of uncertain outcomes in economics is usually based on the 
assumption that agents wish to maximize their expected utility: individuals attach 
probabilities to states of the world that they believe possible, and then evaluate the 
utility of risky prospects by means of mathematical expectations. 
In chapter 1 a discussion of this approach and of some alternative approaches is 
offered.  The point of view that is adopted in that chapter is that it is important to 
define rationality with respect to the context in which it is applied.  It can be 
argued that climate change presents features quite unusual for standard economic 
modelling;  therefore  it  satisfies  a  necessary  prerequisite  for  applying  different 
definitions of rationality, in particular with respect to behavior under uncertainty.  
It is also arguable that alternative approaches to uncertainty need to be considered 
in order to account for ethical value systems that might be felt as compelling by 
the majority of the population
10 or because of ethical considerations that have 
been agreed upon in the political process.  A famous example is the so-called 
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Precautionary Principle: a principle stated by the United Nations
11, promoting the 
prevention of risks characterized by little scientific understanding. 
From a policy perspective the attitude towards uncertainty makes a difference, 
as it usually affects the desirable level of prevention.  Even though, as we discuss 
in chapter 1, from the economic literature it is not clear whether uncertainty about 
climate change should push in the direction of inducing higher or lower abatement 
levels, historically, one can argue that the prevention measures actually realized 
have been lower than optimal, if the United Nations felt compelled to produce a 
statement like the Precautionary Principle.   
Chapter 1 of this dissertation contributes to this debate by developing a model 
of  choice  of  optimal  pollution  levels  where  irreversibility  and  uncertainty  are 
explicitly taken into account.  The theoretical results are derived under different 
assumptions concerning the agents’ attitude towards risk.  The main conclusion 
reached  is  that  prevention  is  likely  to  be  more  valuable  if  people  give  more 
importance to avoiding worse events rather than taking the chance of good events.  
However it is also shown that this result is not general, and that it can be reversed, 
especially if prevention is not likely to be successful and if the impact of climate 
change in utility terms is assumed to be not too high.    
A question that is left open is therefore the determination of the real attitude of 
agents concerning uncertainty in a complex setting.  Therefore chapter 2 and 3 
turn to developing and testing a model of decision under risk that incorporates 
some  attributes  of  complexity.    In  chapter  2  the  theoretical  framework  is 
developed, while chapter 3 reports the results from an experiment conducted to 
test the model.  
In order to keep the model tractable, and to make testing possible, we select 
only one essential feature of the climate change problem, namely the presence of 
thresholds  in  the  payoff functions.    Thresholds  are  a  consequence  of  physical 
irreversibility: regenerating assets sometimes have the feature that an unknown 
critical level must be preserved in order to avoid extinction.  The self-regulating 
capacity of the climate is an example where, if some critical level of pollution is 
surpassed, it may be the case that the equilibrium of the ecosystem is irrevocably 
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disturbed.    As  this  critical  level  will  usually  not  be  known,  this  is  a  typical 
situation where uncertainty plays a role, together with the relative complexity of 
the payoff function. 
As a consequence, the choices of environmental policy makers depend on their 
attitude towards risk.  In chapter 2 the self-regulating capacity of the climate is 
modelled as a renewable resource, and atmospheric pollution as “harvesting”, by 
analogy  with  livestock:  the  accumulation  of  greenhouse  gases  can  be  seen  as 
subtracting  from  the  renewable  sink  capacity  of  the  atmosphere,  which  is  not 
known  with  certainty.    The  chapter  provides  therefore  models  of  different 
theoretical  behavior  rules  and  compares  the  consequences  on  the  optimal 
harvesting rate from a renewable resource with unknown critical stock level.  It is 
shown that the predictions of the models are qualitatively similar: according to all 
theories examined, when uncertainty increases, so does optimal harvesting; when 
the  expected  critical  level  becomes  larger,  then  all  the  theories  prescribe  that 
harvesting should decrease.  However, the optimal harvesting levels differ in their 
absolute magnitude; moreover, the attitude towards risk affects the likelihood of 
picking corner solutions, implying that either the resource is depleted for sure or 
no risk of depletion is tolerated. 
The models are based on different decision-theoretical frameworks: expected 
value, expected utility and rank-dependent utility with convex or inverse-S shaped 
weights.  Expected value and expected utility are the most widely used theories in 
the  literature,  and  they  are  presented  as  benchmark  models.  Rank-dependent 
utility theory is chosen because it can be interpreted, as motivated extensively in 
chapter 1, as a possible way to implement ex-ante the precautionary principle.  As 
discussed previously, somebody who shows ex-ante “prudent” attitudes towards 
risk does not necessarily take smaller risks: the reason for this counterintuitive 
behavior is simply that extremely high levels of resource extraction can in fact 
reduce total risk, because it pays more immediately and at the same time reduces 
uncertainty about future payoffs by making resource extinction a sure event.   
Based  on  the  theoretical  models  of  chapter  2,  chapter  3  presents  an 
experimental  study  that  is  designed  to  provide  an  empirical  assessment  of  the 
“rapid-consumption behavior” (eat it all before it is gone) in the presence of a 
stochastic extinction threshold.  Also this chapter models the atmosphere as an 20      Introduction
   
 
available sink for greenhouse gases with a limited renewable capacity, taken as an 
unknown parameter.  The experiment consists of confronting individuals with a 
choice  for  their  level  of  pollution,  facing  a  matrix  of  possible  outcomes  that 
depend on the level of pollution chosen and on the value of the parameter, which 
will be randomly selected in a second time.  The aim of the experiment is to 
compare the predictive strength of the theoretical models presented in chapter 2.  
In this experiment, a substantial subset of the observed decisions contradict 
standard expected utility theory (EUT) no matter which level of risk-aversion we 
assume, while the alternative model of rank-dependent utility (RDU) proves to be 
more successful in predicting actual choices.  Rank-dependent utility is a theory 
of  choice  under  risk  that  makes  use  of  transformations  on  the  probability 
distributions, rather than on the value function, to model the attitude of subjects 
towards  risk.    An  interesting  result  is  that  in  our  specification  convex 
transformations of the probability fit our data better than inverse S-shaped ones.  
A  convex  transformation  function  has  the  property  of  overweighting  the 
probability  of  events  leading  to  the  worst  outcomes;  an  inverse  S-shaped 
transformation function, instead, has the property of overweighting the likelihood 
of both events leading to the best and events leading to the worst outcomes.  The 
experimental observations presented in chapter 3 can therefore be interpreted by 
stating  that  our  subjects  show  “prudent”  (or  also  “pessimistic”)  behavior.  
Nevertheless, evidence for rapid consumption is found. 
This result is in contrast to findings from earlier studies that generally found 
stronger  evidence  for  inverse  S-shaped  than  for  convex  probability  weighting.  
However, this might be explained by the fact that while experiments in decision 
theory usually examine behavior in the choice among standard lotteries, the model 
presented in chapter 3 presents the subjects with a resource extraction situation 
with a stochastic extinction threshold, and this kind of task seems to invoke a 
much more prudent behavior than the standard tasks.  This result seems therefore 
to speak in favour of those who think that decision criteria are context dependent 
and also to suggest that the calibrations of choice models that are based on the 
classical lottery-choice tasks may actually be inadequate for explaining behavior 
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From the analysis conducted in this first part of the thesis, the consequences for 
environmental policy making are not quite optimistic: although experimental tests 
do not reject the hypothesis that the behavior of subjects can be interpreted as 
“prudent”  when  the  framework  of  choice  is  characterized  by  some  of  the 
complexities typical of climate change and other environmental issues, this is not 
sufficient to avoid rapid extraction behavior. On the contrary, both the theoretical 
models and the experimental observations show that the fact that decision-makers 
do take the risk of extinction into account, does not always lead to extracting less 
of the resource.   
We can conclude that optimal prevention policy is a non-trivial issue when 
risk-preferences  are  taken  into  account  and  that  all  the  models  for  decision-
making  that  we  have  taken  into  consideration  show  a  very  high  sensitivity  to 
small changes in the unknown parameters.  This conclusion has been reached 
under the assumption that the agent in charge of deciding is free to choose the 
optimal level of prevention, and does not have to take strategic considerations into 
account.  However, in real life, climate change represents a global externality, 
where the choice of prevention cannot be taken by single agents independently: 
there is need for international coordination and cooperation in order to ensure that 
the  preventive  efforts  put  in  place  by  one  agent  are  not  made  useless  by  the 
strategic reactions of other agents.  This is the topic of the second part of this 
dissertation. 
Climate change and 
international cooperation 
The literature on international environmental agreements makes use of game 
theoretic  instruments  to  analyse  the  possibilities  for  cooperation  on  climate 
change issues.  One can observe that cooperation is very hard to achieve in reality: 
very important countries, like the USA for instance, have not ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol on the reduction of greenhouse gases emissions; even if the abatement 
targets of Kyoto will be met, this is unlikely to be enough to prevent climate 
change.  If the governments act rationally, the difficulty in achieving cooperation 
could  be  explained  as  an  effect  of  strategic  considerations.    Each  country 22      Introduction
   
 
anticipates the actions undertaken by others and hopes to “free ride”: let the others 
do  the  prevention  job  and  enjoy  the  benefits  without  bearing  the  costs.    This 
situation  is  often  described  in  terms  of  a  “Prisoner’s  Dilemma”,  where 
cooperation would be valuable for everyone, but it cannot be reached because the 
incentives to free ride are too large.   
A  traditional  way  to  induce  cooperation  in  a  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  set  up  is 
introducing  time  and  the  possibility  to  repeat  the  game.    In  this  extended 
framework, cooperation can be sustained by introducing “trigger strategies” in 
which a coalition falls apart completely if one of the countries defeats.  It is an 
open question whether such a mechanism can work in the case of agreements 
involving greenhouse gases or other “stock pollutants” that have the property of 
accumulating over time.  A problem here is that as a consequence of cooperation 
the structure of the game would change in such a way that the punishment threat 
is reduced due to first-period almost full-cooperative abatement
12.   
The free-riding issue can also be overcome by  introducing a possibility for 
countries to commit
13 to the coalition.  In this case, the incentive to free ride still 
exists, but the committed countries can induce cooperation from the outsiders, for 
instance by means of monetary transfers.  However, commitment in the presence 
of uncertainty can lead to inefficiency, and is less likely to take place.  A trade-off 
between  commitment  and  efficiency  characterizes  very  often  the  choice  of 
environmental policy strategies.  This is one of the reasons why some authors feel 
that the central role of efficiency in evaluating policy instruments might have to 
be reconsidered
14.  
The  question  is  made  even  more  complex  by  asymmetries  among  costs-
benefits functions in different countries.  With asymmetric countries, cooperation 
may  be  collectively  rational  (lead  to  better  aggregate  outcomes)  but  not 
individually rational if the distribution of efforts is such that some players end up 
bearing more costs and/or if some players get lower benefits from cooperation.  A 
typical example is the difference in costs bearing and impact sensitivity between 
                                                 
12 De Zeeuw (2005). 
13 Carraro-Siniscalco (1993).   
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developing  and  developed  countries.    Under  some  conditions,  redistribution 
(transfer)  schemes  can  be  designed  to  deal  with  such  situations
15.    However, 
things get more complicated in a dynamic framework, especially if an agreement 
can be renegotiated over time
16.     
Moreover,  the  structure  of  the  negotiation  process  can  make  a  difference.  
Bauer (1992) for example shows that bilateral negotiation may be more successful 
in the presence of asymmetries among countries’ costs-benefits functions.  Two 
coalitions of two countries may then negotiate with each other and form a larger 
coalition, and so on.  The difference here is made by the fact that in the process 
one  country  does  not  just  negotiate  for  itself,  but  it  negotiates  a  position 
conditional on participation of other countries as well.  In such a way cooperation 
can  be  sustained  on  a  larger  scale  and  with  better  aggregate  gains  than  if 
negotiations are unconditional. 
Finally,  the  equilibrium  concept  that  is  used  in  modelling  international 
agreements strongly affects the size of the coalition.  In non-cooperative coalition 
games, the coalition forms as a Nash equilibrium of a two-stage game, where 
membership is decided in a first step and in a second step optimal abatement 
targets are set.  In this game, a subset of countries (“insiders”) plays as one player 
against the other countries (“outsiders”) playing as singletons and the equilibrium 
is usually found by backward induction.  In the equilibrium insider countries must 
not  have  an  incentive  to  leave  that  coalition  (internal-stability  condition)  and 
outsiders  must  not  have  an  incentive  to  join  that  coalition  (external-stability 
condition).  Typically the size of the coalition that is both internally and externally 
stable is very small.  
Cooperative coalition games, on the other hand, are based on different concepts 
of  equilibrium.    One  of  the  most  important  ones  is  the  γ-core  concept
17:  A 
coalition is in the γ-core if no sub-coalition has an incentive to deviate, under the 
assumption  that  in  that  case  the  remaining  coalition  falls  apart.    This  idea  is 
similar to trigger strategies in repeated games: as mentioned, the assumption that 
                                                 
15 An example using cooperative game theory is given in Chander-Tulkens (1997). 
16 See for instance Finus- Rundshagen (1998). 
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the threat is credible is quite strong.  Models with “farsightedness”
18 relax this 
assumption partially: deviations may trigger more deviations but not necessarily a 
complete  break-up  of  the  coalition.  It  can  be  shown  that  this  model  can  also 
sustain  large  coalitions.  A  trade-off  occurs  between  models  with  behavioural 
assumption that are less realistic but may lead to large coalitions and models with 
more realistic behavioural assumptions but only small coalitions. 
Chapter 4 discusses the ability of countries involved in the negotiation process 
to commit in such way that they can play a trigger strategy leading to a larger 
coalition.  As mentioned above, the γ-core concept is based on the assumption that 
countries in a coalition can commit to implement a punishment strategy in the 
case that a country unilaterally deviates. Most commonly the threat is that the 
whole coalition will break apart and that a fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium 
will be played. As this usually leads to very bad outcomes, these models are able 
to more easily reach the conclusion that a full coalition is stable, and thus that 
cooperation  is  possible.  However,  when  catastrophic  consequences  cannot  be 
excluded, then we argue that it is not reasonable for the countries in the coalition 
to commit to a trigger strategy in response to deviations.  This gives us reasons to 
believe  that  in  the  framework  of  climate  change  only  the  non-cooperative 
approach makes sense, and particularly if the players of the game do not control 
their decision variable perfectly and run therefore the risk of committing mistakes.  
In other words it is shown that a threat of this kind is not played in a “trembling-
hand-perfect” equilibrium, where the agents attach a positive but small probability 
to the fact that the other agents might “miss” their optimal-strategy action. 
It is clear that this kind of considerations, which are of some importance for 
any coalition game, are even more interesting in the framework of climate change, 
because  of  the  complexity  and  uncertainty  that  characterize  this  issue,  as 
discussed in the first part of the dissertation.  Therefore, in modelling international 
agreements  on  climate  change  it  is  most  recommendable  to  adopt  a  non-
cooperative setting.  As this leads to pessimistic conclusions about the possibility 
of reaching large consensus and effective abatement targets, it is necessary to look 
for mechanisms that can help improve the situation.   
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Therefore chapter 4 further investigates the role of investments as a form of 
commitment  in  a  non-cooperative  game.    Investments,  for  instance  in  green 
electricity  plants,  constitute  sunk-costs  for  the  investor,  and  once  they  are 
undertaken they can change the structure of payoffs and reduce the incentives to 
free ride.  Introducing the possibility of investing in green electricity plants in a 
game  of  international  environmental  agreements  can  therefore  lead  to  more 
cooperation and to higher levels of CO2 abatement.  As the success and extent of 
such  a  positive  correlation  of  events  depends  on  the  efficiency  of  the  green 
technology, this model suggests that knowledge is the key to solve international 
negative  externalities  and  that  its  value  lies  not  only  in  the  direct  effects  on 
production and growth but also incorporates the indirect effect on the cooperative 
attitude of countries. 
These results are encouraging, but they are not built on standard assumptions.  
In particular, the payoff functions used in the model presented in chapter 4 are not 
derived from any optimization process, and are defined in a somewhat ad-hoc 
way.  In chapter 5 we see therefore a model of coalition formation based on more 
standard settings. 
Some of the positive feedbacks observed in the simpler model still hold true in 
this one: it is true in general that members of the coalition have a higher incentive 
to invest in green capital, and it is also true that larger coalitions induce higher 
overall  investments  in  green  capital,  which  in  principle  can  sustain  larger 
coalitions.  However, outsiders to larger coalitions invest less in green capital, 
which lowers their investments costs.  This is in fact another free-rider benefit that 
neutralizes the effect of the green capital, so that again small coalitions result in 
equilibrium.  The model is anyway able to reach somewhat encouraging results, as 
it turns out that if the members of a coalition are allowed to share a relatively 
small  positive  externality,  for  example,  the  R&D  costs  of  investment,  the  full 
coalition can be sustained.  
This comes in accordance with the idea, already present in the literature
19, that 
cooperation in technology development is easier than cooperation on emission 
abatement.  While this result has been previously stated on the basis of empirical 
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observations,  the  present  paper  reaches  the  same  conclusion  following  purely 
theoretical arguments.  Thus this model provides an explanation and supports the 
thesis  that  the  best  way  to  reach  effective  international  cooperation  is  an 
agreement based both on technology incentives and on abatement targets. 
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1. Climate change 
scenarios and the 
precautionary principle
20 
It is well known that uncertainty regarding climate change is particularly deep 
and extensive.  Damage may occur in a totally uncontrollable and irreversible 
way, after exceeding unknown threshold levels of pollution.  Moreover, most of 
the costs of prevention of climate change have to be borne by present generations, 
while  damage  is  believed  to  mostly  affect  future  generations.    Clearly, 
determination of the "best" path of development would be controversial even if all 
future contingencies were known with certainty.  It is therefore important that the 
ethical issues do not become obscured by the scientific difficulties.   
The ethical  guidelines for dealing with global warming  and other problems 
related to development have been addressed by the United Nations Organization 
(UN).  The precautionary principle, stated in the Rio '92 Declaration (UN 1993), 
may  be  read  as  a  signal  of  dissatisfaction  with  current  environmental  policy 
practice, particularly in the face of uncertainty.  Many reasons could be cited for 
such a failure, among them the fact that policy makers often fail in interpreting 
and  representing  the  beliefs  of  individuals  and  (most  of  all)  the  scientific 
community.   
This  chapter  proposes  a  model  for  the  implementation  of  the  precautionary 
principle  in  the  climate  change  framework,  a  model  therefore  that  aims  at 
determining  optimal  abatement  and  prevention  levels,  explicitly  assuming  a 
special attitude towards uncertainty.  Toward this end, I use a somewhat different 
approach from that used by most of the economic literature on this topic.  Many 
authors (for example, Ulph and Ulph 1997, Nordhaus and Popp 1997, Gollier, 
Jullien  and  Treich  2000)  identify  the  concept  of  prudence  with  conservative 
                                                 
20 This chapter has been published in the book Risk and Uncertainty in Environmental and 
Natural Resource Economics, edited by J. Wesseler, H.P. Weikard, and R. Weaver, Cheltenham, 
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behaviour  ex  post,  and  they  analyse  the  emergence  and  “optimality”  of 
conservative  behavior  in  the  presence  of  varying  conditions  of  uncertainty, 
learning  and  irreversibility.    The  main  result  emerging  from  this  literature  is 
that—even  when  irreversible  damage  occurs—conservative  behaviour  (lower 
emission levels) arises only under specific assumptions on the utility functions 
and  on  the  distribution  of  risk  (Heal  and  Kriström  2002).    Another  flow  of 
literature  analyzes  the  emergence  of  conservative  behavior  as  the  result  of 
deviation  from  expected  utility  behaviour  on  the  part  of  authorities  that  have 
different objectives than the maximization of collective welfare.  Bouglet, Lanzi 
and Vergnaud 2002, and Chevé and Congar 2000 and 2002, fall into this category. 
In  these  contributions,  the  precautionary  principle  is  either  explained  by  or 
identified with the minimization of future regret (limiting the risk of a sanction).  
 The essence of the precautionary principle, however, seems to be captured by 
neither of these classes of models.  In my opinion, it lies in the fact that, given the 
special conditions that characterize the global warming issue, we should behave 
prudently ex-ante, while trying to maximize collective welfare.  The approach 
followed in this paper, more in line with Vercelli (1995) and Henry and Henry 
(2002), is as follows: prudence is defined as a decision criterion, consisting in a 
deviation from expected utility.  Given the adoption ex-ante of such a criterion, 
and  given  a  description  of  uncertainty  based  on  scenarios,  I  derive  some 
conclusions  on  the  predictability  of  the  consequences  on  the  desired  level  of 
emissions. 
Typically, information regarding climate change is made available to policy 
makers in the form of scenarios.  Scenarios describe possible future developments 
of a set of variables (demographic, economic, and environmental variables), given 
assumptions on actions that might be undertaken and/or states of the world that 
might occur.  Decisions are based on such descriptions.  The idea behind this 
paper is to treat scenarios as special states of the world, each representing some 
combination  of  hypotheses  about  interactions  between  climate  and  economy.  
Non-monotonic  utility  functions  within  scenarios  reflect  the  risk  of  exceeding 
threshold levels of pollution, after which a sudden loss in utility occurs.  Thus, 
scenarios  differ  from  each  other  in  the  distribution  of  thresholds  and  their 
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The first question addressed is what the optimal choice of aggregate emissions 
and consumption is when uncertainty is represented by multiple scenarios and 
when  the  precautionary  principle  applies.    A  second  question  is:  are  actual 
decision makers likely to pursue such optimal policies?  If not, are they instead 
likely to pollute more or less than the optimal amount?  This depends on how we 
think  governmental  decision  makers  behave  in  the  face  of  uncertainty.    The 
literature on decision-making shows that individuals often deviate from standard 
definitions  of  rationality,  even  in  situations  where  uncertainty  is  more 
straightforward than it is for climate change (Starmer 2000). 
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the analytical set-up. 
In  section  2.1,  I  present  a  utility  function  characterized  by  thresholds  whose 
location  and  impact  are  unknown  and  are  described  by  probability  densities.  
Uncertainty is the subject of section 2.2, where I characterize scenarios and give a 
simplified introduction of RDU theory.  Section 2.3 builds the model for choice of 
consumption.    I  derive  some  analytical  results  and  illustrate  the  features  and 
outcomes of performed simulations in chapter 3.  Finally chapter 4 draws some 
conclusions. 
Irreversibility, uncertainty, and 
the precautionary principle 
According  to  the  precautionary  principle,  irreversibility  is  a  sufficient  pre-
requisite for implementing prevention measures:  
“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities.  Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.” (UN 1993)  
Implementation of this principle depends clearly on the framework to which it 
is  applied:  in  the  case  of  Chlorofluorocarbons  (CFCs),  the  international 
community  agreed  on  banning  their  use  (Montreal  Protocol),  since  they  were 
considered responsible for depleting the ozone layer of the stratosphere (with very 
dangerous consequences), and cheap substitutes could be introduced quickly.  In 30      1. Climate change scenarios and the precautionary principle
   
 
the case of greenhouse gases (GHGs), a ban does not seem possible, since a fast 
and  complete  substitution  of  some  sources  of  GHG,  like  fossil  fuels,  is  not 
economically  feasible.    Therefore,  balancing  costs  and  benefits,  some  optimal 
positive level of emissions should be determined, even in the presence of strong 
uncertainties. 
Precaution, according to the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, is 
"an  action done to  avoid possible danger".   Being prudent means therefore to 
choose  among  different  actions,  paying  particular  attention  to  their  worst 
consequences.  Such behaviour can be represented analytically by means of rank-
dependent utility (RDU) models under special hypotheses, as I will show later. 
Henry  &  Henry  (2002)  also  make  use  of  a  similar  model  to  discuss  the 
precautionary principle: they argue that when the beliefs of individuals can be 
represented by means of non-additive probabilities, the choice of a regulator is 
sub optimal if it does not reflect this feature.  Rank-dependent utility is a model 
based on non-additive beliefs, and therefore this normative argument applies.   
One shortcoming of RDU is that it implies a violation of the independence 
axiom, which can lead to inconsistencies in choice (Machina 1989).  However, 
more recently Ghirardato (2001) demonstrated that in the presence of unforeseen 
contingencies (that is, when the decision maker is aware that he cannot describe 
his  problem  in  a  complete  way),  nonadditive  beliefs  can  be  derived  without 
relaxing the independence axiom, considering the possibility that acts be defined 
not  as  functions  but  as  correspondences  between  states  of  the  world  and 
consequences.    This  result  recalls  the  intuition  behind  Vercelli  (1995),  who 
suggests that nonadditive beliefs may legitimately drive choice when scientific 
understanding of a problem is incomplete.  My personal view follows this line of 
reasoning,  and  my  argument  in  favour  of  a  normative  use  of  RDU  is  that  it 
reproduces  prudence,  and  UNO  recommends  prudence  in  the  face  of 
irreversibility.  
Finally, I choose to use RDU among all available models for two reasons.  On 
the  one  hand,  RDU  is  relatively  tractable,  since  it  consists  of  a  simple 
transformation over cumulative probabilities, and can therefore easily be used in 
computer simulations just by adding few steps to the generation of usual random 
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expected utility, and includes as a limit case the minimax principle.  Therefore, 
even if formally this model is a model of choice under risk (since it assumes an 
underlying probability distribution), in practice it behaves very much like models 
of choice under uncertainty and can be easily put in relation to them.  Ideally, one 
would like to use a model of choice under uncertainty for the case of climate 
change,  but  it  is  interesting  to  use  RDU  in  this  framework  for  its  pragmatic 
advantages, which provide the possibility to analyze quite a flexible and general 
model and making use of (a large number of) computer simulations at the same 
time. 
The following section introduces a way to represent the essential features of 
irreversibility in a static framework, by means of thresholds in the utility function. 
Thresholds 
The global climate is a complex system: when a change (like pollution) occurs 
in one part of the system, the chain of reactions can be very sensitive to small 
differences in the size of the initial shock.  The relation between pollution and 
damage can consequently present threshold values where damage increases very 
steeply, or even jumps up in a discontinuous way. Carpenter, Ludwig and Brock 
1999 give a relatively simple presentation of a pollution model with thresholds.  
The qualitative features of such a model can be considered similar to those of the 
climatic system. 
Irreversibility in this framework means that once the threshold is crossed, a 
structural  change  in  the  model  occurs  which  cannot  be  repaired—even  if  the 
emission level is brought back to lower levels afterwards.  In other words, the 
choice to cross the threshold is made only once.  This means that learning may not 
be  a  valuable  option  (Aalbers  1999),  which  makes  a  static  model  the  most 
appropriate.  This paper refers indeed to a static model of utility maximization in 
the presence of thresholds, developed by Aalbers (1999).  In such framework, two 
independent probability densities are assumed: 1)  ( ) B π , defined over the interval 
[ ] max min;B B , describes the location of a threshold B for GHG emissions; 2)  ( ) α θ , 
defined on the interval  [ ] 1 ; 0 , describes the fraction  ( ) α − 1  of consumption lost 
due to environmental damage, once the threshold is crossed.  32      1. Climate change scenarios and the precautionary principle
   
 
If  the  consumption  level  is  c,  and  assuming  one-to-one  correspondence 
between consumption and pollution, then the probability of crossing the threshold 
is  { } ( ) c c B Π = ≤ Pr , where  ( ) B Π  is the distribution function for  ( ) B π . 
Since we assume that the two variables B and α are independent of each other, 
their joint distribution is given by  ( ) ( ) ( ) α α Θ × Π = Ω B B, .  Suppose the decision 
maker  derives  utility  deriving  both  from  consumption,  c,  and  from  amenity, 
c B a − ≡ , in this way:  ( ) ( ) ( ) a c u c U ν + = , where  ( ) 0 = a ν  if   0 ≤ a  (assuming 
that no utility is derived from the environment if the threshold has been crossed).  
Once c has been chosen and when the true state of nature is ) ~ ,
~
( α B , utility is 
given by: 
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Therefore, a priori expected utility for each level of consumption is: 















To  simplify  the  analysis,  we  can  assume  that  ( ) ( ) 0 0 0 = =ν u ,  and  that 
( ) ( ) ( ) c u u c u α α = .  Substituting, the expression for expected utility becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,
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where  ( ) ( ) [ ] a u E u l − =1 ,θ  denotes the expected value in utility units of the 
percentage loss in consumption. 
In reality, the two probability densities  ( ) B π  and  ( ) α θ  are not known, and 
even the most accurate analyses do not provide reliable and complete predictions 
about  threshold  values  for  pollution  and  their  impact  on  the  economy.    The 
scientific community prefers to make use of scenario analyses, which  provide 
projections of possible future developments for the main subsystems of interest 
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assessments  that  correspond  to  a  variety  of  hypotheses  regarding  how  these 
systems work and how they relate to each other. 
Uncertainty and the scenario 
approach 
“Projected climate changes during the 21st century have the potential to 
lead  to  future  large-scale  and  possibly  irreversible  changes  in  Earth 
systems  resulting  in  impacts  at  continental  and  global  scales.    These 
possibilities  are  very  climate  scenario-dependent  and  a  full  range  of 
plausible scenarios has not yet been evaluated.”
 (IPCC 2001b). 
The  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change  (IPCC)  works  on  the 
development  of  climate  scenarios.    Such  scenarios  include  assumptions  and 
predictions on both geophysical and socio-economic factors.  In particular, the 
latter are meant to depict possible developments for the future and to provide 
directions for the choice of structured sets of policies that complement each other, 
dealing with all dimensions of the problem.  However, it is quite reasonable to 
think  that  not  all  these  policies  can  be  implemented  simultaneously  and  in  a 
coordinated way: from the point of view of one single decision unit (say, the 
ministry  for  environment  of  one  specific  country)  some  socio-economic 
conditions are exogenously determined, beyond its own control, and substantially 
independent of its current decision.  Therefore there is uncertainty, not only within 
scenarios, but also across scenarios. 
Geophysical uncertainty must also be taken into account: the climate system is 
chaotic, which means that predictions are affected by both model uncertainty and 
initial conditions.  To increase reliability, probability forecasts are obtained on 
basis of “multi-model, multi-initial-condition ensembles” (IPCC 2001a).  Yet, the 
report of Working Group I of the IPCC stresses that “an important question is 
whether a multi-model ensemble made by pooling the world climate community's 
stock of global models adequately spans the uncertainty in our ability to represent 
faithfully the evolution of climate”. (IPCC2001a). 
As a result, a plurality of scenarios can be considered, which differ in their 
assumptions on both socio-economic and physical parameters.  Such scenarios 34      1. Climate change scenarios and the precautionary principle
   
 
can be treated as states of the world in a traditional decision-making problem, 
because  they  are  exogenously  given,  while  a  subset  of  variables  (here  only 
emissions) can be considered decision variables.  This is the approach taken in 
this paper.  Even though I use the word “scenario” basically as a synonym for 
“state of the world”, I maintain the lexical distinction, since one distinctive feature 
of scenarios is that they constitute a sample of possible states of the world, while 
decision  theory  requires  that  the  set  of  states  of  the  world  be  exhaustive  and 
exclusive (one and only one state of the set realizes).  
Characterization of scenarios.  
The warming effect of GHGs may be reduced by some reactions in parts of the 
system, which are therefore called “negative feedbacks.”  “Negative” refers to the 
sign of the relative effect on the temperature, whereas it may be increased by other 
kinds of reactions; these are therefore called “positive feedbacks”.  The sign of a 
feedback is not always known—for instance, the aggregate impact of aerosols on 
temperature, as reported by IPCC (2001a).  We can therefore talk about several 
scenarios that differ in the underlying assumptions about the sign of groups of 
feedbacks.  As already suggested, among the uncertain feedbacks we might want 
to include also the possible actions of parts of the human social and economic 
system.  This is possible as long as such actions can be considered independent 
from  the  present  action.    Considering  all  possible  combinations  of 
positive/negative  signs  for  all  uncertain  feedbacks,  we  obtain  a  complete  and 
exclusive state space. 
Within a scenario  S s ,..., 1 = , I assume that an assessment for the probability 
densities  ( ) B s π   and  ( ) α θ s   is  given.    Let  us  say  that  1 = s   denotes  the  most 
favourable case where all uncertain feedbacks are negative,  2 = s  denotes a less 
favourable case in which some of the uncertain feedbacks are positive (and so on), 
until  S s =   denotes  the  worst  scenario  in  which  all  uncertain  feedbacks  are 
positive.  Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    35
     
 
I assume that the support of the density function is the same in each scenario 
([ ] [ ] max min max min ; ; B B B B
s s = ,  S s ,..., 1 = ∀ ).  Therefore the following expected utility 
function  represents  how  expected  utility  varies  over  consumption  in  each 
scenario: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) c c u u l dB B c B v c u c EU s s s
B
c
s s Π − − + = ∫ θ π ,
max
 
for  S s ,..., 1 = . 
The vector  ( ) ( ) ( ) c EU c EU S ,..., 1  of expected utility values reached in each state 
when consumption level c is chosen can be interpreted as a “lottery” in which one 
gets  ( ) c EU1  if state 1 occurs,  ( ) c EU 2  if state 2 occurs, and so on.  
Choice and uncertainty  
Consider the lottery  ( ) ( ) ( ) c EU c EU S ,..., 1 , and denote  ( ) c EU  as its expected 
utility: 





s s c EU p c EU
1
. 
According  to  traditional  decision  theory,  individuals  should  choose  among 
lotteries  as  if  they  were  maximizing  expected  utility,  for  some  probability 
distribution  ( ) S p p ,..., 1 .    Actual  decision  makers  however,  in  real  and 
experimental  frameworks,  do  not  always  seem  to  follow  such  a  criterion.  
Evidence from experimental and field observations clearly show that individuals 
deviate from expected utility maximization on many occasions, and many theories 
have been developed with the purpose of clarifying and predicting the patterns of 
actual  choice  in  the  presence  of  uncertainty  (Starmer,  2000).    One  possible 
explanation is that people transform probabilities in some systematic way, just 
like they do with outcomes in their utility function.  We are familiar with the idea 
that individuals may have concave utility functions, which reflects the fact that 
they value differently the same  change in consumption from different starting 
points.  In the same way, they might apply a transformation on probabilities.  This 
is the intuition behind the rank-dependent utility theory (RDU), of which I give a 36      1. Climate change scenarios and the precautionary principle
   
 
short presentation hereafter.  This presentation draws much from Wakker (1989), 
to which I refer the reader for a more precise and complete, but still intuitive, 
presentation of RDU theory. 
For  given  consumption  c,  let  us  consider  a  permutation  over  the  set  of 
scenarios  ( ) S ρ ρ ,..., 1 , such that  ( ) ( ) c EU c EU S ρ ρ ≥ ≥ ... 1 .  For each scenario we 
can compute decumulative probabilities:  s s p p P ρ ρ ρ + + = ... 1 . Let now  ( ) P ϕ  be a 
nondecreasing  transformation  function  such  that  ( ) 0 0 = ϕ   and  ( ) 1 1 = ϕ .    The 
RDU-value of our lottery is defined as: 





s s s c EU
S
s
ρ ρ ρ ϕ ϕ
 
where I abuse notation defining  0 0 = ρ P . 
To understand the difference between RDU(c) and EU(c), first notice that we 
can rewrite EU(c) as follows: 




− ∑ s s
S
s
s P P c EU ρ ρ ρ . 
Therefore, we can consider expected utility (EU) as a special case of RDU, 
where  the  transformation  function  is  linear:  ( ) P P = ϕ .    Defining  the  decision 
weights  [ ] 1 − − ≡ s s s P P dw ρ ρ ρ  and   ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 ' − − ≡ s s s P P dw ρ ρ ρ ϕ ϕ , we see in Figure 3 that 
s s dw dw ' ≥   whenever  ( ) s Pρ ϕ   has  slope  not  larger  than  1,  and  s s dw dw ≥ '  
whenever  ( ) s Pρ ϕ  has slope not smaller than 1.  In particular, in Figure 3 we see 
that for a convex transformation function the decision weights of RDU are smaller 
for better outcomes and larger for worse outcomes than the decision weights for 
EU  (remember  that  P,  reported  on  the  horizontal  axis,  are  decumulative 
probabilities). 
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Figure 3 Convex transformation function and relative decision weights. 
 
RDU has been tested in experiments of choice under uncertainty, and empirical 
evidence
 (Tversky and Wakker 1995) suggests that actual weighting functions are 
inversely S-shaped, as is shown in Figure 4.  The inverse-S shaped weighting 
functions have a very nice interpretation in terms of sensitivity to probabilistic 
estimates:  if  the  weighting  function  is  approximately  linear  for  decumulative 
probabilities bounded away from the extreme values zero and one, then the slope 
of the linear portion of the graph represents an index of deviation from expected 
utility: it is one for EU-maximizers, and smaller than one for RDU-maximizers, as 
illustrated  in  the  diagram  by  the  dotted  line  with  slope  σ.    This  means  that 
observed  deviations  from  EU  could  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  sensitivity  to 
probabilistic information.  The smaller σ, the more an individual deviates from 
EU, and the less he pays attention to those probabilities that are bounded away 
from the certainty values zero and one.  Accordingly, he focuses more attention 
on the best and the worst outcomes.  
 38      1. Climate change scenarios and the precautionary principle
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Figure 4. Inverse-S shaped transformation function 
 
Implementing the precautionary principle 
Discussing  RDU  gave  us  two  insights.    First,  individuals  do  not  always 
maximize  expected  utility,  but  RDU  models  with  inversely  S-shaped 
transformation functions are sometimes more adapt at explaining their behaviour.  
This does not necessarily imply that also governments behave like that, but it 
raises two questions: whether they do behave in this way, and what impact this 
might  have  on  their  policies  about  climate  change.    Second,  a  hypothetical 
individual  who  maximizes  RDU  with  a  convex  transformation  function 
systematically attaches more weight to the worse outcomes, and less to the better 
outcomes, than an individual that maximizes EU.  This may sound appealing from 
a normative point of view, since this kind of model seems intuitively to reproduce 
what we call a prudent behaviour.  
It is interesting to see what would be the consequences on consumption levels 
if a government chose this way to implement the precautionary principle, and 
compare it to the two “more realistic” situations in which the government either 
maximizes EU, or RDU with an inversely S-shaped transformation function.  I 
will  refer  to  the  last  two  models  as  the  “benchmark  1”  and  “benchmark  2” Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    39
     
 
respectively,  and  I  will  refer  to  the  RDU  model  with  convex  transformation 
function as the “precautionary model”. 
Results 
Both benchmark 2 and the precautionary model are derived from maximization 
of (6), where only the assumptions about  ( ) P ϕ  change.  Both models are quite 
complex to deal with analytically.  Some results can be derived for given location 
densities (that is, when only expected damage varies across scenarios).  In this 
case it is possible to prove that a convex-weight-RDU-maximizer always chooses 
a  consumption  (emission)  level  lower  or  equal  to  the  level  chosen  by  a  EU-
maximizer.  Such a result is reported in section 3.1.  For more general situations, 
in which both the density for the location of the threshold and the expected impact 
of crossing the threshold vary across scenarios, I report the results of a number of 
numerical simulations in section 3.2.  The experiments show that even under these 
more general conditions a convex-weight-RDU-maximizer (precautionary model) 
only  rarely  chooses  higher  levels  of  consumptions  than  benchmark  1.    For 
inverse-S  shaped  weights  (benchmark  2)  no  general  results  can  be  derived; 
simulations show, however, that optimal consumption for this model is quite often 
higher than for benchmark model 1.  
Analytical results 
Some analytical results can be stated for the cases in which scenarios differ 
only in the expected impact of crossing the threshold.  In this case an individual 
that maximizes convex-weighted RDU, which is a “prudent” individual in my 
definition, will never choose a higher level of emissions when compared to a EU-
maximizer.    This  result  is  stated  in  Proposition  1,  which  is  preceded  by  two 
preliminary results in Lemmas 1 and 2. 
 
Lemma 1 For given  ( ) B π ,  ( ) ( ) c EU c EU s s ' ≥   [ ] 1 ; 0 ∈ ∀c  iff  ( ) ( ) ' ' , , s s s s u l u l θ θ ≤ . 
 Proof.  Suppose  ( ) ( ) ( ) B B B s s π π π = = ' ,  and  ( ) ( ) ' ' , , s s s s u l u l θ θ ≤ ,  then 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] c u l u l c c u c EU c EU s s s s s s ∀ ≥ − Π = −    0 , , ' ' ' θ θ . 40      1. Climate change scenarios and the precautionary principle
   
 
 
Lemma  2  For  given  ( ) B π ,  either  ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 ; 0    ∈ ∀ ≥ c c EU c RDU ,  or 
( ) ( ) [ ] 1 ; 0    ∈ ∀ ≤ c c EU c RDU ,  depending  on  the  probabilities  attached  to  the 
scenarios and on the transforming function.  In particular, for convex weights, 
( ) ( ) [ ] 1 ; 0    ∈ ∀ ≤ c c EU c RDU . 
 Proof. Lemma 1 ensures that the rank ordering of scenarios does not 
change over c.  Therefore an individual that maximizes RDU applies the 
same weights  s dw ,  S s ,..., 1 =  for every c.  Thus: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 ; 0 ' ,    , ' ' ∈ ≥ ⇔ ≥ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ c c c EU p c EU dw c EU p c EU dw s s s s s s s s s s s s  
which  proves  the  first  statement.  The  second  statement  follows 
straightforwardly, since for convex weighting functions more weight is 
assigned to those states of the world for which expected utility is lower. 
 
Proposition 1 For given  ( ) B π , and for convex weighting functions, an individual 
that maximizes RDU always chooses a level of consumption non-larger than an 
individual that maximizes EU. 
 Proof. It holds true that: 




c dEU s s ' ≥ ￿ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 , , ' ' ' ≥ − + Π s s s s u l u l c u c c u c θ θ π  
that is, by Lemma 1: 




c dEU s s ' ≥ ￿ ( ) ( ) c EU c EU s s ' ≥ . 
The function that lies below has a smaller first derivative.  Moreover, as 
already noticed, it has relatively larger decisions weights in RDU than in 
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The  first  derivative  of  RDU(c)  is  always  smaller  than  that  of  EU(c).  
Therefore: (i) if there is an interior global optimum both for EU(c) and 
for RDU(c), the latter must lie to the left of the former; (ii) if EU(c) has 
global  optimum  in  1 = c ,  then  RDU(c)  has  either  an  interior  global 
optimum, or an optimum in  0 = c , or in  1 = c ; (iii) if EU(c) has a global 
optimum in  0 = c , then RDU(c) also has a global optimum in  0 = c , 
since  by  lemma  2  it  always  lies  below,  and  for  0 = c  
( ) ( ) ( ) s c EU c EU c RDU s ∀ = =    . 
 
The intuition behind this result is that if the location of the threshold has the 
same  distribution  in  all  scenarios,  the  only  thing  that  matters  is  the  assessed 
impact of crossing the threshold.  Within scenarios it is always true that the higher 
this  impact,  the  lower  the  utility  and  its  first  derivative  for  every  level  of 
consumption.  Therefore, for convex weights, RDU(c) has everywhere a smaller 
derivative than EU(c), and it must reach the optimum at a lower or equal level of 
consumption. 
This reasoning does not apply when scenarios differ also in the density that 
describes the location of the threshold,  ( ) B s π .  In this case all sorts of situations 
can  arise,  and  in  some  cases  convex-weighted  RDU  leads  to  higher  emission 
levels  than  EU.    To  understand  the  intuition  behind  this,  consider  that  when 
consumption increases, so does the probability of crossing the threshold.  But this 
happens at a different rate for different densities.  In some ”bad” scenarios, the 
threshold  is  probably  already  crossed  at  low  levels  of  consumption:  a  further 
increase  does  not  lead  to  a  big  increase  in  the  probability  of  crossing  the 
threshold.  In such circumstances it is better to increase consumption, in order to 
compensate  for  the  environmental  loss  that  has  already  occurred:  the  worst 
outcome would arise from crossing the threshold and not exploiting consumption 
possibilities.  Depending on the other parameters of the problem, such an effect 42      1. Climate change scenarios and the precautionary principle
   
 
can prevail, leading a ”prudent” decision maker to choose even higher levels of 
consumption than a “traditional” decision maker. 
Simulation results 
In order to better understand how the model works and whether more general 
results can be found besides those stated in Proposition 1,  I have  run several 
simulations.  To do so, I had to give some specification to the model: 
-  probability  densities  for  the  location  of  the  threshold  ( ( ) B π ):  since  the 
support is finite, and since I want to control the skewedness and variability of the 
density in order to generate various kinds of hypothetical scenarios, I used beta 
densities (the assumption of unimodal distributions is maintained overall in what 
follows); the parameters A and B for the beta distributions have been pseudo-
randomly  generated  from  a  computer-based  log-normal  generator,  so  that  the 
interval [ ] ∞ ; 0  has been screened concentrating on more “plausible values” for the 
parameters; 
- probability densities for the impact of crossing the threshold ( ( ) α θ ): this 
density does not appear in the model but through the expected damage  ( ) θ , u l ; I 
therefore used pseudo-random uniformly distributed values on the interval [ ] 1 ; 0  to 
represent such expectations; 
- utility function: I use a utility function of the shape  ( ) ( )
a b c B c c u − + = .  In 
simulations I always assume that  1 = b ,  2
1 = a ; 
- probability of a scenario: for most simulations I assumed two scenarios; the 
probability of one scenario was driven from a pseudo-random number generator 
that simulates a uniform distribution over  [ ] 1 ; 0 ; the probability for the second 
scenario was of course derived by imposing  1 2 1 = + p p ; 
- RDU transformation functions: I used two types of weighting functions, one 
that was introduced in the decision-theory literature by Tversky and Kahneman 
(and that has the typically observed inverse-S shape),  ( ) [ ] , 1 ) (
1
γ γ γ γ ϕ P P P P − + =  
and a strictly convex one,  ( )
γ ϕ
1
P P = ; both functions are defined for  ( ] 1 ; 0 ∈ γ , in 
the simulations I tried ten values of γ (γ=0.1,0.2,…,1) for each combination of all 
other parameters. 
Figure  5(a)  shows  an  example  where  3 = S   and  2
1 = A ,  3
1 = B ,  5 . 0
1 = l , 
7
2 = A ,  6
2 = B ,  2 . 0
2 = l ,  10
3 = A ,  10
3 = B ,  3 . 0
3 = l .    In  Figure  5(b)  the Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    43
     
 
continuous line represents the expected utility function across scenarios, EU(c), 
and c
* is the optimal choice of consumption when  3 . 0 1 = p ,  5 . 0 2 = p ,  2 . 0 3 = p .  
The dashed line instead represents the RDU-expected utility function, RDU(c), 
and c
** is the optimal choice of consumption when  ( )
γ ϕ
1
P P = and  4 . 0 = γ . 









(a) Example of 3 scenarios 




























Figure 5. Example of three scenarios and relative cross-scenario RDU and EU functions.   
 
In this first case c
* > c
**.  Figure 6 shows a case in which the opposite occurs.
21  
This illustrates the result that no general relation between c
* and c
** can be easily 
found.    To  explore  this  topic  in  more  detail,  I  ran  a  number  of  simulations, 
limiting the analysis to the simple case of two scenarios.  In these simulations, 
pseudo-random and independent values of the parameters A, B, and l were drawn, 
and for each combination c
* and c
** were compared for  1 ,..., 2 . 0 , 1 . 0 = γ .  One 
hundred  combinations  were  analysed  in  this  way  for  Tversky-Kahneman 
weighting functions and another one hundred for convex weighting functions. 
                                                 
21 In this example S=2 and A¹=2 B¹=10 l¹=0.05, A²=3 B²=2 l²=0.4, p1=0.2, p2=0.8, and the 
weighting function is convex with γ=0.4. 44      1. Climate change scenarios and the precautionary principle
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Figure 6   
In the case of convex weighting functions c
** > c
* for 12% of randomly drawn 
parameter  combinations,  while  in  the  case  of  Tversky-Kahneman  weighting 
functions, this percentage is 31%, so that we can conclude that in general it is 
really difficult to predict the direction of deviations from expected utility optimal 
values if an individual maximizes RDU.  However, one can state that convex-
weight-RDU-maximizers only rarely choose higher levels of consumption than 
EU-maximizers, while this is more likely for inverse-S shaped weights. 
Conclusions 
The model in this paper aims at defining optimal choice of emission levels 
under special circumstances, such as thresholds in the utility function and lack of 
scientific knowledge about relevant aspects of the problem.  The approach of the 
paper has been to adopt a special decision criterion ex-ante in order to account for 
the fact that the precautionary principle applies in the circumstances mentioned. I 
have shown that for this model results are not unequivocal, since in some cases 
imposing “prudent” behaviour leads to higher levels of pollution.  The reason for Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    45
     
 
this result is that some model specifications make it very likely to cross threshold 
levels of pollution already for low consumption; in these cases, if the assessed 
impact  of  climate  change  is  not  too  high  it  is  possible  that  the  most  prudent 
decision  is  indeed  to  compensate  the  loss  of  environmental  utility  with  more 
consumption.  Though the high degree of unpredictability of the results of this 
model  is  common  to  other  models  that  analyse  the  same  problem,  the 
interpretation here is somewhat different, since it implies that a conservative use 
of resources is not necessarily optimal even applying the precautionary principle 
ex-ante.  However, it is also clear that for most parameters combinations, convex-
weighted  RDU  (prudence)  determines  a  lower  level  of  emissions  than  the 
benchmark EU model, and this is always the case when scenarios differ only in 
the assessed impact of crossing the threshold. 
Normatively, these results stress one feature of RDU: since more weight is 
given  to  the  worse  outcomes,  a  big  issue  becomes  how  the  worst  scenario  is 
designed.    Making  the  precautionary  principle  operational  translates  then  in  a 
problem of identifying the appropriate state space, as suggested also by Henry & 
Henry (2002).  Such a high sensitivity to the specification of the state space leaves 
a  large  degree  of  freedom  in  implementation,  and  it  might  be  regarded  as  a 
shortcoming of this theory.  However, it is interesting that this way of modeling 
actually forces the debate between economists and (climate) scientists deep into 
ontological aspects and away from modelling issues (such as the shape of the 
utility function).  What really matters here is the value of the physical parameter l 
(expected damage from crossing the threshold) and the distribution π (describing 
the location of the threshold).  Indeed, there exists a tension between scientists 
and economists about the problem of climate change.  Such a tension is obviously 
sharpened by some communication problems between two different disciplines, 
but is probably more deeply rooted in diverging perceptions of “how bad can bad 
be?”, with respect to the consequences of climate change.  If this model correctly 
reflects such  a tension,  this may turn the negative aspect of sensitivity into a 
positive aspect of identification of a relevant content that too often remains hidden 
behind sophisticated mathematics. 
Finally, simulations show that there is a relevant difference between convex-
weighted-RDU maximizers and inverse-S shaped RDU maximizers; the latter are 46      1. Climate change scenarios and the precautionary principle
   
 
namely “more likely” to choose higher levels of emissions than the former.  This 
observation  becomes  particularly  interesting  if  we  believe  that  actual  decision 
makers  are  inverse-S  shaped  RDU  maximizers,  as  appears  to  be  the  case  in 
experiments on individual choice under uncertainty.  On the other hand, nothing 
can ensure that policy makers behave in the face of uncertainty in the same way as 
single individuals do, and the circumstances of choice about climate change have 
never, to my knowledge, been reproduced in laboratory experiments.  This work 
therefore stresses the importance of testing such a hypothesis. 
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2. Resource depletion 
facing the risk of unknown 
thresholds: theoretical 
models of choice 
In this chapter we present a model of resource depletion with thresholds. As 
already done in chapter 1, we assume that when harvesting pushes the stock of a 
renewable resource underneath a critical level, the resource looses its regenerative 
properties  and  is  not  able  to  renew  itself  anymore.    If  this  critical  level  is 
unknown, an agent engaged in the harvesting of the resource faces a problem of 
choice under risk
22.  In real life similar situations can be faced when managing a 
renewable resource like a fishery, or the atmospheric and climatic equilibrium.    
We are interested in the decision-making problem faced by the agent when the 
only limits to harvesting are given by the initial stock of the resource and the 
uncertainty about the critical level.  For reasons of tractability the model is kept 
very simple in its building blocks: we have linear payoff functions and uniform 
probability distributions, and we completely disregard the value of leisure and the 
costs of harvesting.  This is functional to our purpose of focussing on the effects 
of  perceived  risk  on  harvesting.    As  discussed  already  in  chapter  1,  different 
theories can be used to predict and explain behavior under risk and uncertainty.  
In this chapter we present a model similar to the model in chapter 1, but much 
                                                 
22 Discussions of renewable resource management under uncertainty and with thresholds can 
be found in Van Kooten and Bulte (2000), although they do not discuss the case where both 
characteristics occur. Aalbers (1999) discusses uncertainty regarding the location and impact of the 
threshold in the context of climate change. 
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more simple, and use it to analyze and compare three major theories of decision 
under risk: expected value maximization, risk-aversion, and rank-dependency
23.  
The  comparison  of  the  theories  should  help  us  draw  conclusions  on  the 
qualitative  and  quantitative  differences  among  these  theories,  concerning  the 
predicted levels of optimal harvesting.  If we interpret harvesting broadly as “use” 
of  a  resource,  we  can  see  how  these  conclusions  can  be  of  interest  in  the 
framework of climate change, where we can see the atmosphere as a pollution 
sink of given, renewable, capacity, and pollution as the use of such capacity. 
Compared  to  the  analysis  in  chapter  1,  this  chapter  offers  a  more  limited 
analysis, focussing only on the risk represented by the unknown location of the 
threshold, while we assume that the impact of crossing the threshold is known.  
The advantage of this focus is that we can derive more results analytically, and 
also  that  we  can  use  the  models  in  this  section  as  a  theoretical  basis  for  an 
experimental analysis, which will be the subject of chapter 3. 
 For each theory we derive the consequences on harvesting decisions when the 
parameters  of  the  probability  distribution  for  the  critical  stock  level  vary:  in 
particular  we  look  at  how  optimal  harvesting  varies  across  theories  when  the 
range and the mean of the distribution change.   
The decision problem 
One  agent  chooses  the  amount  d  of  harvesting  from  a  renewable  resource, 
having the initial stock  0 R .  The growth function of the resource is such that if the 
agent extracts a lot and depletes the resource, reducing it to a level lower than a 
threshold  R
CRIT,  the  system  collapses  and  nothing  will  be  left  for  future 
generations.   
Assume  that  R
CRIT  is  unknown,  and  all  what  the  agent  knows  is  that  the 
threshold can vary over a compact range, A =[ ] R R; , with some probability density 
function, f(R).  Let g(d) be the payoff function derived from direct consumption, 
and  ( ) d π ˆ  the utility function derived from leaving  d R − 0  of the resource for use 
to future generations. Harvesting is sustainable if d is such that the remaining 
                                                 
23  For  an  overview  of  these  theories  with  special  attention  to  rank-dependent  utility  see 
Diecidue and Wakker (2001). Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    49
     
 
stock  exceeds  the  critical  level  necessary  for  the  resource  to  “survive”: 
CRIT R d R ≥ −
0 .  If  harvesting  is  sustainable  in  period  one  we  assume  that 
( ) 0 ˆ > d π , otherwise  ( ) 0 ˆ = d π .  Thus the total payoff for the agent at time one is 
given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
  
otherwise                




 − ≤ +
=
d g




Therefore the expected payoff for the agent when he/she chooses a level d of 
consumption in period one is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) d R F d d g d E − + =
0 ˆ )) ( ( π π  
where F(R) is the cumulative density for the threshold.  If the agent is risk 
neutral he/she maximizes this expression.   
If instead the agent is risk averse and has utility function  () ⋅ u , with  0 '> u  and 
0 ' ' < u , then he/she maximizes expected utility: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] d R F d g u d R F d d g u d EU − − + − + =
0 0 1 ˆ ) ( π . 
Currently EV and EU are the most common ways of modelling preferences 
under uncertainty in the environmental economics literature
24.  However, decision 
theorists  have  shown  that  in  many  experimental  situations  individuals  behave 
inconsistently  with  these  theories  (see  the  discussion  in  chapter  1  for  more 
details).   
Among the alternative models that are used in the literature for descriptive 
purposes, rank-dependent utility is one of the most successful
25: if we assume for 
simplicity that utility is linear ( ( ) x x u = ), and that all payoffs are non-negative, 
then  the  rank-dependent  utility  model  predicts  that  an  agent  maximizes  the 
following expression
26: 
                                                 
24 See for instance an application in Armantier and Treich (2004). 
25 See Starmer (2000) for a review. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) d R F w d d g d RDU o − ⋅ + = π ˆ  
where  w(.)  is  a  probability  transformation  function,  defined  on  the  interval 
[0;1], where it is assumed to be monotonically increasing, and such that  ( ) 0 0 = w  
and  ( ) 1 1 = w .  The transformation function is usually assumed to be inverse-S 
shaped,  however  for  our  purposes  it  is  more  interesting  to  consider  convex 
transformation functions.  An agent maximizing RDU with convex transformation 
functions  attaches  more  weight  to  worse  outcomes,  compared  to  an  agent 
maximizing  expected  payoffs,  and  therefore  modelling  choices  in  this  way 
induces a kind of behaviour that can be interpreted as “prudent” (see also the 
discussion and the description of the theory in chapter 1).  We think this particular 
feature of the model might play a role in a setting with thresholds: in most cases 
crossing the threshold would be the worst possible outcome, and agents might 
well experience some fear and explicitly try to avoid it. 
In  the  following  sections  we  derive  analytically  the  first-order  and  second-
order conditions for the special case when the payoffs are linearly increasing in 
the use of the resource d, and the probability density of the threshold value for the 
resource stock R
CRIT is uniform over a  given range. To be more specific it is 
assumed that both the “present” payoff, g(d), and the “future” payoff,  ( ) d π ˆ , are 
linear, i.e.  ( ) kd d g =  and  ( ) d d α π = ˆ , where k and α are given coefficients for the 
first and the second period respectively.  This is done for different models: (1) 
assuming that agents maximize expected value (i.e. are risk neutral), (2) assuming 
that agents maximize expected utility (i.e. are risk averse) and (3) assuming that 
agents maximize rank dependent utility with convex weights.  
Risk neutral agents 
When we assume that the agents maximize the expected value it is possible to 
derive the optimum harvesting amount explicitly. Expected payoff is given by: 
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R R d kd
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− ≤ ≤ − R R
R d R
d kd
R R d R R
) (




which can easily be shown to give: 








Such  interior  optimum  is  indeed  a  global  optimum  if  the  following  two 
conditions hold: 














0 α  
That is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) R R kR R R R R k − ≥ − + − 0
2
0 4α α  








+ ≤ − +
R R
R d R
d kd R R k
*
0 * *
0 α α  
That is: 






≥ − + + − − + + − R R k R R R R k k R R α α α α  
We can rewrite the internal optimum in terms of the mean and range of the 





= ,  R R r − = : 
( ) M R r
k
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This  means  that  as  the  range  of  the  distribution  increases,  implying  more 
uncertainty, harvesting increases. When the mean of the distribution increases, 
meaning that on expectation more of the stock is needed to keep the resource 
productive, harvesting decreases. 
Risk-adverse agents 
Next we look at the case when risk averse agents maximize expected utility, 
which is given by:  
( ) [ ]
( )


























− < ≤ +
=
R R d kd



















Assuming a (constant relative risk aversion) utility function of type  ( )
a x x u = , 
with  1 0 < < a , if there is an interior optimum it can be found solving:  



























R R d R R
0 0     max
0 0
α  
Which gives the optimal extraction level: 














α 0 0 *
1
 
Such an interior optimum is a global optimum if the following two conditions 
hold: 
1.  Condition CRRA1: 
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2.  Condition CRRA2: 


















0 α α  
In this case, the optimum can be expressed in terms of the mean and range of 
the distribution of 























2 2 1 α
α
 











































This means that qualitatively the predictions of this model are the same as the 
EV predictions: when uncertainty increases, harvesting increases, and when the 
expected 
CRIT R  increases, harvesting decreases, thus leaving more of the resource 
stock intact. 
Note that this also holds for other models like CARA etc.  
Rank-dependent utility  
As a third model we assume that an agent chooses harvesting as to maximize 
rank-dependent utility, which is defined as follows
27: 
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Because we want to use a convex weighting function, we will assume that 
( ) 1 0   ,
1
< < = γ
γ x x w .  Thus the first-order condition becomes: 
0



































or, in terms of mean and range: 
0
2
2 ) ( 2 1
2




























r M d R
k  
It is not possible in this case to derive the optimal extraction level explicitly.  
However  we  can  show  that  this  model  has  the  same  qualitative  implications 
compared  to  EV  and  CRRA:  the  internal  optimum  is  increasing  in  r  and 
decreasing in M.  We prove this result in the following sections. Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    55
     
 
Optimal harvesting under RDU when the range of possible R
CRIT varies 
To see how the optimum varies when the range increases, one can study the 
sign of the derivative of the first-order condition with respect to d and with respect 








2 ) ( 2 1
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r M d R
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  are  positive  or  both  are  negative,  then  the  implicit  function  theorem 

























1) Derivative with respect to d 










2 ) ( 2
1
2
































 is smaller than zero if and only if
28: 






This  condition  is  also  the  second-order  condition  that  we  need  to  impose 
because we are only searching for a maximum.  Thus we know that no internal 





.    We  also  know  that  the 
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internal optimum has to be searched in the interval  [ ] R R R R J − − ≡ 0 0 ; .  If we 
express it in terms of mean and range of the distribution of 
CRIT R , the interval 
becomes   

 






0 0 .  If there is an internal optimum, it 
therefore  has  to  be  found  in  the  intersection  between  J  and 













.  This is stated more precisely in Lemma 1 below. 
 






















0 r M R  and if there exists an internal optimum 
*
RDUCW d , then it 
holds true:  

















Proof:  see Appendix B.  
 





 is always negative in the range of 













2) First derivative with respect to r 
We can show





 is positive for:  
[ ] 2 1;d d d ∈
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with: 
( )( ) ( ) ( )








+ − + − − + + − = γ
γ γ γ γ r M R r M R r M R d
( )( ) ( ) ( )








+ − + − + + + − = γ
γ γ γ γ r M R r M R r M R d  
and negative elsewhere.  
Furthermore, we can prove that any internal optimum is such that  1
* d dRDUCW > . 







2 ) ( 2 1
2




























0 d  the solution to  0 0 = L . This can easily be derived analytically: 








and it can be proven
30 to always be larger than  1 d . 
It  also  is  a  straightforward  consideration  to  notice  that  the  second-order 






, since the parameter k does not play a role here. This 
means that  0 L  varies in the opposite direction asd . If we now set  0
~
> = k k , we 
can deduce that  0
~
0 > + L k . To satisfy the first-order condition we thus have to 
reduce  0 L , that is, increase d . Thus we can conclude that: 
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Lemma 2 For all admissible parameter values, if there is an internal optimum 
*
RDUCW d , it holds true that  1
*
0
* d d dRDUCW > > . 
 
Imposing  the  second  order  condition,  we  notice
31  finally  that 
( ) [ ] r M R d + −
+
> 0 2 2
1 γ
γ





 is always positive between  1 d  and  2 d , 
lemma 1 and lemma 2 together imply: 
 
Proposition 1 If the problem admits an internal optimum, 
*
RDUCW d , it holds true 
that: 





















dRDUCW     
 
Thus when the range of possible values for the unknown threshold varies, we 
have the same result for RDUCW as it holds for EV and EU. This means that 
when uncertainty increases, then the optimal harvesting also increases.  This result 
does not take corner solutions into account. We will discuss corner solutions later 
on. 
Optimal harvesting under RDU when the mean of R
CRIT varies 






 and then use some of the results in the previous section in order to 







The first derivative of L with respect to M is: 
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This derivative is non-negative if and only if
32  
( ) ( ) 0 1
2










r M d R
 






 + − ≥ r M R d
2
1
0 γ  
In order to have an internal optimum, we need to impose that  0 = L  and we 
need to check that this local maximum is a global one, that is, it has to be larger in 
value than the corner solutions. This implies that the following two conditions 
need to be met simultaneously: 














































r M d R
d kd kR
r




r M d R
k
 
Substituting the RHS of the first expression for k  in the second expression, we 
obtain: 
( ) ( ) 0 2 2 1 2 2 0 0 0
2 ≥ + − + + − r M R R d R d γ γ  
It is straightforward to see that: 




0 ≥ − + − = + − − + = ∆ r M R R r M R R R γ γ γ γ  
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M ≥ , and because 
2
r
M R − =  is the lower limit of the distribution of 
CRIT R  then it has to be non-negative, implying that  0 ≥ ∆ . 
Thus we can find two values,  6 5 d d ≤  such that an internal optimum exists 
only if  5 d d ≤  or  6 d d ≥ : 
( ) ( ) ( )
2






r M R R R
d d









 and we 
can  prove
33  that  ( ) ( ) r M R d + −
+
≥ 0 6 2
1 γ
γ
,  and  thus  there  exists  no  internal 
global optimum such that  6
* d d ≥ . 
Besides,  we  can  show









M R d γ ,  and  thus  for  all  global 
optima such that  5





. This implies that if there is 







. Thus we can state the 
following: 
 
Proposition 2 For all admissible parameters, it holds true that, if there exists an 
internal optimum 
*
RDUCW d , then: 
1.  5
*










                                                 
33 See Appendix C 
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Combining propositions 1 and 2, and noticing that  ( ) [ ] r M R d + −
+





Proposition 3 For all admissible parameters, it holds true that, if there exists an 
internal optimum 
*
RDUCW d , then: 
1.  5
*
















Proposition 3 states that the same results hold for RDUCW as for EV and EU: 
if the spread of the distribution of 
CRIT R , r, becomes larger, then for all these 
theories the optimal harvesting increases; if the average of the distribution, M, 
becomes higher, then the optimal harvesting decreases.  
In the next section we show some examples to illustrate the behavior of the 
internal optimum when the parameters r and M vary, and compare the outcomes 
across the different theories. We also look at some examples where we get corner 
solutions. 
Comparison of the theories 












Observations derived by 400 numerical examples typically suggest that: 
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  for low γ or high α 
The way the optimum varies in r is more difficult to predict and in general it is 
not possible to say which theory predicts sharper reactions, and examples can be 
found  for  all  possible  situations.  We  will  show  hereafter  a  few  examples  to 
illustrate this observation.  In designing the examples we use parameters close to 
the ones used in the experiment described in chapter 3. 
Example 1 
We set here: 














 + = M R r
k







































9 . 0 88 . 6
7 . 0 64 . 6
5 . 0 43 . 6
3 . 0 26 . 6





















9 . 0 72 . 6
7 . 0 05 . 6
5 . 0 17 . 5
3 . 0 12
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This example illustrates a feature that we have observed in simulations, that is, 
it is relatively easy to get corner solutions when computing the optimal harvesting 
according  to  RDUCW,  compared  to  the  other  theories:  88%  of  the  parameter 
combinations  used  in  the  simulations  lead  to  corner  solutions  for  RDUCW, 
compared to 62.5% for CRRA and 78% for EV.  This means that giving more 
importance to worse outcomes leads more easily to the decision of crossing the 
threshold  for  sure  or  stay  safe  for  sure.    One  could  say  that  RDUCW  theory 
triggers more extreme decisions.  In this particular case the upper corner solution 
prevails, because the spread of the distribution here is so large that crossing the 
threshold is an event that cannot be avoided for sure.   
Figure 7 to Figure 9 illustrate the utility functions according to expected value, 
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a=0,1 a=0,3 a=0,5 a=0,7 a=0,9  
Figure 8 



















gamma=0,1 gamma=0,3 gamma=0,5 gamma=0,7 gamma=0,9  
Figure 9 Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    65




In this example we use the same parameters, but we reduce the range of the 
possible unknown values for 
CRIT R . We set: 
12 0 = R   6 = M   6 = r   6 = α   1 = k  













 + = M R r
k







































9 . 0 86 . 4
7 . 0 56 . 4
5 . 0 22 . 4
3 . 0 82 . 3





















9 . 0 76 . 4
7 . 0 16 . 4
5 . 0 35 . 3
3 . 0 3














From our simulations we see that, just like in this example, CRRA often reacts 
more sharply to a variation in the range r of the probability distribution, compared 
to the other two theories: for small variations of r this happens in the 84% ca. of 
the simulated examples where all theories present an internal optimum.   
Also  notice  that  in  this  case,  RDUCW  is  the  only  one  to  predict  corner 
solutions, even though in this case the preferences are attracted more towards the 
lower corner rather than the upper corner as observed in example 1.  What has 
happened?  Reducing the range of the distribution means that there is less doubts 
where the actual 
CRIT R  may be located.  As a result, all the utility functions are 66      2. Resource depletion facing the risk of unknown thresholds: theoretical models of choice
   
 
now more skewed to the left.  The RDUCW function, especially for very low 
values of γ, especially evaluates the advantage of securing a safe outcome, and 
picks  the  lower  corner  solution.  This  option  was  not  available  in  example  1.  
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a=0,1 a=0,3 a=0,5 a=0,7 a=0,9  
Figure 11 





















gamma=0,1 gamma=0,3 gamma=0,5 gamma=0,7 gamma=0,9  
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Example 3 
We now look at what happens if we increase the mean of the distribution. We 
set: 
12 0 = R   7 = M   6 = r   7 = α   5 = k  
Figures 7 to 9 show that all functions are now skewed even more to the left, 
and thus the optimal choices are also lower in most cases.  As the optimal values 
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a=0,1 a=0,3 a=0,5 a=0,7 a=0,9  
Figure 14 




















gamma=0,1 gamma=0,3 gamma=0,5 gamma=0,7 gamma=0,9  
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Example 4 
We now give an example where all theories express an optimum at the upper 
corner solution.  We set: 
12 0 = R   6 = M   6 = r   7 = α   5 = k  
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a=0,1 a=0,3 a=0,5 a=0,7 a=0,9  
Figure 17 
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Conclusions 
We have used three different theoretical frameworks to describe the behavior 
of  an  agent  that  wants  to  manage  a  renewable  resource  and  faces  the  risk  of 
crossing an unknown threshold.  If harvesting is such that the remaining stock of 
the resource is below a critical level, the resource will not be productive in the 
future.  Our models analyze the choice of the agent when we assume that the 
agent is risk-neutral, risk-adverse, or when we assume that the agent wishes to 
avoid bad outcomes.  In all these situations, if the optimal harvesting is not a 
corner solution, the models predict the same qualitative behavior when the range 
and the mean of the distribution of the unknown parameter change: if the range of 
the distribution increases, meaning more uncertainty, then it is optimal to harvest 
more; if the mean of the distribution increase, meaning that it is easier to cross the 
threshold, then it is optimal to harvest less.  However, often the theories predict 
corner  solutions,  in  which  case  usually  no  reaction  is  expected  when  a  slight 
change in the range and mean of the distribution occurs, and very sharp reactions 
are  observed  when  the  range  or  the  mean  of  the  distribution  change  more 
substantially.  For agent maximizing a utility function of the CRRA or RDUCW 
type, these results also depend on the parameter of the utility function, α and γ 
respectively.  Usually lower values of the parameters induce stronger variations in 
harvesting: this is not surprising, as these parameters are inversely related to the 
sensitivity of the agent to risk and to bad outcomes. 
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Appendix A1: The rank-dependent utility function 
When  d d
~
= , we have a state-space made of two events:  
CRIT R d R E ≥ −
~
: 0 1   
and  
CRIT R d R E < −
~
: 0 2  
If  event  1 E   occurs,  then  the  payoff  is  given  by  ( ) ( ) d d g
~ ˆ ~
π + .  If  event  2 E  
occurs, then the payoff is given by  ( ) d g
~
, with  () () 0 ˆ , 0 ≥ ⋅ ≥ ⋅ π g . One and only one 
of the two events occurs.  
The probability that  1 E  occurs is: 
  { } ( ) d R F d R R p
CRIT ~ ~
Pr 0 0 1 − = − ≤ =  
and the probability that  2 E  occurs is: 
( ) d R F p
~
1 0 2 − − =  
1 E  is the best outcome, so its decision weight is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) d R F w p w dw
~
0 1 1 − = =  
and consequently the decision weight for  2 E  is: 
( ) ( ) d R F w dw
~
1 0 2 − − =  
Meaning that the RDU value for d
~
 is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] d R F w d g d R F w d d g d RDU o o
~
1
~ ~ ~ ˆ ~ ~
− − ⋅ + − ⋅ + = π  74      2. Resource depletion facing the risk of unknown thresholds: theoretical models of choice
   
 
It takes straightforward calculations to see that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) d R F w d d g d RDU o
~ ~ ˆ ~ ~
− ⋅ + = π  
Thus the RDU function has the form: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) d R F w d d g d RDU o − ⋅ + = π ˆ  
 
Appendix A2: Derivation of the signs of the 
derivatives with respect to d, r, and M 
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This is larger than or equal to zero iff: 
( ) 0
1
2 ) ( 2 0 ≥
−
+ + − − −
γ
γ
d r M d R
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or: 






2) Derivation of the derivative with respect to r and its sign 
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which is equivalent to (multiplying by  0 2
3 2 > r γ ): 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1 2
2 2 2 2
0
0 0 0
≥ − − − −
+ − − + − − + − −
d R M d
r M d R d d R M r M d R
γ α
αγ αγ
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Thus  the  first  derivative  of  the  equilibrium  condition  with  respect  to  r  is 
positive if and only if: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 2 ) 1 2 )( ( 2 1 2 0 0 0
2 ≥ + − − − + + − + + − r M R M R r M R d d γ γ γ γ  
This, in turn is equivalent to: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 2 ) 1 2 )( ( 2 1 2 0 0 0
2 ≤ + − − + + + − − + r M R M R r M R d d γ γ γ γ  
Define:  [ ] ( ) r M R M R r M R + − − + − + + − = ∆ ) ( 2 ) )( 1 ( 8 ) 1 2 )( ( 4 0 0
2
0 γ γ γ γ .  
Then it holds true that  0 ≥ ∆  for all admissible parameter combinations: 
Proof: 
[ ]
[ ] 0 ) ( ) ( 2 ) 1 ( 8





2 2 2 2
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M R r r M R
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3) Derivation of the derivative with respect to M 
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Appendix B: Proof of lemma 1 
Proof of lemma 1  
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  for all admissible parameter values: 
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This is always true as  1 0 < < γ . 
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( ) ( ) ( ) 0
2 2
0 1 2 2 1 R r M R + ≤ − + − γ γ γ  
( ) 0 2 2 4 0 ≤ − + − r M R γ γ  
( ) [ ] 0 2 2 0 ≤ + − − r M R γ , which is true by assumption. 
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3. Can fear of extinction 
foster extinction? 
Regenerating assets sometimes have the feature that an unknown critical level 
must be preserved in order to avoid extinction.  In case of livestock, for example, 
it is well known that a critical minimum stock size (or minimum gene pool) is 
necessary  to  allow  a  sustainable  rate  of  reproduction.  Similar  scenarios  with 
different critical thresholds are possible.  It may be the case, for example, that the 
equilibrium of an ecosystem is irrevocably disturbed, if some  critical level of 
pollution  is  surpassed.    In  most  of  these  settings,  however,  neither  exact 
theoretical  values  nor  exact  empirical  measurements  of  the  critical  threshold 
variables  are  available.    Hence,  such  resources  can  be  modelled  as  having  a 
stochastic extinction threshold, i.e. there is a positive probability of extinction that 
increases in the level of extraction.
36  
The  management  of  a  renewable  resource  with  a  stochastic  extinction 
threshold, obviously, involves making risky choices, because any choice of the 
current consumption level corresponds to some level of extinction risk. In the 
classical Expected Utility (EU) choice model as well as in most Non-Expected 
Utility (Non-EU) models, the manager of such a resource weighs off the benefit of 
a higher consumption today against the benefit of risky future consumption of the 
resource. Thus, the optimal choices of resource managers will obviously depend 
on their attitude towards risk.  
From  an  environmental  economics  point  of  view,  the  somewhat  surprising 
outcome of the optimization in most choice models is that resource managers, 
who prefer to avoid risk, tend to choose much higher extraction levels than those, 
who  are  risk  seeking  (Bargiacchi  2003;  see  also  chapter  2  of  the  present 
                                                 
36 The details of the models may differ. For example, ex-ante there may be a lower threshold, 
below which the probability of extinction is known to be zero, and an upper threshold, above 
which the probability of extinction is known to be one. This corresponds to knowing the lower and 
upper bounds of the distribution of the (ex-post) stochastic extinction threshold. 84      3. Can fear of extinction foster extinction?
   
 
dissertation).  The  surprising  element  here  is  that  more  “fearful”
37  resource 
managers  take  on  a  much  greater  risk  of  resource  extinction  than  “fearless” 
managers. The reason for this counterintuitive behavior is simply that extremely 
high levels of resource extraction actually entail less payoff risk, because today’s 
instantaneous and risk-free consumption is increased in exchange for uncertain 
future resource consumption. In other words, maximizing current consumption 
may in fact reduce total risk, because it pays more immediately and at the same 
time reduces uncertainty about future payoffs by making resource extinction a 
sure  thing.  Hence,  theory  suggests  that  sustainable  usage  of  resources  with 
stochastic  extinction  thresholds  is  more  likely  to  be  achieved  with  a  fearless 
resource manager than with a fearful one. 
The  rapid-consumption  behavior  (i.e.  “eat  it  up  quickly,  before  it’s  gone” 
behavior) by fearful managers is a theoretical result, with different choice models 
predicting widely varying degrees of the effect.
38 Since the literature on risky 
choice is still far from having identified a single most appropriate model for all 
decision  situations  (Starmer  2000),  assessing  the  actual  behavior  of  resource 
managers  when  faced  with  a  stochastic  extinction  threshold  remains  an 
empirically relevant, but scientifically open question.  
In this chapter, we present an experimental study that is designed to provide an 
empirical  assessment  of  the  rapid-consumption  behavior  in  the  presence  of  a 
                                                 
37 Note that we are avoiding the term “risk-averse”, because there is no general consensus yet 
on  how  risk-aversion  is  to  be  defined  in  the  domain  of  Non-EU  models,  even  though  the 
discussion by Schmidt and Zank (2002) has made important progress on the issue.  Following a 
similar definition as Schmidt and Zank (2002), chapter 2 of this dissertation examines the behavior 
of resource managers in our setting, when it is assumed that they like to avoid outcome dispersion 
as measured by a mean-preserving spread. 
38 Note that non-ecological assets with stochastic extinction thresholds may also lead to a rapid 
consumption behavior of managers.  If, for example, a risk-averse manager recognizes that the 
survival of his firm depends on an unknown (i.e. stochastic) minimum level of financial resources, 
he may prefer a rapid extraction of the firms resources to a prudent behavior that may nevertheless 
end with the firm’s total collapse. The financial extractions initiated by ENRON managers in the 
pre-collapse phase were perhaps due to such a rapid extraction behavior. Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    85
     
 
stochastic extinction threshold. We run an experiment on a simple one-player, 
two-period  resource  extraction  game,  the  same  game  that  has  been  analyzed 
theoretically in chapter 2. First, the resource manager chooses an initial extraction 
from the resource. If the amount of resource left after the initial extraction is less 
than a randomly drawn and ex-ante unknown extinction threshold, the game ends. 
Otherwise,  the  resource  manager  chooses  the  extraction  level  for  the  second 
period, after which the game ends. Since the random distribution of the extinction 
threshold  variable  is  ex-ante  known  to  the  resource  manager,  but  not  its 
realization, the manager faces a risky choice.   
The purpose of the experiment is to test agents’ behaviour when uncertainty 
and thresholds are present.  This chapter relates thus to the previous two chapters 
in that it looks for evidence in support or against the theories presented until now.  
We find that a substantial subset of the observed decisions contradict standard 
expected utility theory (EUT) no matter which level of risk-aversion we assume. 
Hence,  we  compare  our  results  also  with  two  versions  of  the  rank-dependent 
utility  (RDU)  model,  which  is  the  most  widely  accepted  non-expected  utility 
model (Camerer 1995, Starmer 2000, Decidue and Walker 2001). One version 
(RDUTK) is based on the parameterization suggested by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992)  and  entails  an  inverse  S-shaped  probability  weighting  function,  which 
implies  that  the  probability  of  “undesired”  outcomes  and  that  of  very  good 
outcome are given more weight than in a linear weighting. Since the assumption 
that the risk of the very good events is “over-weighted” by resource managers 
seems rather unintuitive in our context, we also compare our results with a version 
of  the  RDU-model  in  which  the  probability  weighting  function  is  convex  in 
outcomes  (RDUCW).  This  parameterization  of  the  RDU  model  is  based  on 
Bargiacchi  (2003)  and  leads  to  an  “over-weighting”  of  only  the  undesired 
outcomes  in  comparison  to  linear  weights.  Hence,  resource  managers,  whose 
behavior is of the RDUCW-type, will tend to be more “prudent” concerning any 
catastrophic  outcome,  obviously  including  the  worst-case  scenario  of  resource 
extinction.  
From the four decision models that we consider – risk-neutral expected utility 
(EV),  constant  relative  risk-aversion  expected  utility  (CRRA),  rank-dependent 
utility  with  a  Tversky  and  Kahneman  (1992)  probability  weighting  function 86      3. Can fear of extinction foster extinction?
   
 
(RDUTK),  and  rank-dependent  utility  with  a  convex  probability  weighting 
function (RDUCW) – only the first is parameter-free. All other three have a single 
parameter that must be estimated empirically. While out-of-sample estimates of 
the parameters are available and occasionally used in the literature, assuming a 
single  value  for  all  decision-makers  (or  all  experimental  subjects)  would  be 
ignoring the fact that these parameters describe individual risk-attitudes that may 
be distributed over a wide range due to individual differences. On the other hand, 
when the parameters’ value ranges are taken into consideration, a comparison of 
competing models becomes more involved, because the sets of outcomes that are 
predicted by different models may diverge greatly in size.  
We deal with these issues by comparing our observations to the theoretical 
models in two ways. First, we compare the experimental outcomes to the point-
predictions of each model for parameter values that cover the feasible range.
39 
Using this method, we not only find that our in-sample-estimates of the model 
parameters come astonishing close to the values reported in the literature
40. We 
also  find  that  when  applying  the  best-fit  parameters,  the  two  rank-dependent 
models do much better in explaining the data than the two expected utility models. 
This result is inline with numerous other studies on risky choice behavior.
41   
The second method we use to assess the explanatory power of the alternative 
models is to compare the predictive success of the models using Selten’s (1991) 
measure of predictive success. This measure compares each model’s “prediction 
area” (i.e. the entire set of outcomes that is predicted over the admissible range of 
parameters) to its “hit rate” (i.e. the number of observations within the prediction 
area). The rank-dependent utility model with convex weights (RDUCW) turns out 
to be the model with the highest measure of predictive success, i.e. the model 
                                                 
39 Obviously, EV always makes a unique point prediction, because it is parameter-free. CRRA 
entails a parameter of risk-aversion that is generally restricted to lie between 0 and 1. RDUTK and 
RDUCW each require a parameter that controls the shape (curvature) of the probability weighting 
function. Both of these parameters are also assumed to be in the range from 0 to 1.  
40 See for instance Donkers, Melenberg, and Van Soest (2001). 
41 E.g. Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992); Tversky and Kahneman (1992); Abdelaoui (1998); 
Gonzalez and Wu  (1999).  For an overview see Starmer (2000). Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    87
     
 
exhibiting the best relationship between the range of feasible outcomes and the 
rate of model-compliant observations. This result is in contrast to findings from 
earlier studies (see footnote 5) that generally found stronger evidence for inverse 
S-shaped than for convex probability weighting.  
There  is  an  important  difference,  however,  between  the  decisions  typically 
examined  and  those  in  our  experimental  setup.  While  standard  lottery  choice 
problems  are  examined  in  all  the  other  cited  studies,  we  model  a  resource 
extraction situation with a stochastic extinction threshold. This type of task seems 
to  invoke  a  much  more  prudent  behavior  of  subjects  than  the  standard  tasks, 
which would explain why the behavior  we observe is better explained by the 
prudent (or “pessimistic” as Starmer (2000) puts it) version of the rank-dependent 
decision model with a convex probability weighting function.  
Note that subjects in other experiments involving an extinction risk have also 
been  reported  to  exhibit  an  “overly”  prudent  behavior.  Hey,  Neugebauer,  and 
Sadrieh  (2005),  for  example,  observe  substantially  higher  levels  of  “under-
extraction”  (harvesting  less  than  the  optimal  amount)  in  the  treatments  with 
incomplete information on the resource extinction threshold than in the treatments 
with perfect information.
42 Although the experimental setup was very different 
from ours and did not allow a clear comparison with the theoretical decision-
making models, the result does support the general notion that resource managers 
facing  the  danger  of  resource  extinction  maybe  much  more  cautious  in  their 
extraction behavior than subjects performing simple lottery-choice tasks. This in 
turn suggests that the calibrations of choice models that are based on the classical 
                                                 
42 It is well-known that the management of renewable resources, in general, is not optimally 
preformed by human subjects (Sterman 1989; Moxnes 1998). Most of the experimental studies in 
the area, however, are concerned with extremely complicated decision situations that do not allow 
clear comparisons of the observed behavior with theoretical decision-making models of the type 
that we consider here. One difficulty arises from the fact that subjects make wrong judgments on 
the  dynamics  of  growth,  usually  underestimating  the  exponential  dynamics.  Hence,  when 
stochastic and dynamic elements enter the decision situation – as is the case in many of the studies 
so far – then it is difficult to distinguish the behavioral effects separately. We focus on the risky 
choice aspect, by using a design that totally avoids the confounding effect of growth dynamics. 88      3. Can fear of extinction foster extinction?
   
 
lottery-choice  tasks  may  actually  be  inadequate  for  explaining  behavior  of 
subjects  who  face  more  complicated  risky  choices  that  involve  extreme  low-
probability negative outcomes such as total loss in the case of resource extinction. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Our experiment is based on a theoretical model
43 where one agent chooses the 
amount d of harvesting from a renewable resource, having the initial stock  0 R .  
The renewal capacity of the resource is such that if the agent extracts a lot and 
depletes  the  resource,  reducing  it  to  a  level  lower  than  a  threshold  R
CRIT,  the 
system collapses and nothing will be left for future generations.  R
CRIT is assumed 
unknown, and it can fall in a compact range of values,  [ ] R R A ; = , with uniform 






= .  Function  ( ) kd d g =  is the payoff derived from direct 
consumption, and  ( ) d d α π = ˆ  is the payoff derived from leaving  d R − 0  of the 
resource for use to future generations.  Harvesting is sustainable if d is such that 
the  remaining  stock  exceeds  the  critical  level  necessary  for  the  resource  to 
“survive”: 
CRIT R d R ≥ −
0 .  If harvesting is sustainable in period one we assume 
that  ( ) 0 ˆ > d π , otherwise  ( ) 0 ˆ = d π , so that the total payoff is given by: 
( ) ( )
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Therefore the expected payoff for the agent when he/she chooses a level d of 
consumption in period one is: 
                                                 
43 See Chapter 2 for a full description of the model and of its theoretical implications. Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    89
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If the agent is risk neutral he/she maximizes this expression.   
If instead the agent is risk averse and has utility function  ( )
a x x u = , then he/she 
maximizes expected utility: 
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Finally, if we assume for simplicity that utility is linear ( ( ) x x u = ), and that all 
payoffs are non-negative, then the rank-dependent utility model predicts that an 
agent maximizes the following expression: 
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where  w(.)  is  a  probability  transformation  function,  defined  on  the  interval 
[0;1], where it is assumed to be monotonically increasing, and such that  ( ) 0 0 = w  
and  ( ) 1 1 = w .  We will test RDU with two possible weighting functions:  
1.  a convex function:  ( ) 1 0   ,
1
< < = γ
γ x x w  
2.  an inverse-S-shaped function:  ( )
( ) [ ]









x w  
These  are  not  the  only  weighting  functions  proposed  in  the  literature.    In 
particular for inverse-S-shaped weights there have been a number of functions 
tested in previous experiments.  We choose simple weighting functions with only 
one parameter because we want to fairly judge their performance in comparison to 90      3. Can fear of extinction foster extinction?
   
 
“plain” expected utility, which also only has one parameter.  It has been shown 
that functions with two parameters can better explain behavior in experiments, 
and also that a combination of risk-aversion and probability weighting can reach 
better performances.  These questions have been left out from the present work, 
because we focus on an applied setting, and wish therefore to keep the theoretical 
and methodological aspects relatively simple.  
The  models  presented  have  similar  qualitative  implications  on  the  optimal 
choice of harvesting, but they present different degrees of sensitivity to changes in 
the  probability  distribution  of  the  uncertain  threshold.    In  particular,  rank 
dependent utility is more likely to select corner solutions, and therefore solutions 
that are more stable with respect to small changes in the probability distribution, 
but  more  unstable  with  respect  to  substantial  changes  in  the  probability 
distribution.  Furthermore in this setting, rank-dependent utility is more likely to 
select “eager” solutions, that is, corner solutions at which the resource is depleted 
completely. 
Experimental design and 
hypotheses  
Experimental design 
The main aim of this paper is to examine the decisions individuals make in 
situations with thresholds and with varying conditions of uncertainty. To that end 
we have set up an experiment, in which the subjects have to deal with a special 
two-period decision problem, based on the theoretical framework described in 
section 2. In the first period they will actually have to make a choice about their 
desired level of “extraction” from a virtual resource. The resource needs a critical 
amount to be able to renew itself and thus to ensure future income. The critical 
amount is a threshold, and it is unknown. The only thing subjects know is that the 
threshold has a certain distribution within a given range. 
If  a  subject  extracts  too  much,  that  is,  if  the  left  over  is  smaller  than  the 
threshold value of the resource, the payoff in the second period will be zero, so he 
will only have a positive payoff in the first period. If a subject extracts less than 
the (unknown) critical value, he will gain a given payoff in the second period in Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    91
     
 
addition to the positive payoff in the first period. The second-period payoff is 
increasing in the level that has been chosen in the first period (the explanation 
here  is  that  part  of  the  harvesting  in  the  first  period  increases  the  harvesting 
capacity in the second period).  
Note that in the experiment, the subjects do not actually have to make a choice 
in the second period, and can concentrate exclusively on their first-period choice, 
but their payoffs reflect the theoretical structure of the problem. In the experiment 
only linear payoffs and uniform distributions are used.   
To see the relationship between the theoretical framework from section 2 and 
the decisions tasks in the experiment consider the following example (task 5 in the 
experiment). The following tables show the linear payoffs for R
0 = 12, k =1 and α 
= 6. Table 1 simply shows for each choice of the extraction d in the first period 
the total payoff conditional on the choice being “sustainable”, i.e. if 12 – d ≥ 
R
CRIT. In this case total payoffs are the sum of the payoffs in the two periods. 
Table 2 shows for each choice of d in the first period the total payoff conditional 
on the choice being “not sustainable”, i.e if 12 – d < R
CRIT. In this case, total 
payoff only consists of the payoff obtained in the first period. Table 3 shows the 
total payoff conditional on the threshold level of the resource. This table is a 
combination of Table 1 and Table 2. In Table 3 the range of possible threshold 
levels is 13 (R




D  k*d  α α α α*d  Total payoff 
0  0  0  0 
1  1  6  7 
2  2  12  14 
3  3   18  21 
4  4   24  28 
5  5  30  35 
6  6   36  42 
7  7   42  49 
8  8  48  56 
9  9  54  63 92      3. Can fear of extinction foster extinction?
   
 
10  10  60  70 
11  11  66  77 
12  12  72  84 




D  K*d  Total payoff 
0  0  0 
1  1  1 
2  2  2 
3  3  3 
4  4  4 
5  5  5 
6  6  6 
7  7  7 
8  8  8 
9  9  9 
10  10  10 
11  11  11 
12  12  12 
Table 2  Payoffs if first-period choice is not sustainable. 
 
Note that in the experiment we have only used tables like Table 3
44 to show 
outcomes to subjects, using different specifications of the parameters k, α, and of 
the range of possible critical values for the resource stock, always assuming a 
uniform  distribution  over  the  range  (see  below).  An  interesting  extension  for 
future research would be to investigate experimentally whether subjects make the 
same decisions if they get to see the first two tables instead of the third one. 
Let  us  now  look  at  the  decisions  people  have  to  make  and  the  theoretical 
predictions  for  this  example.  Consider  first  the  first  two  tables.  Obviously, 
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choosing a higher value of d implies higher payoffs if the choice is sustainable, 
and  also  if  it  is  not  sustainable.  The  point  is  that  a  higher  d  increases  the 
probability that the threshold will be passed, i.e. it increases the chance that the 
subject ends up in the Table 2, which has lower payoffs than Table 1. This feature 
is also present and visible in table 3. For instance, if a subject would choose d = 4 
he has a relatively high probability of getting a payoff of 28 (if 12 – d ≥ R
CRIT, or 
12 - R
CRIT ≥ 4), and a small probability of getting 4 (if 12 – d < R
CRIT, or 12 - R
CRIT 
< 4). Note that the payoff of 28 corresponds to the outcome in Table 1 for d = 4, 
and the payoff of 4 corresponds to the outcome in Table 2 for d = 4. On the other 
hand, if a subject would choose d = 9, he has a relative high probability of getting 
a payoff of 9. However there is also a small probability of getting a payoff as high 
as 63. It is precisely this trade-off that causes various theories to have different 
predictions, as we will see below.   
 
d \ 12-R
crit  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1  1  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7 
2  2  2  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  14 
3  3  3  3  21  21  21  21  21  21  21  21  21  21 
4  4  4  4  4  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28 
5  5  5  5  5  5  35  35  35  35  35  35  35  35 
6  6  6  6  6  6  6  42  42  42  42  42  42  42 
7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  49  49  49  49  49  49 
8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  56  56  56  56  56 
9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  63  63  63  63 
10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  70  70  70 
11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11  77  77 
12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  84 
Table 3  Total payoffs conditional on the threshold level of the resource. 
In the experiment the subjects were confronted with a booklet containing eight 
tasks.  The eight tasks, which form eight treatments, are the result of a 2x2x2 
factorial design, with treatment variables α (α = 6 and α =7), k (k=1 and k=3) and 
the range of the possible critical amounts (small spread with 7 possible values and 94      3. Can fear of extinction foster extinction?
   
 
large  spread  with  13  possible  values).
45  Table  4  gives  an  overview  of  the 
treatments: 
 
Task  K  α  Spread 
1  1  7  Large 
2  1  6  Small 
3  3  7  Small 
4  3  6  Large 
5  1  6  Large 
6  3  7  Large 
7  3  6  Small 
8  1  7  Small 
Table 4 Overview of the eight treatments. 
The hypotheses 
The hypotheses we want to test follow directly from the theoretical framework 
described in section 2, where we use the uniform distribution and linear payoffs. 
We consider four models, which lead to the following four hypotheses:   
H0: the choices are consistent with EV maximization 
{ } { }
CRIT
d R d d kd ≥ − +
∈ 12   Pr max
12 ,..., 0 α ; 
 
H1: the choices are consistent with CRRA utility maximization with risk-
aversion equal to a 
{ }( ) [ ] { } ( ) { } [ ] ; 12   Pr 1 12   Pr max
12 ,..., 0
CRIT a CRIT a
d





                                                 
45 The tasks in the booklet have been designed in the attempt to maximize the power of the 
hypothesis testing. That is, the combinations of α and k are chosen such that the different theories 
lead to different predictions, and the distance between the predictions is as large as possible, in 
order  to  make  it  easier  to  discriminate  among  the  theories  and  to  make  the  distinction  more 
reliable. Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    95
     
 
H2: the choices are consistent with RDU maximization with inverse-S shaped 
weights and convexity parameter  TK γ  
{ } { } [ ]
CRIT
d R d w d kd ≥ − ⋅ +
∈ 12   Pr max
12 ,..., 0 α  
where  ( )














H3: the choices are consistent with RDU maximization with convex weights 
(prudent behavior) with convexity parameter  CW γ  
{ } { } [ ] CW CRIT
d R d d kd
γ α
1
12 ,..., 0 12   Pr max ≥ − +
∈  
where: 













12 12 if 0
12 12 if
12








CRIT   
For each of the eight tasks, Table 5 shows the optimal choices for all parameter 
values and for each theory separately. The second row displays whether the spread 
is small (range 3-9) or large (range 0-12). Parameter values yielding the same 
optimal  choice  have  been  combined.  For  instance  if  we  assume  that  people 
maximize their utility using a CRRA utility function in task 1 the choice d = 6 
would  be  consistent  with  parameter  values  between  0.1  and  0.3,  whereas  the 
choice d = 7 would be optimal for parameter values equal to or larger than 0.4.   
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  Task  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
  Range  0-12  3-9  3-9  0-12  0-12  0-12  3-9  3–9 
EV    7  6  6 & 7  10  8  9  7  5 & 6 
                   
0.1 ≤ a ≤ 0.3  6  4  6  11  7  10  12  4 
a = 0.4  7  5  6  10  7  10  12  4 
a = 0.5  7  5  6  10  7  10  7  5 
CRRA 
0.6 ≤ a ≤ 0.9  7  5  6  10  7  9  7  5 
                   
0.1 ≤ γTK ≤ 0.3  12  3  12  12  12  12  12  3 
γTK  = 0.4  12  3  9  12  12  12  9  3 
γTK  = 0.5  11  8  9  12  11  12  9  3 
γTK  = 0.6  10  7  8  11  10  11  9  7 
γTK  = 0.7  9  7  8  11  9  11  8  7 
γTK  = 0.8  8  6  7  11  9  10  8  6 
RDUTK 
γTK  = 0.9  8  6  6  10  8  10  7  6 
                   
0.1≤ γCW ≤ 0.2  12  3  12  12  12  12  12  3 
γCW = 0.3  4  3  12  12  12  12  12  3 
γCW = 0.4  5  3  12  12  5  12  12  3 
γCW = 0.5  5  4  12  12  6  12  12  4 
γCW = 0.6  6  4  12  12  6  12  12  4 
γCW = 0.7  6  5  6  12  7  9  12  5 
γCW = 0.8  7  5  6  10  7  9  12  5 
RDUCW 
γCW = 0.9  7  5  6  10  7  9  7  5 
Table 5 Optimal choices according to the theory. Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    97
     
 
The experimental procedure 
The experiment was run with students of first-year microeconomics classes at 
Tilburg University in December 2003.
46 At the beginning of the class the lecturer 
told the students that they could participate in a decision-making experiment, to 
be run during the break. After the first hour of class the experimenters came into 
the  classrooms  and  asked  who  wanted  to  participate.  The  students  who 
volunteered  to  participate  received  a  booklet  containing  the  eight  one-shot 
decisions tasks (see Appendix). It was explained that subjects had to make a series 
of decisions, one in each task. One task would be played for real money and 
subjects would receive  the payoffs from the experiment immediately after the 
second hour of the class. Students could fill in their booklets at their own pace. It 
took them on average almost fifteen minutes to do so. 
The  experimenters  re-entered  the  class  after  the  second  hour.  First  it  was 
determined which task would be paid by a random draw from a covered deck of 
eight cards. Then the level of the threshold was determined by a random draw 
from a covered deck of cards that contained 13 (7) cards in case the selected task 
had a large (small) spread.  
A total of 45 students have taken part in the experiment, and each of them 
responded to all eight tasks, i.e. they were involved in eight treatments. This gives 
us a total of 360 observations. The subjects earned on average 3,50 euro. 
Results 
Our observations present quite a high variation in choices across individuals 
and across tasks. Figure 19 shows for each task the recurrence of each possible 
choice in our observations. The highest concentration is observed in task 4 where 
more than 1/3 of the subjects choose d = 12    
 
                                                 
46  Before  running  the  experiment  in  class,  a  pilot  experiment  was  conducted.    The  main 
purpose of this pilot experiment, in which 10 Graduate students participated, was to check whether 
the instructions were clear and how long it took to make the eight decisions. Although the subjects 
were also paid, we do not include the observations in the analyses in this paper.  98      3. Can fear of extinction foster extinction?







































































































































































































Figure 19  Distribution of observed choices per task. Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    99
     
 
A couple of tasks, namely tasks 6, 7, and 8, exhibit double or even triple modal 
value for d. In the other four tasks the observations are nicely dispersed around 
one single mode. More precisely, task 3 presents something like a “prevailing” 
mode, with most of the observations dispersed around d = 5, and a “secondary” 
mode in d = 12. The variation observed in our data is a reassuring aspect, a sign 
that central number bias and the experimental setting did not too strongly affect 
our subjects. Random answers on the other hand seem also not too likely since we 
observe  quite  different  distributions  corresponding  to  different  tasks,  as  you 
would  expect  when  subjects  actually  react  to  changing  conditions.    Also 
reassuring  is  the  fact  that  only  11  observations  out  of  360,  meaning  ca.  3%, 
violate stochastic dominance. 
In  the  following  paragraphs  we  will  compare  our  observations  to  the 
predictions that can be derived by each one of the theories described in section 3.   
Comparing choices to Expected Value maximization 
No subject behaves perfectly in accordance to EV theory. The two subjects 
who come closest, choose the EV maximizing value of d in 4 out of 8 tasks. On 
average, subjects choose a value of d that does not maximize EV in 6,5 tasks out 
of 8.  
The choices that instead are compatible with EV maximization (also called 
“hits”) are distributed as shown in Table 6. In total they make ca. 19% of the 
observations. 
 
TASK  HITS  relative frequency 
1  8  .18 
2  11  .24 
3  12  .27 
4  6  .13 
5  1  .02 
6  2  .04 
7  5  .11 
8  22  .49 
OVERALL  67  .19 
Table 6  Distribution of EV hits across tasks. 100      3. Can fear of extinction foster extinction?
   
 
Figure  20  compares  the  observed  choices  to  the  EV  predictions.  The  light 
bubbles represent the experimental observations: the larger the bubble, the more 
often the choice was observed. The dark points represent the EV theoretical point 
predictions. From the graph it seems that EV does not represent the data very 
correctly, in particular it seems to miss the very clear mode of task 4, and also 


























Figure 20  Comparison between  the theoretical EV predictions and the experimental 
observations. 
 
Comparing choices to Constant Relative Risk 
Aversion utility maximization 
Also in the case of CRRA, no subject behaves perfectly in accordance to the 
theory. The 5 subjects, who come closest, have 4 out of 8 choices consistent with 
the  theoretical  predictions  for  an  arbitrary  but  given  parameter.  On  average, 
subjects choose a value of d that does not maximize CRRA for any arbitrary but 
given parameter in 5,8 tasks out of 8.  Besides, on average, subjects choose in ca. 
69% of the observations a value of d that does not maximize CRRA for any value 
of the parameter at all. In other words, these observations contradict the theory.  Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    101
     
 
In order to estimate the best fit of the CRRA parameter a, we had to drop all these 
theory  violating  observations.  This  left  us  with  111  valid  observations  for 
estimation. Table 7 below summarizes the distribution of valid observations per 
task. 
 
TASK  HITS  relative frequency 
1  21  .47 
2  21  .47 
3  6  .13 
4  7  .16 
5  8  .18 
6  9  .20 
7  17  .38 
8  22  .49 
OVERALL  111  .31 
Table 7   Summary of valid CRRA observations per task. 
Using the valid observations, we estimate the parameter as follows.  Per each 
individual we compute the sum over all tasks of the squared distances from the 
theoretical optimum in utility terms. We do this for 9 parameter values distributed 
over a regular grid covering the whole parameter domain.  Minimizing such sum 
of squared errors, we assign to each individual an estimated parameter. We then 
count how many times each parameter appears as the best fit for an individual.  
Figure 21 compares the recurrences of each parameter over all observations.   
 102      3. Can fear of extinction foster extinction?






















Figure 21  Recurrence of best-fitting parameter values for CRRA theory across individuals. 
Our best overall estimate is the one that exhibits the highest recurrence, in this 
case  4 . 0 = a . Using this value of the parameter, we compare in Figure 22 the 
theoretical point predictions to the observations, as done for EV in Figure 19. 
From the picture it is clear that CRRA gives a better representation of the data 
than EV. In particular it does quite well in tasks 2, 5 and 8. Like EV, however, it 
still does not represent very well the observed choices in task 4. 
 Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    103


























Figure 22 Comparison of theoretical CRRA predictions for a=0.4 and experimental 
observations. 
 
Comparing choices to Rank Dependent Utility 
maximization with Tversky-Kahneman Weights 
No subject behaves perfectly in accordance to RDUTK theory. Only 8 subjects 
exhibit  choices  consistent  to  theoretical  predictions  for  an  arbitrary  but  given 
parameter in at least 4 tasks; of these, 1 subject is consistent with the theory in 6 
tasks. On average, subjects choose a value of d that does not maximize RDUTK 
for any arbitrary but given parameter in 5,8 tasks out of 8.  Besides, on average, 
subjects choose a value of d that does not maximize RDUTK for any value of the 
parameter  at  all  in  ca.  59%  of  the  observations.  In  order  to  proceed  with 
estimation of the parameter, we dropped the theory violating observations. This 
left us with 148 valid observations useful to estimate the parameter. Table 8 below 
summarizes the valid observations per task. 
 104      3. Can fear of extinction foster extinction?
   
 
TASK  HITS  relative frequency 
1  8  .18 
2  19  .42 
3  20  .44 
4  26  .58 
5  9  .20 
6  24  .53 
7  22  .49 
8  20  .44 
OVERALL  148  .41 
Table 8 Summary of valid RDUTK observations per task. 
Using the valid observations, we estimate the RDUTK parameter as we did for 
CRRA.  Figure  23  displays  the  recurrence  with  which  each  parameter  value 


























Figure 23  Recurrence of best-fitting parameter values for RDUTK theory across individuals. 
 
Our best  estimate for an overall RDUTK parameter is therefore  6 . 0 = TK γ . 
Using this parameter value, we compare the theoretical point predictions to the Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    105
     
 
observations in Figure 24. RDUTK does not predict correctly the behaviour of 
subjects in tasks 1 to 3 and in tasks 5 and 7. It does come the closest to the 


























Figure 24 Comparison of theoetrical RDUTK predictions for γTK=0.6 and experimental 
observations. 
 
Comparing choices to Rank Dependent Utility 
maximization with Convex Weights 
No subject behaves perfectly in accordance to RDUCW theory. The 3 subjects 
that  come  closest  to  theoretically  predicted  behaviour,  make  choices  that  are 
consistent with the theory in 6 out of 8 tasks. Another 7 subjects make at least 4 
choices that are consistent with the theoretical predictions for an arbitrary but 
given parameter. On average, subjects choose a value of d that does not maximize 
RDUCW for any arbitrary but given parameter in 5,1 tasks out of 8.  Besides, on 
average, subjects choose a value of d that does not maximize RDUCW for any 
value of the parameter at all in ca. 47% of the observations. This left us with 191 
valid observations for estimating the parameter, which we did following the same 106      3. Can fear of extinction foster extinction?
   
 
procedure as done for CRRA. Table 9 below summarizes the valid observations 
per task. 
 
TASK  HITS  relative frequency 
1  35  .78 
2  24  .53 
3  14  .31 
4  25  .56 
5  32  .71 
6  14  .31 
7  17  .38 
8  30  .67 
SUM  191  .53 
Table 9  Summary of valid RDUCW  observations per task. 

























Figure 25 Recurrence of best-fitting parameter values for RDUCW theory across individuals. 
Our best overall estimate for the RDUCW parameter value is  7 . 0 = CW γ . Using 
this value, we can compare the theoretical point predictions to the observations in Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    107
     
 
Figure 26. RDUCW improves on the EV predictions in tasks 1 to 5. It predicts the 
same in task 6. In tasks 7 and 8, the RDUCW point prediction is not much better, 
but surely not worse than in the EV case. Compared to CRRA, it performs better 



























Figure 26  Comparison of theoretical RDUCW predictions for γCW=0.7 and experimental 
observations. 
 
Measuring the predictive success of the theories 
In  the  previous  section  we  have  used  part  of  our  data  to  calibrate  the 
parameters of each theoretical model.  The estimates that we have obtained come 
close to other estimates previously found in the literature on decision making.  We 
turn now to comparing the predictive success of the theories, using the parameter 
values that we have estimated. 
In order to compare the relative performance of the theories, we can make use 
of    Selten’s  “Measure  of  Predictive  Success”  (Selten,  1991).  This  measure  is 
computed by subtracting the prediction “area” of a theory from its “hit rate”. The 108      3. Can fear of extinction foster extinction?
   
 
area is defined as the number of choices that can be predicted by one theory 
(varying the parameter), divided by the number of available choices. The hit rate 
is the number of observations that fall in the prediction of the theory, divided by 
the number of observations. The higher the measure, the better the performance of 
the theory. The indexes so computed are shown in Table 10, per task and over the 
total set of observations. Bold numbers indicate the highest value per row. 
 
Task  EV  CRRA  RDUTK  RDUCW 
1  0,100855  0,312821  -0,206838  0,393162 
2  0,184982  0,346154  0,144689  0,340659 
3  0,125224  0,062612  0,157424  0,171735 
4  0,062612  0,008945  0,373882  0,427549 
5  -0,0547  0,100855  -0,184615  0,403419 
6  -0,03248  0,046154  0,302564  0,157265 
7  0,042125  0,250916  0,216117  0,250916 
8  0,346154  0,346154  0,223776  0,451049 
TOTAL  0,095823  0,183436  0,125992  0,326124 
Table 10  The theories compared on basis of Selten's Measure of Success. 
 
In Table 10, the total index is derived subtracting the total area for each theory 
(= the total number of predictions / total number of possibilities) from the total hit 
rate (= total number of hits / total number of observations).
47   
The  numbers  indicate  quite  clearly  that  RDUCW  performs  best  in  most 
occasions, and always close to the best.  Task 6 deserves some special attention, 
as most theories are unable to predict the behaviour displayed by our subjects. It is 
perhaps important to mention that this task was the one with the highest payoffs at 
stake, meaning that choosing d = 12 the subjects would get a low chance to earn 
quite a substantially high payoff. Our observations seem to suggest that in such 
circumstances individuals tend to behave in a different way than usual. In fact, 
only RDUTK has a relatively high predictive success rate for this task. But note 
that at the same time this theory performs rather poorly on all other tasks. 
                                                 
47 Net of the observations discarded because they violate dominance. Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    109
     
 
Each of the theories we have presented leads to point predictions regarding 
choices.  However, when a utility function is smooth, the difference in terms of 
utility between the optimum and some other points nearby might be so small that 
subjects consider it irrelevant. The resulting observations would reflect a spread of 
choices around the optimum. 
We  will  use  a  number  of  graphs  to  compare  theoretical  utility  levels  to 
observed choices. This method does not provide us with a synthetic measure of 
the relative success of theories, but it enables us to have a look at what happens 
beside the maximum-point prediction. In Figure 27 the theoretical utility functions 
per  each  task  are  plotted  on  the  same  plot  area  as  a  scatter  of  the  empirical 
observations.  The scales of the functions are not comparable, but the relative 
positions of each point of one function, can be compared to the relative positions 
of each point of the other functions. In this way it is possible to visually compare 
peaks and lows in the frequency of observed choices to their relative utility level 
according to each theory. 
 110      3. Can fear of extinction foster extinction?
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Figure 27 Utility functions derived from the theories compared to the empirical frequencies. 
 
From the graphs it seems that the same observations apply as discussed until 
now: in general no theory is able to precisely reproduce all of the peaks and lows; 
however RDUCW often follows the shape of the empirical distributions more 
sharply and more precisely than the other functions do, and thus appears better in 
explaining the frequencies also of values of d that differ from the optimal ones. 114      3. Can fear of extinction foster extinction?
   
 
Conclusions 
An  extremely  important,  but  yet  open  question  in  the  assessment  of 
environmental policies is how people deal with decision situations in which they 
can trade-off immediate consumption against decreasing the probability of a very 
large scale (future) loss. The management of renewable resources with stochastic 
extinction thresholds is such a decision situation, because as extraction levels are 
increased, the probability of resource extinction increases. Applying the results of 
the standard experimental work on risky choice to this type of decision setting 
yields a counterintuitive result, because risk avoidance – both in expected and in 
most non-expected utility models – leads to a rapid extraction behavior, i.e. the 
resource is extracted as quickly as possible in order to avoid the risk associated 
with future consumption. In terms of environmental policy this result basically 
implies  that  installing  a  risk-seeking  resource  manager  reduces  the  risk  of 
resource extinction. 
To which extent rapid extraction behavior is to be expected, however, strongly 
depends on the specific risky choice model and the calibration of its parameters. 
The classical expected utility model with relative risk-aversion (CRRA) predicts a 
high  degree  of  rapid  extraction  at  any  level  of  risk  aversion  in  the  range  of 
parameter values reported in the literature. The most popular non-expected utility 
model,  the  rank-dependent  utility  model  with  an  inverse  S-shaped  probability 
weighting function (RDUTK) as suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), in 
many cases leads to an even higher degree of rapid extraction than CRRA, when 
standard parameter estimates are used for both models. The same result holds for 
the rank-dependent utility model with a convex probability weighting function 
(RDUCW),  which  also  often  predicts  a  higher  level  of  rapid  extraction  than 
CRRA.
48 
The experimental research in this paper is concerned with the question how 
well each of the different models of risky choice can capture extraction behavior 
in the presence of a stochastic extinction threshold. Given the results of other 
experiments  in  resource  management,  we  started  out  with  the  hypothesis  that 
                                                 
48 For a detailed theoretical comparison of the model predictions see chapter 2. Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    115
     
 
subjects will be more prudent in the resource extraction than predicted by CRRA 
and RDUTK (i.e. exhibit rapid extraction behavior to a lower degree). In fact, 
using Selten’s (1991) measure of predictive success, we find that the RDUCW, 
which is the most “prudent” of the models suggested, provides the best fit for our 
observations. This holds even when we allow for heterogeneity of the parameters 
of the model across individuals. Hence, our experiment shows that subjects facing 
extraction  decisions  in  a  setting  with  stochastic  extinction  threshold  are  best 
modelled  as  a  population  of  rank-dependent  utility  maximizers  with  convex 
probability weighting functions and heterogeneous weighting parameters. 
On first sight, the result of our experiment seems at odds with results obtained 
in  earlier  experiments  comparing  different  risky  choice  models,  because  most 
other papers conclude that the inverse S-shaped probability weighting function 
provides the best overall fit. Those papers, however, have in general used very 
specific types of risky choice situations (mostly simple lottery choice tasks) to 
assess behavior. Hence, one conclusion from our study is that which risky choice 
model fits best will strongly depend on the type of decision task that is used. 
Obviously, tasks – such as ours – that resemble renewable resource management 
invoke a more prudent behavior than simple lottery choice tasks.  
From an environmental policy point of view our results are not as good news as 
it might seem. Although we can interpret the behavior of our subject as “prudent” 
in the sense that they appear to weight bad outcomes heavier than good ones, 
rapid  extraction  behavior  is  present.  Our  experiment,  which  was  specifically 
designed to test the behavior in such situations, shows that a large majority of 
decision-makers  do  take  the  risk  of  extinction  into  account,  but  that  does  not 
always lead to extracting less of the resource.   116      3. Can fear of extinction foster extinction?
   
 
Appendix 
Participant code: A1 
Welcome to our choice experiment! 
 
Instructions 
This booklet contains eight tasks.  
In  each  task,  you  will  see  a  “payoff  table”  that  describes  all  possible  scores 
resulting from your choice (the row) and from a random draw (the column).  
In all tasks, the payoff table contains 13 rows that are numbered from 0 to 12.  
In each task, you must choose one of the 13 rows of the payoff table. 
 
Please, make your choice by writing the number of the row that you prefer most 
on the blank under the table. Write one of the numbers 0 to 12 under each of the 
eight tables. 
 
Once you have made all your eight choices, you will draw two cards from two 
different decks. The first card draw is from a covered deck with 8 cards.  The 
number written on the card that you draw specifies which task will actually be 
played for money. Only one task will be played for money.  
 
If the task to be played out for money has a “large” payoff table with 13 columns, 
your second draw will be from a covered deck with 13 cards.  
If the task to be played out for money has a “small” payoff table with 7 columns, 
your second draw will be from a covered deck with 7 cards.  
In either case, the drawn card specifies the column of the table that is relevant for 
your final payoff. By matching this number with the number of the row that you 
have chosen, you will find the cell in the payoff table that contains your final 
payoff in points. 
 
Each point is exchanged with 10 Cents and paid out to you privately in cash. 
 
You find an example in the next page. Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    117




Random Draw of the Card 
  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1  2  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7 
2  4  4  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  14 
3  6  6  6  21  21  21  21  21  21  21  21  21  21 
4  8  8  8  8  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28 
5  10  10  10  10  10  35  35  35  35  35  35  35  35 
6  12  12  12  12  12  12  42  42  42  42  42  42  42 
7  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  49  49  49  49  49  49 
8  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  56  56  56  56  56 
9  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  63  63  63  63 
10  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  70  70  70 













12  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  84 
 
 
Suppose that the payoff table above belongs to the task that will be played out for 
money. 
Suppose that you have chosen the row “9” in this task. 
Since this is a “large” payoff table with 13 columns, you will draw from a deck of 
13 cards. 
Suppose that you draw the card with the number “2”.  
 
Your payoff is displayed in the cell where row “9” and column “2” intersect: 18 
points. 
 
You will be paid (18 x 10 Cents =) Euro 1.80 for your participation. 118      3. Can fear of extinction foster extinction?
   
 
TASK 1   
  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1  1  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8 
2  2  2  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16 
3  3  3  3  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24 
4  4  4  4  4  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32 
5  5  5  5  5  5  40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40 
6  6  6  6  6  6  6  48  48  48  48  48  48  48 
7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  56  56  56  56  56  56 
8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  64  64  64  64  64 
9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  72  72  72  72 
10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  80  80  80 
11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11  88  88 
12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  96 
 
Which row do you choose? __________  (Please, write a number between 0 and 
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TASK 2   
  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1  7  7  7  7  7  7  7 
2  14  14  14  14  14  14  14 
3  21  21  21  21  21  21  21 
4  4  28  28  28  28  28  28 
5  5  5  35  35  35  35  35 
6  6  6  6  42  42  42  42 
7  7  7  7  7  49  49  49 
8  8  8  8  8  8  56  56 
9  9  9  9  9  9  9  63 
10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10 
11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11 
12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12 
 
 
Which row do you choose? __________  (Please, write a number between 0 and 
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TASK 3  
  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1  10  10  10  10  10  10  10 
2  20  20  20  20  20  20  20 
3  30  30  30  30  30  30  30 
4  12  40  40  40  40  40  40 
5  15  15  50  50  50  50  50 
6  18  18  18  60  60  60  60 
7  21  21  21  21  70  70  70 
8  24  24  24  24  24  80  80 
9  27  27  27  27  27  27  90 
10  30  30  30  30  30  30  30 
11  33  33  33  33  33  33  33 
12  36  36  36  36  36  36  36 
 
Which row do you choose? __________  (Please, write a number between 0 and 
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TASK 4  
 
  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1  3  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9 
2  6  6  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18 
3  9  9  9  27  27  27  27  27  27  27  27  27  27 
4  12  12  12  12  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36 
5  15  15  15  15  15  45  45  45  45  45  45  45  45 
6  18  18  18  18  18  18  54  54  54  54  54  54  54 
7  21  21  21  21  21  21  21  63  63  63  63  63  63 
8  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  72  72  72  72  72 
9  27  27  27  27  27  27  27  27  27  81  81  81  81 
10  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  90  90  90 
11  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  99  99 
12  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  108 
 
Which row do you choose? __________  (Please, write a number between 0 and 
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  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1  1  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7 
2  2  2  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  14  14 
3  3  3  3  21  21  21  21  21  21  21  21  21  21 
4  4  4  4  4  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28 
5  5  5  5  5  5  35  35  35  35  35  35  35  35 
6  6  6  6  6  6  6  42  42  42  42  42  42  42 
7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  49  49  49  49  49  49 
8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  56  56  56  56  56 
9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  63  63  63  63 
10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  70  70  70 
11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11  77  77 
12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  84 
 
Which row do you choose? __________  (Please, write a number between 0 and 
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TASK 6  
  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1  3  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10 
2  6  6  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20 
3  9  9  9  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30 
4  12  12  12  12  40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40  40 
5  15  15  15  15  15  50  50  50  50  50  50  50  50 
6  18  18  18  18  18  18  60  60  60  60  60  60  60 
7  21  21  21  21  21  21  21  70  70  70  70  70  70 
8  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  80  80  80  80  80 
9  27  27  27  27  27  27  27  27  27  90  90  90  90 
10  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  100  100  100 
11  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  110  110 
12  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  120 
 
Which row do you choose? __________  (Please, write a number between 0 and 
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TASK 7  
 
  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1  9  9  9  9  9  9  9 
2  18  18  18  18  18  18  18 
3  27  27  27  27  27  27  27 
4  12  36  36  36  36  36  36 
5  15  15  45  45  45  45  45 
6  18  18  18  54  54  54  54 
7  21  21  21  21  63  63  63 
8  24  24  24  24  24  72  72 
9  27  27  27  27  27  27  81 
10  30  30  30  30  30  30  30 
11  33  33  33  33  33  33  33 
12  36  36  36  36  36  36  36 
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TASK 8  
  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1  8  8  8  8  8  8  8 
2  16  16  16  16  16  16  16 
3  24  24  24  24  24  24  24 
4  4  32  32  32  32  32  32 
5  5  5  40  40  40  40  40 
6  6  6  6  48  48  48  48 
7  7  7  7  7  56  56  56 
8  8  8  8  8  8  64  64 
9  9  9  9  9  9  9  72 
10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10 
11  11  11  11  11  11  11  11 
12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12 
 
Which row do you choose? __________  (Please, write a number between 0 and 
12.) 126      3. Can fear of extinction foster extinction?
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4. Modelling negotiations 
for an international 
agreement on climate 
change 
 
In part one we have approached climate change from the perspective of one 
unique decision agent that we can see as a global benevolent dictator trying to 
maximize an aggregated measure of global welfare. In that framework we have 
shown that optimal policy is a non-trivial issue when risk-preferences are taken 
into account and that all existing models for decision-making show a very high 
sensitivity  to  small  changes  in  the  unknown  parameters.  Moreover,  we  have 
shown that none of the existing models represents to a satisfactory extent the 
actual risk-preferences of real agents. 
In that framework we have abstracted completely from strategic issues that 
arise when decisions have to be made by more than one agent at the same time. 
Since climate change is a global pollution problem, we know that such issues play 
a central role in the current debate. Even though there is at this point in time a 
fairly wide consensus about the need for climate policies, it still proves very hard 
for political leaders to find an agreement on an international scheme of abatement 
of greenhouse gases emissions. The negotiations about the Kyoto protocol have 
recently  seen  important  countries  like  the  USA  and  China  withdraw  with  the 
argument  that  they  want  to  implement  other  ways  out  of  the  climate  change 
problem.  In particular, these countries do not want to impose abatement targets at 
the  expenses  of  economic  growth  and  they  state  that  it  is  more  efficient  to 
incentivate  the  development  of  green  technology.  This  argument  is  not 
convincing,  though:  of  course  it  is  true  that  developing  green  technology  is 
needed to prevent climate change and at the same time ensure economic welfare, 
but it is not in contradiction with the goal of setting transparent abatement targets; 130      4. Modelling negotiations for an international agreement on climate change
   
 
on  the  contrary,  setting  the  targets  is  a  way  of  credibly  committing  to  give 
sufficient incentives for the development of green technology.  
As we will discuss in the following two chapters, investments in technology 
may play an important role in the negotiations. However, they can be seen as an 
alternative way to reach the common goal of emission abatement. This goal can 
be fixed taking technological change into account, and the one does not preclude 
the  other.  On  the  contrary,  we  will  show  that  under  some  conditions  on  the 
structure  of  costs  and  benefits,  investments  in  green  technology  should  be 
expected to foster cooperation. In particular we can show that if part of the costs 
can  be  shared  by  a  coalition,  thereby  creating  a  positive  externality,  then  full 
cooperation  can  be  reached.  One  can  think  here  for  example  of  shared  sunk 
investments in research and development. 
Climate change as a prisoner’s 
dilemma 
In the economic literature on international agreement, climate change like other 
environmental externalities are usually represented as games of the “prisoner’s 
dilemma” type. In these games, the social optimum is not reached because when 
all other players play the socially optimal strategy, there are incentives for each 
player to deviate. In the assumptions of the game, if all other countries abate their 
greenhouse  gas  emissions,  it  is  better  for  my  country  to  maintain  the  same 
emission level as usual, or even emit more, as it allows economic growth without 
costs of abatement, while climate change is prevented thanks to the efforts spent 
by other countries. 
It is not clear, as a matter of fact, that just reducing emissions can prevent 
climate  change,  thus  the  causal  relationship  and  the  logical  structure  of  a 
traditional “prisoner’s dilemma” does not necessarily fit our problem in reality. As 
already discussed in the first part of this thesis, there is high uncertainty as for 
what the true outcomes of current actions will be in the future. There are also time 
lags to be accounted for, and the measurements we do today are only able to 
evaluate our actions in the past, meaning that  we do not know if our current 
actions are actually capable of implementing the desired outcomes. We cannot Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    131
     
 
exclude  the  possibility  of  very  pessimistic  scenarios,  according  to  which  any 
action today would not be sufficient to prevent climate change or even mitigate it. 
If such a scenario was true, then we would not have the need to undertake any 
action: the outcome of the game would not depend on our actions. There would in 
fact be no game to play and no cake to share. In such a scenario it would as well 
be reasonable to pollute as much as we like, since it would make no difference at 
all. On the other hand, it is also not possible to exclude that the only efficient 
strategy would be to abate 100% emissions as quickly as possible. This might be 
true if the actual payoff structure was dichotomised: either emissions stop or a 
catastrophic event will occur and everyone will be worse off. In this case we 
would not be facing a prisoner’s dilemma, but rather a coordination issue: either 
we all abate 100%, or we do not need to undertake any other action, since that 
would  not  make  any  difference.  Such  a  situation  could  be  represented  in  the 
following game where a generic country (i) plays “against” the rest of the world 
(ROW): 
 
    ROW 
    abate  not abate 
abate  10;10  0;0 
i 
not abate  0;0  0;0 
 
This game has two Nash equilibria: either everybody abates or nobody does. It 
is a matter of coordination to pick the best outcome, and it may not be a very 
interesting problem from a game-theoretical point of view. It is nevertheless a 
scenario  that  should  be  kept  in  mind  when  one  thinks  about  policy 
recommendations,  and  it  does  pose  a  couple  of  interesting  questions  for 
economists to answer: how can we reach 100% abatement in the fastest and least 
costly way? And could it be economically efficient to help poorer countries face 
the costs of abatement so that we can make sure that the only meaningful outcome 
can be reached?  132      4. Modelling negotiations for an international agreement on climate change
   
 
These are important considerations from a political and economical point of 
view, but as we have discussed, they are not of a game-theoretical nature, and they 
do not explain why current negotiations are failing
49.  
Because we want to investigate the game theoretical aspects of the problem, we 
need therefore to assume that these rather extreme scenarios are not true, and that 
there is room for negotiation: there is a cake to share. No matter whether this 
situation is real or not, the perceived payoff structure is what matters in a game, 
and if some of the political agents think that other countries’ effort will be enough 
to ensure some economic benefits, then the prisoner’s dilemma may represent 
appropriately the way that the climate negotiation game is played. 
For this reason we continue in this tradition and deal with a model of coalition 
formation where the payoffs are such that the incentives to quit the agreement 
increase faster than the benefits from joining, so that the full coalition, where all 
countries in the game join the agreement, is not sustained. In this framework we 
want to look for conditions and policy instruments that are  capable to induce 
better cooperation. 
Cooperative vs. non-cooperative 
behavior 
Global  environmental  problems  such  as  climate  change  require  cooperation 
between sovereign states to overcome welfare losses that occur if these states only 
focus  on  the  effects  of  their  own  emission  reductions  on  their  own  level  of 
welfare. International cooperation, however, is vulnerable to free-rider behaviour 
so  that  one  is  confronted  with  the  classical  dilemma  between  the  benefits  of 
cooperation and the incentives to free ride. The dominant strand in the literature is 
                                                 
49 They might however give some extra insight also into cooperation issues. For instance they 
may  help  explain  the  apparently  irrational  behaviour  of  countries,  like  Europe,  that  keeps 
cooperating even in the face of important defections on part of other big countries.  One might 
think that Europe perceives the payoff structure underlying the negotiations for a climate protocol 
as a coordination game.  If that is the case it might be a rational strategy to try and give signals in 
the hope to be followed by the rest of the world, so that the good outcome can be selected. Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    133
     
 
based on an equilibrium concept for these two aspects. The idea is that a coalition 
forms  with  the  property  that  countries  neither  have  an  incentive  to  leave  that 
coalition (in order to enjoy free-rider benefits) nor to join that coalition (in order 
to enjoy the benefits of cooperation). Usually this is referred to as internal and 
external stability (Hoel, 1992, Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993, Barrett, 1994, Finus, 
2003). This equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the so-called open-membership 
game where countries first decide whether they want to be part of the coalition or 
not  and  then  decide  on  their  emission  reduction,  either  as  a  member  of  the 
coalition or as an outsider. 
Typically the size of the coalition that is both internally and externally stable is 
very  small.  This  result  has  been  challenged  by  approaches  that  are  based  on 
different  game  theoretic  models.  One  is  based  on  the  γ-core  concept  in 
cooperative games (Chander and Tulkens, 1995). A coalition is in the γ-core if no 
sub-coalition has an incentive to deviate (under the assumption that in that case 
the  remaining  coalition  falls  apart).  It  can  be  shown  that  transfers  between 
countries exist such that the grand coalition is in the γ-core and in that sense 
stable.  This  idea  is  similar  to  trigger  strategies  in  repeated  games  where 
cooperation can also be sustained by assuming that in case some country deviates 
cooperation falls apart. The behavioural assumptions in these approaches are quite 
strong, however. These assumptions can be relaxed somewhat by introducing the 
idea of farsightedness (Chwe, 1994). In this approach deviations may trigger more 
deviations  but  not  necessarily  a  complete  break-up  of  the  coalition.  It  can  be 
shown  that  this  model  can  also  sustain  large  coalitions.  A  trade-off  occurs 
between models with behavioural assumption that are less realistic but may lead 
to large coalitions and models with more realistic behavioural assumptions but 
only small coalitions. 
In  this  chapter  we  discuss  an  important  aspect  of  the  negotiation  process, 
namely the ability to commit in such a way to implement a trigger strategy that 
can  lead  to  larger  coalitions.  As  mentioned  above,  the  γ-core  theoretical 
framework is based on the assumption that countries in a coalition can commit to 
implement a punishment strategy in the case that a country unilaterally deviates 
from the agreement. Most commonly the threat is that the whole coalition will 
break apart and that the fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium will be played. 134      4. Modelling negotiations for an international agreement on climate change
   
 
We  will  designate  this  as  a  “γ-strategy”.  As  this  usually  leads  to  very  bad 
outcomes, these models are able to more easily reach the conclusion that a full 
coalition  is  stable,  and  thus  that  cooperation  is  possible.  The  non-cooperative 
models instead are based on the assumption that when one country does not join 
the coalition, the others will play their best-response strategy, which might well be 
to form a smaller coalition. In other words, they are not able to commit to playing 
punishment strategies. As a result of this assumption, the equilibrium will be a 
“PANE” (Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium) where a coalition formed by a 
subset of the countries (insiders) play as one player a Nash game against the other 
countries, each playing on their own (outsiders). 
In what follows we show why we think that the γ-strategy is not a credible one, 
considering  the  consequences  in  case  the  negotiation  game  is  played  as  a 
simultaneous move game or a sequential move game where the coalition moves 
second. 
Suppose  N countries are negotiating a coalition and consider the choice of 
country i that is playing against a coalition formed by j countries.  Carraro and 
Siniscalco (1997) define two payoff functions  ( ) j P  and  ( ) j Q , respectively for 
insiders and outsiders of a coalition of size  j , and they assume that when the 
number of countries in the coalition increases then both insiders and outsiders 
earn higher payoffs.  Furthermore, the outsider payoff function  ( ) j Q  is assumed 
to increase faster in the size of the coalition, j, than the insider payoff function 
( ) j P , because the countries in the coalition have to internalize more damage and 
therefore abate more as more countries join in.  The following set of conditions 
are used to model the game when s is the equilibrium size of the coalition: 
1.  ( ) ( ) j P j P ≥ +1 ; 
2.  ( ) ( ) j Q j Q ≥ +1 ; 
3.  ( ) ( ) j Q j P ≥ +1  for  1 ,..., 1 − = s j ; 
4.  ( ) ( ) j Q j P ≤ +1  for  n s j ,..., = .   Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    135
     
 
Since  the  countries  in  the  coalition  have  already  found  a  cooperation 
agreement, their strategy space consists of the choice between γ (the coalition 
does not form unless country i participates) and δ (the coalition forms anyway). 
 
    Coalition 
  γ  δ 




0 P   ( ) s Q ; ( ) s P  
 
 
where  ( ) ( )
0 1 1 P Q P ≡ = .  For this game, whenever  ( ) ( ) 1 + > s P s Q , and for any 
2 ≥ s , there are two Nash equilibria:  ( ) γ ; C , and  ( ) δ ; NC . In the first case the 
coalition threatens country i playing a γ-strategy and therefore i is induced to 
cooperate. In the second case the coalition does not use its threatening power and 
therefore i does not cooperate. In the latter equilibrium, the coalition is worse off 
and country i is better off than in the former. 
There  are  some  reasons  to  argue  however  that  this  "worse"  (from  the 
standpoint of the coalition) equilibrium is more likely to occur. 
Except  for  the  special  case  where  1 = s ,  one  can  see  that  δ  is  a  weakly 
dominating strategy for the coalition, in this one-shot game. This implies (in a 
two-players game like this) that ( ) δ ; NC  is the only trembling-hand perfect Nash 
equilibrium. That is, this equilibrium is robust to the possibility that some player 
makes a mistake. In this sense, caution precludes players from playing weakly 
dominated strategies (see Mas-Colell, Winston and Green, 1995, section 8.F). 
To prove this, notice that the Nash equilibrium  ( ) γ ; C  cannot be trembling-
hand  perfect:  if  a  vector  of  (randomized)  strategies  representing  a  Nash 
equilibrium  of  a  game  is  trembling-hand  perfect  it  cannot  involve  playing  a 
weakly dominated strategy with positive probability.  One can therefore focus on 
the only other Nash equilibrium.  To show that  ( ) δ ; NC  is indeed a trembling-
hand  perfect  Nash  equilibrium,  consider  first  the  sequence  of  totally  mixed 136      4. Modelling negotiations for an international agreement on climate change
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. As  ∞ → i k  such a sequence 
approaches the pure strategy NC. Furthermore, best response of the coalition to 
each element of the sequence is δ, since:  
( ) ( ) ( )














































for any natural number  1 ≥ i k .  In the same way, one can consider the sequence of 
totally  mixed  strategies  ( ) ( ) ( ) k p k p − 1 ; ,  where  the  coalition  plays  γ  with 
probability  ( ) ( ) ( )








k P s Q
s P s Q
k p   and  δ  with  probability  ( ) k p − 1 .  As 
∞ → k  such sequence approaches the pure strategy δ, since  ( ) 0 → k p . Besides, 
the best response of country i to each element of the sequence is NC, since: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1
1 0
0 ≥ + − + −
−
+ −
− = − s P s Q P s Q
k P s Q
s P s Q
C EU NC EU
 
for any natural number  1 ≥ k . Therefore,  ( ) δ ; NC  is the trembling-hand perfect 
Nash equilibrium. 
Moreover, it can be argued that since 
0 P  is a worse outcome than  ( ) 1 + s P , 
country i should be careful in avoiding such outcome. However, this has some 
cost, and in real-life situations emissions cannot be controlled perfectly, so that a 
positive probability has to be assigned to country i playing NC even if it expects 
the coalition to play γ. This creates a cost to the coalition in case they decide to 
threaten playing γ. Such a cost,  1 c , is given by the difference in expectations when 
playing  δ  and  when  playing  γ,  given  that  country  i  plays  NC  with  positive 
probability  p :  ( ) [ ]
0
1 P s P p c − = .  But,  avoiding  the  threat  and  playing  δ 
straightforward also has a cost,  2 c , given by the difference in the best outcomes Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    137
     
 
that are reachable by playing such strategies if players behave rationally (that is, if 
they make no mistakes). Such outcomes are obviously those obtained in the Nash 
equilibria  and  therefore  the  cost  for  the  coalition  of  playing  δ  is 
( ) ( ) s P s P c − + = 1 2 .  One can thus expect the coalition to play δ when this cost is 
smaller than the cost of playing γ: 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) 0 1
0
2 1 ≥ + + − − = − s P s P P s P p c c . 
This implies that the coalition should choose to play δ when the probability that 









= .  Notice that the 
threshold  decreases  with 
0 P ,  and  tends  to  zero  when 
0 P   becomes  infinitely 
negative. This shows that when non-cooperation leads to a catastrophic event, the 
coalition prefers playing δ, even if this practically prevents the enlargement of the 
coalition. This is another argument in favour of considering ( ) δ ; NC  a more likely 
outcome of the game, rather than ( ) γ ; C . 
We can  find more arguments if we now turn to consider an  extensive-form 
game.  If the coalition is able to commit, it can be considered as the first mover. 
For a generic starting coalition size j, the game is then illustrated by Figure 28. 
 
 coalition 
γ  δ 
C  C  NC  NC 
 i   i 
(P(j+1); P(j+1))  (P
0; P
0)  (P(j+1); P(j+1)) (P(j); Q(j)) 
 
Figure 28 Extended form of the game if the coalition can commit to a strategy 138      4. Modelling negotiations for an international agreement on climate change
   
 
The sub-game perfect game equilibrium leads to  ( ) γ ; C  with certainty for all 
1 > j . In other words, if the coalition can announce credibly to be playing γ, then 
country i will certainly cooperate. The ability to commit is not a common feature 
of international agreements, as there is no super-national institution capable of 
enforcing agreements. Therefore, if the coalition is unable to commit, the choice 
whether to play γ or δ can be thought of as a choice made after player i has 
decided about cooperation. This situation is illustrated in Figure 29, from which it 




γ  δ 
C  NC 
 i 
(P(j+1); P(j+1))  (P
0; P
0)  (P(j+1); P(j+1))  (Q(j);P(j)) 
 coalition 
γ  δ 
 
Figure 29 Extended form of the game if the coalition cannot commit 
 
Green investments to foster 
cooperation in a non-
cooperative setting 
From  what  is  discussed  above,  it  is  clear  that  there  are  good  reasons  for 
analysing the international agreements on climate change in a non-cooperative 
framework. This is “bad news”: as we have seen, it often implies that only small 
coalitions can be sustained. In what follows we propose a model that incorporates Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    139
     
 
green  investments  as  a  way  to  foster  cooperation  and  make  larger  coalitions 
possible. 
As we have mentioned, it is often argued that technological change is the best 
answer to the global warming challenge. In the long run, if “green” (or greener) 
technology will be available and cheap enough, we would expect that emissions 
should drop, while not much negatively affecting other variables, such as income. 
We  are  here  interested  in  looking  at  the  effects  of  green  technology  on 
international cooperation. Nowadays, green technology is not yet widespread and 
cheap enough to completely substitute the dirty one. However, several countries 
use renewable resources like water, wind, sun, or biogas, to produce at least part 
of  their  energy  supply  in  sustainable  ways.  Does  the  availability  of  green 
technology affect the cooperative attitude of a country? Endres and Ohl (2002) 
use the term “cooperative-push” to designate an intrinsic feature of a political or 
economic measure that is able to induce cooperative behaviour, by changing the 
payoff structure of the negotiation game
50.  
Is it possible to apply a similar concept in the climate change setting?  We 
think  that  investments  in  green  technology,  besides  being  an  important  factor 
needed to ensure sustainable growth, also might have the property of changing the 
payoff structure of the international negotiation game on climate change: if the 
costs of abatement are reduced, then the incentives to free-ride might decrease, 
and it might result easier to achieve self-enforcing cooperation agreements.  
To analyse this issue, we expand on the Carraro-Siniscalco (1997) approach.  
We  assume,  to  simplify,  that  ( ) j P   and ( ) j Q   are  continuous  and  monotonic 
functions, and thus use the following set of assumptions, which is equivalent to 
the set of assumptions originally used in the discrete framework: 
1.  ( ) 0 ' > j P ; 
                                                 
50 Endres and Ohl mention here as an example the implementation of unleaded fuel policy in 
Germany. This failed at the European Union level, because some countries, like Italy, did not want 
to cooperate. After Germany unilaterally introduced catalytic converters, though, the Italians were 
induced to provide unleaded fuels in order to keep attracting German car-tourists, and eventually 
this led to the spreading of catalytic cars in Italy as well. 140      4. Modelling negotiations for an international agreement on climate change
   
 
2.  ( ) 0 ' > j Q ; 
3.  ( ) ( ) 0 0 P Q < ; 
4.  ( ) ( ) n P n Q > . 
Consider that when the marginal country i does not join the coalition, then its 
realized gain, ( ) ( ) 1 + − j P j Q , can be decomposed as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] j j D H j P j P j P j Q j P j Q − ≡ − + − − = + − 1 1  
where  ( ) ( ) j P j Q H j − = represents  the  gain  from  being  outside  the  coalition 
instead  than  inside  of  it  (that  is,  the  free-riding  incentive),  and 
( ) ( ) j P j P D j − + = 1   represents the (social) loss from foregone extra reductions 
in emissions that could have occurred if country i had joined the coalition. 
For our modelling purposes, we introduce one more variable, K, representing a 
sunk-cost investment in a green technology. A green technology has the property 
of producing clean goods, for instance renewable energy, thereby reducing the 
cost of ex-post abatement. An example of such an activity could be a source of 
"alternative energy", like solar energy or wind energy. Building more plants for 
the production of alternative energy represents a sunk investment and implies that 
j H  is reduced: even if the country does not cooperate, it will now cost less to 
reduce emissions, and therefore the advantage of free-riding is reduced by the 
sunk investment. We can therefore introduce it in our setting, assuming that it 
increases  the  payoffs  (gross  of  the  sunk  cost)  for  any  country.  Moreover,  if 
abatement  costs  are  convex,  it  increases  the  insiders’  payoff  more  than  the 
outsiders’ because the former have to abate more. 
To see this, assume that abatement costs are given by a function  ( ) a c , with 
0 '> c   and  0 "> c .    Furthermore,  assume  that  investing  a  sum  K  in  the  clean 
technology  provides  with  a  costless  abatement  rate  ( ) K b .  Therefore,  if  a 
represents  total  abatement,  its  cost  equals  ( ) ( ) K b a c − .    If  the  insiders  of  the 
coalition have to abate  ' a  and the outsiders  " a , with  " ' a a > , it follows that the 
gains from investing a given sum K in the renewable energy are higher for the 
insiders since convexity implies:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0    " " ' ' > ∀ − − > − − K K b a c a c K b a c a c .  Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    141
     
 
We can model this by assuming that  ( ) j P  and  ( ) j Q  are a function of K, such 
that  ( ) ( ) K j Q K j P K K , , > .  As a result, ( ) K H H j j =  is decreasing in K.  We do 
not need to assume that K affects  j D : for instance if K only induces a shift in the 
functions, it will not affect this component.  
If the initial equilibrium size of the coalition was j, after investments have 
taken place to an amount K, it may result  ( ) j j D K H <  and therefore country i 
now wants to join the coalition as well. The system has a new equilibrium at a 
new situation where the coalition is formed by  j j ≥ ' countries. In Figure 30, one 
can see a graphic representation of the incentive curves  ( ) K Pj  and  ( ) K Q j  for a 
low  and  high  value  of  K  respectively,  and  the  way  in  which  the  relative 
equilibrium coalition changes.  
The reasoning that we have followed does not include any consideration about 
the fact that a forward-looking player will take into account the consequences of 
investments  in  green  technology  on  the  final  equilibrium.  We  can  call  this  a 
“myopic” model. 
If we now want to allow the countries to be more forward-looking, we need to 
formalize the relation between investments and the size of the coalition.  Each 
country  faces  a  two-step  decision:  in  the  first  step  they  chose  the  level  of 
investment in the alternative energy, in the second step they chose whether to join 
the coalition or not, and thereby determine the equilibrium size of the coalition. 
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Let  K  be the level of investment chosen in the first step and assume that the 
payoff functions are of the type: 
( ) j K K j P α ζ + = ,   
( ) j K K j Q γ η + = ,  
with  γ α < < 0  so that there are incentives to free ride as j becomes larger, and 
with ζ η < < 0 ,  so  that  investing  in  K  is  less  attracting  if  you  are  out  of  the 
coalition. 
Then, for given K, the incentive to free ride is decreasing in K, whereas the 
gains from cooperation are constant: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )K j K j P K j Q K j H η ζ α γ − − − = − = , , ,  
( ) ( ) 0 , < − − = η ζ K j H K  
( ) ( ) ( ) α = − + = K j P K j P K j D , , 1 , . Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    143
     
 
Notice that in these assumptions it holds  ( ) ( ) K H K H j j 1 + ≤ , meaning that for 
given  technology  the  advantage  of  free  riding  is  higher  when  the  coalition  is 
larger
51.  This is not necessarily implied by the standard assumptions on  ( ) j P  and 
( ) j Q , and it is a consequence of using linear functions.  
In this model, investments foster cooperation, as shown in figure Figure 31 
below. 
The picture shows that for higher values of K the coalition size becomes larger 
in equilibrium.  As payoffs are always increasing in the size of the coalition, both 
insiders and outsiders are better off with a positive level of investments in the 
green technology.  The optimal amount of investment depends on the investment 
cost relative to the other parameters, in particular η and ζ, which represent the 
efficiency of the green technology.   
The model can be solved per backward induction: first the equilibrium size of 
the coalition in the second stage of the game is derived as a function of the level 
of  investments,  and  then  such  function  is  used  to  determine  the  optimal 
investment strategy in the first stage. 
                                                 
51  This  is  not  an  innocent  assumption:  it  implies  that  insiders’  (outsiders’)  abatements  are 
always non-decreasing (non-increasing) in j. Let us denote with  I a  the insiders’ abatement, with 
O a  the outsiders’, and with  a  the total abatement when the coalition has size j. Let us define a 
function  ( ) a b , denoting the benefits from abatement and assume that both insiders and outsiders 
benefit in the same way from abatement. Then we can write:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) O I I O j a c a c a c a b a c a b j P j Q H − = + − − = − =   
(where we have assumed K constant) meaning that: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) O O I I O O I I j j a a a a a c a c a c a c H H '   and   ' 0 ' ' 1 ≥ ≥ ⇔ ≥ − + − ⇔ ≥ +  
where we denote with  I a'  the insiders’ abatement, and with  O a'  the outsiders’, when the 
coalition has size  1 + j .   
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We  can  make  several  assumptions  regarding  the  negotiation  process  in  the 
second stage.  In particular, we can assume either that countries are unable to 
know  whether  they  will  be  insiders  or  outsiders  (for  instance  because  the 
negotiation process will happen in random order), or that they are able to foresee 
perfectly their role inside or outside the coalition.  We will distinguish these two 
cases in the following presentation and derive the equilibrium size of the coalition 
and the level of investment for both cases separately. 
Random negotiation process 
2nd STAGE: Coalition size 
Given  K , the equilibrium size of the coalition is that value of j such that 
( ) ( ) K j P K j Q , 1 , + = .  Notice that our assumptions are such that the two functions 
cross once and only once.  Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    145
     
 
So in the equilibrium it must hold: 










1st STAGE: Optimal investment 
The optimal investment is at the level where expected payoffs are maximum, 
given  the  probabilities  that  a  country  is  an  insider  or  an  outsider.    Such 
probabilities  coincide  with  the  relative  numbers  of  insiders  and  outsiders 
respectively: 
( ) ( )










































































The first derivative of this objective function is constant and it equals: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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− + − = 1 1 N N  
There is thus no internal optimum for this problem.  Each country desires to 
invest as much as possible in the clean technology if D is positive, and nothing at 
all if it is negative.  Assuming for simplicity that K expresses the percentage 
conversion  from  current  technology  to  clean  technology  we  can  impose 
1 0 ≤ ≤ K .  Therefore we can state the following result: 
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γ η N N . 
Which offers a clear intuition for our result: when the productivity of green 
investments is sufficiently high, then it is worth for all countries to invest
52.  
From  Proposition  1  it  is  clear  that  the  equilibrium  size  of  the  coalition  is 
increasing in α and in ζ , and decreasing in η and γ  when  0 > D .  Instead, the 
                                                 
52 Notice that in our model we have set N as a given number and not as a parameter, hence we 
cannot make any statement about its influence on the other variables of this model. Our payoff 
functions do not depend on this value, which is of course not true in real life. So it is meaningless 
to make comparative-static analysis regarding this parameter. In particular, we cannot state that the 
productivity  of  green  investments  required  by  condition  1  increases  or  decreases  in  the  total 
number of countries: N is here just a given number without any meaning and corollary 1 simply 
means  that  green-investment  productivity  has  to  reach  a  positive  lower  limit  in  order  for 
investments to be non-zero. 
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coalition size does not depend on the productivity of green investments when 
0 < D : this makes sense because in this latter case sunk-investments are absent.  
Non-random negotiation process 
Let us now assume that the negotiation process is structured in such a way that 
already in the first stage countries are able to anticipate whether they  will be 
insiders or outsiders.  The optimal level of investment in the green technology 
does not need to be the same for an insider as for an outsider.  Denoting with  I K  
investments for an insider and with  O K  investments for an outsider, we can use 
the same simple model as in the previous section, where: 
( ) j K K j P I I α ζ + = ,  
( ) j K K j Q O O γ η + = ,  
2nd STAGE: coalition size 
In equilibrium it holds that: 
( ) ( ) O I K j Q K j P , 1 ,
* * − =  
that is: 
( ) 1











1st STAGE: optimal investments 
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As the objective functions are linear and separable in the two control variables, 
we have that  I K  and  O K  are chosen independently from each other and that there 
are no internal solutions.  Thus we can state: 
 
Proposition 2 
If  1 > +
γ
α
ζ  then: 
0
* = O K   
1






* j  
If  1 < +
γ
α
ζ  then: 
0
* = O K   
0








Also  this  result  has  a  clear  intuition:  when  1 > +
γ
α
ζ ,  it  means  that  the 
marginal  benefits  of  green  investments,  plus  a  correction  term  that  can  be 
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its marginal costs.  In this case therefore, it is convenient for insiders to replace 
the old technology with the green one.   
We can compare the outcome of this version of the model with the outcome of 
the model with non-random negotiations and see that with random negotiations 
the predicted size of the coalition is smaller.  This observation is consistent with 
our intuition: when the negotiations are conducted randomly and each country has 
a chance to end up as an outsider, then the expected gain from green investments 
is lower than it is in the non-random model for those countries that already know 
they  will  be  insiders.  Thus  the  incentive  to  invest  is  lower  and  so  is  the 
cooperative push of green investments. 
 Conclusions 
Our model is oversimplified but it shows that when our hypotheses on the 
shape of the payoff functions for members of a given coalition and outsiders hold 
true, then investments in green technology and the participation in international 
environmental agreements are strategically interconnected in a positive way.  The 
intuition for this is that investments in green technologies reduce the incentives to 
free  ride and induce larger participation rates in the agreement.  Since in our 
assumptions  higher  participation  rates  require  more  abatement  effort,  it  then 
becomes more convenient to invest in green technologies.  This leads to a virtuous 
circle where technological change and cooperation enhance each other.   
As the success and extent of such a positive correlation of events depends on 
the technological parameters η and ζ , which in turn depend on the efficiency of 
the green technology, it can be concluded that, under our assumptions, knowledge 
is the key to solve international negative externalities.  From a policy perspective 
this implies that research in the field of green technologies should be encouraged 
and facilitated, as its value lies not only in the direct effects on green technology 
but also incorporates the indirect effect on the cooperative attitude of countries. 
It  has  to  be  noticed,  however,  that  the  assumptions  of  our  model  are  non-
standard ones.  In particular, we make assumptions on the shape of the payoff 
functions, which are not derived from any optimization process. In chapter 5 we 
therefore turn to analyzing a model in the standard setting, and find the conditions 
under which green investments can foster cooperation. Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    151
     
 
5. Stable coalitions with 
green investments 
Introduction 
In  this  chapter  we  go  deeper  into  the  question  of  analysing  the  role  of 
investment in green capital in models with internal and external stability. We look 
for micro-foundations for the model described in Chapter 4, where investments in 
green  capital  are  shown  to  foster  cooperation.  In  that  framework  we  made 
assumptions on the shape of the payoff functions and showed that it was possible 
to  sustain  full  cooperation.  In  this  chapter  we  analyze  a  model  based  on 
maximization  of  net  benefits  of  abatement,  so  that  we  can  derive  the  payoff 
functions as a result of the optimal choice of abatement levels, on part of the 
members of the coalition and the outsiders.  Our analysis shows that in this kind 
of models full cooperation cannot be reached under general conditions. 
In what follows we show that it is true in general that members of the coalition 
have  a  higher  incentive  to  invest  in  green  capital.  It  is  also  true  that  larger 
coalitions induce higher overall investments in green capital, which in principle 
can sustain larger coalitions. However, outsiders to larger coalitions invest less in 
green capital, which lowers their investments costs. This is in fact another free-
rider benefit that neutralizes the effect of the green capital, so that again small 
coalitions result in equilibrium. The only way larger coalitions can result is by 
noting that the members of a coalition may share, for example, the R&D costs of 
investment.  To  put  it  differently,  only  some  extra  positive  externality  of 
cooperation can boost the size of the coalition. 
The idea that cooperation in technology development is easier than cooperation 
on emission abatement is not new in the literature. Buchner and Carraro (2004) 
discuss  the  possibility  of  substituting  international  agreements  based  only  on 
abatement targets, like the Kyoto protocol, with agreements based only on R&D 
funds and the introduction of technology standards. In their paper they show with 
calibrated simulations that the latter kind of agreements, while self-enforcing, is 
not likely to produce the desired effect of reducing emissions, because R&D on 152      5. Stable coalitions with green investments 
 
the one hand induces cooperation, but it also stimulates growth on the other hand. 
The authors claim that probably better results could be reached by an agreement 
based both on technology incentives and on abatement targets. The present paper 
seems to reach the same conclusion, based on purely theoretical arguments. 
We first present the simplest abatement model that shows that coalitions are 
small  when  internal  and  external  stability  are  required.  Then  the  option  of 
investment in green capital, with the purpose to lower the cost of abatement, is 
introduced. It is shown that the low-size property is quite robust. Different ways 
to introduce this cost reduction and extensions to more standard types of models 
all have the property that the size of the coalition remains small, if the green 
capital stocks are given. However, if countries know that they will be members of 
the coalition and will abate together, they will also jointly decide on investments. 
This implies that a larger coalition will induce higher investments and in this way 
a larger coalition may be sustained. This requires a model with three stages. In the 
first  stage  countries  decide  on  membership,  in  the  second  stage  coalition  and 
outsiders decide on investments in green capital, and in the third stage they decide 
on abatement. It will be shown that when the coalition shares the fixed costs of 
investments, large coalitions can be sustained. 
Internal and external stability 
without green investments 
The  simplest  abatement  model  that  shows  why  coalitions  are  small,  when 
internal and external stability are required, is formulated as follows. Each country 
i, for  n i ,..., 2 , 1 = , with n the total number of countries, can abate  i a  with benefit 
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=  
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i a a a m − − − ∑
=  
This implies that each member of the coalition will abate  m ai =  and each 
individual country will abate  1 = i a . It follows that the members of the coalition 
have a net benefit: 
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2 − − + = m n m m Q  
Internal stability requires that the following condition is met: 
( ) ( ) 1 − ≥ m Q m P  
and external stability requires: 
( ) ( ) m Q m P ≤ +1  
This is only satisfied for m = 2 and m = 3. Note that this is independent of the 
total number of countries n. Whether a coalition of size 2 or 3 results depends on 
what we assume in case of indifference. 
Internal and external stability 
with green investments 
Suppose now that the countries can invest in green capital ki, which changes 
their decision problem on abatement. For example, it affects the parameter in their 
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or it assures a certain level of abatement so that they only have to pay for 
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and in the second case the countries abate  i k m+   and  i k + 1  respectively, and 
here the expressions become 
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In the second case it is immediately clear that the results on the size of the 
coalition do not change, because the capital terms cancel out, but the first case 
needs a bit more analysis. Internal stability requires: 
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It follows that: 
∑ ∑
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1 2 − ≤ − m m  
And thus we can conclude that: 
3 ≤ m  
Again the conclusion holds that the size of the coalition that is internally and 
externally stable is small, regardless of the total number of countries. This means 
that if the levels of green capital are given, the story remains the same. It also 
means that asymmetries in costs do not change the general conclusion. The result 
seems very robust.  
The basic model above is simple but misses one aspect that may be important. 
The interaction is rather weak: outsiders, for example, will always abate the same 
amount, regardless of what the coalition does. One would expect, however, that 
outsiders should abate less, if the coalition is large and abates more. This is the 
idea  of  carbon  leakage.  We  now  extend  our  model  in  order  to  capture  this 
phenomenon. To keep the analysis tractable, the effect of green capital will be 
modelled in the simple way (see above): not as an effect on the parameter of the 
cost function but as a shift of the cost function. 
Assume that for a given level of investment  i k , the net benefits of country i are 
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If a coalition of size  n m < ≤ 1  forms, member countries within the coalition 
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leading to the FOCs: 
( ) m i k a ma m i i ,..., 1 ,    0 = = − − − α β  
while outsider maximize their own net benefits: 
( ) n m i k a a a i i ai
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leading to the FOCs: 
( ) n m i k a a i i ,..., 1     , 0 + = = − − − α β  
It follows that: 
( )( ) 0
2 = + − − − + k a a m n m α α β  
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Note that the Nash equilibrium without coalition formation results for  1 = m , 
and that the abatement levels for the full coalition are given by the first expression 
with  n m = . Note also that for this model only total green capital k affects the 
behaviour in the last stage of the game. 
Optimal investments 
The expressions for net benefits become 
2 2














β α α β β α β
+ − +
− − + − + − + − +
=
m n m
k m k m n m k m n m













β α α β β α β
+ − +
− − + − + − + − +
=
m n m
k k m n m k m n m
k m Q  
The general analysis is complicated so that we use an example to show what 
happens. A more general full analytical discussion will be presented in the next 
section. 
Example 
Suppose  that  the  total  number  of  countries  4 = n   and  the  parameters  and 


















































































Note that  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 5 , 2 5 , 2 5 , 3 5 , 3 Q P Q P = = = : the reason is that  5 = k  means that 
the green capital is equal to β, which can be interpreted as the initial level of 
emissions or the maximum level of abatement. In this case the investment in green 
capital is so high that abatement is not needed any more in the last stage of the 
game. 
Note also that  ( ) ( ) k P k Q , 3 , 2 >  for  5 < k which means that for a given level of 
green capital, the coalition of size 3 is not internally stable. This is in accordance 
with what was found for the preliminary models in the previous section. However, 
if a coalition of size 3 triggers a higher investment in green capital  ( ) 3 k  than a Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    159
     
 
coalition of size 2, it may happen that  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 3 , 3 2 , 2 k P k Q < , so that a coalition of 
size 3 becomes internally stable: for any level  ( ) 5 2 < k , there exists a  ' k such that 
for  ( ) 5 2 ' < < k k  it holds that  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 3 , 2 2 , 2 k P k Q < .  Furthermore, if countries 
decide on membership first, before they decide on investment, it is reasonable to 
assume that they decide on investment together. This may drive up the level of 
green capital sufficiently high to sustain the larger coalition. 
It will be shown that total investment in green capital will indeed be higher if 
more  countries  first  decide  to  join  the  coalition,  but  this  does  not  necessarily 
sustain a larger coalition. The reason is that total investment increases but the 
investment  of  outsiders  decreases.  Outsiders  therefore  have  lower  investment 
costs: in fact another free-rider benefit. If we now look at the total net benefit for 
the investment stage and the abatement stage together, internal stability for the 
larger coalition is lost again.  




i k γ , 
with  20 = γ . 
If a coalition of size  3 = m  forms, the optimality conditions for investment are: 
( ) i k k 20 290 58
90
3
− + − ,   3 , 2 , 1 = i  
( ) , 0 20 210 42
90
1
= − + − i k k   4 = i  
It follows that 
0888 . 0    , 368 . 0    , 1929 . 1 4 3 2 1 = = = = = k k k k k  
If a coalition of size 2 = m  forms, the optimality conditions for investment are: 
2 , 1    , 0 20 ) 2400 480 (
676
2
= = − + − i k k i  
4 , 3    , 0 20 ) 2100 420 (
676
1
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It follows that 
129 . 0    , 2948 . 0    , 8477 . 0 4 3 2 1 = = = = = k k k k k  
Note  that  ( ) ( ) 8477 . 0 2 1929 . 1 3 = > = k k ,  so  that  a  larger  coalition  indeed 
triggers a higher total investment in green capital. 
Note also that  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 8297 . 7 3 , 3 1439 . 7 2 , 2 = < = k P k Q , so that a coalition of 
size 3 seems to become internally stable. However, this conclusion is not correct 
because in this case membership is decided before investment and abatement and 
net benefit for these two stages together satisfies 




1 = − < = − k k Q k k P  
Outsiders to a larger coalition invest less and therefore also have free-rider 
benefits in the investment stage, so that we have the same old story again. 
R&D spillovers foster cooperation 
We have shown that green investments are not sufficient to foster cooperation. 
In  this  section  we  will  show  that  the  larger  coalitions  can  be  achieved  if  the 
members of the coalition have lower average investment costs than the outsiders: 
for example, when the members of the coalition share the costs of R&D
53.  
In order to show this we introduce a fixed cost of investment δ. The members 
of the coalition share this cost or have a lower fixed cost because of a knowledge 
spillover  between  them.  In  this  way  the  optimality  conditions,  the  resulting 
investments and  ( ) ( ) 3 , 3 k P  and  ( ) ( ) 2 , 2 k Q  are the same. If for example  1 = δ , then 
the net benefits of an outsider always decrease by 1, but the net benefits of a 
member of the coalition with size 3 only decrease by  3
1 .   It follows that: 




1 = − − > = − − k k Q k k P  
so that the coalition of size 3 is stable. 
The conclusion is that just introducing an investment stage is not sufficient to 
sustain larger coalitions. Some positive externality of cooperation is needed to get 
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this  result.  This  can  also  be  achieved  by  introducing  a  positive  externality  of 
cooperation directly into the abatement stage, but we prefer to model investments 
explicitly. 
The question remains how large the internally and externally stable coalition 
can be, and for which level of δ. In order to investigate this question, we need a 
full analysis of the model in section 3. 
The full model 
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From  the  optimality  conditions  (see  appendix  A)  we  can  derive  total 
investment in green capital: 
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The expressions for net benefits become: 
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At this point the expressions become too difficult to continue analytically. It is 
easy, however, to programme these equations and to test for internal and external 
stability numerically. We know from the example in section 4 that for  0 = δ  we 
still have the old grim story of small stable coalitions, but for  0 > δ  we may be 
able to enlarge the size of the stable coalition. Two values of δ are interesting: the 
minimum value of δ needed to enlarge the coalition with one country, which we 
call  1 δ  hence after, and the minimum value of δ needed to get the full coalition, 
which we call  f δ . We will analyze numerically how these two values depend on 
the value of the parameters: the initial level of emissions β, the cost parameters α 
and γ, and the total number of countries n.  
We fix the parameter β = 5 and equate the cost parameters α and γ so that we 
can look at the value of δ as a function of the cost parameter α = γ and the total 
number of countries n. First we state, as a benchmark, the precise result for δ = 0. 
 
Proposition 1 
For  0 = δ  the size of the stable coalition is either 1 or 2. For any n, a value  ' α  
exists, such that for  ' α α <  the size of the stable coalition is 1 and for  ' α α >  the 
size of the stable coalition is 2. The value of  ' α  is increasing in n. 
 
This confirms the standard result that the size of the stable coalition is small.  
For high values of the cost parameter the size is 2, but even this small coalition 
breaks down for low values of the cost parameter, and this happens sooner in case 
the  total  number  of  countries  is  large.    Next  we  introduce  a  positive  δ, 
representing a positive externality of joint R&D for the coalition, and calculate the 
minimum  value  needed  to  enlarge  the  coalition  with  one  country.    Figure  32 
presents the typical result that can be stated as follows. Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    163




For  1 δ δ ≥  the size of the stable coalition is enlarged with at least one country. 
As a function of the cost parameter α, the minimum value  1 δ  first increases, then 
decreases  down  to  zero  at  ' α α = ,  and  then  jumps  up  and  decreases 
asymptotically to zero. 
 
Figure 32   Typical behavior of δ1 
It is clear that  0 1 = δ  at  ' α α =  because at that point, according to Proposition 
1, the stable coalition is already enlarged from size 1 to size 2 without introducing 
any δ .  It is also intuitively clear that beyond that point  1 δ  decreases because a 
higher value of the cost parameter α makes it easier to enlarge the size of the 
stable coalition, and the same applies for the decrease just before  ' α .  The initial 
increase in  1 δ  for low values of α  is due to the effect of the relative size of  1 δ  
and α : it can be shown that 
α
δ1  is always decreasing.  In Proposition 1 it was 
shown that  ' α  increases in n.  This implies for the pattern in Proposition 2 that the 164      5. Stable coalitions with green investments 
 
picture is stretched out to the right: Figure 33 and Figure 34 give examples for 
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The important conclusion is that some positive externality of cooperation opens 
up the possibility of a larger stable coalition.  In the standard model a higher value 
of the cost parameter α  increases the size of the stable coalition from 1 to 2 but 
then it stops.  This result is very robust for variations in the standard model.  
However, with the positive externality it is possible to increase the size of the 
stable coalition further.  Moreover, for high values of the cost parameter α  only a 
little bit is needed: for any small  0 > δ , a value  ' ' α  exists, such for  ' ' α α >  the 
size of the stable coalition is 3. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to see if the full coalition can also result as a stable 
coalition and therefore we define  f δ  as the minimum value of δ  needed to get 
the full coalition. Figure 4 shows that  f δ  also first increases and then decreases in 
α , just as the general tendency for  1 δ .  However,  f δ  is not forced to zero at 
' α α =  because the focus is now on the stability of the full coalition and not on 
the stability of the coalition of size 2. Furthermore,  f δ  is everywhere larger than 
1 δ , as is to be expected of course.  Again it can be shown that 
α
δ f  is always 
decreasing, so that the initial increase is due to the effect of the relative size of  f δ  




If we fix the cost parameter α  and plot  f δ  as a function of the total number of 
countries n, Figure 36 results.  First note that the benchmark case now shows a 
stable coalition of size 2 in the beginning, followed by a stable coalition of size 1.  
The reason is that for a fixed α , we need a small n to get a stable coalition of size 
2 (compare with figures 1 and 2): in this picture it holds that for any  α  there 
exists a value  ' n  such that for  ' n n >  the size of the stable coalition is 1.  The 
pattern of  f δ  is interesting. Initially, when the stable coalition has size 2 in the 
benchmark case,  f δ  is increasing in n.  However, when the coalition of size 2 
breaks down in the benchmark case,  f δ  becomes decreasing in n.  It means that 
for a large total number of countries, only a small positive externality is needed to 
get the full coalition.   Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    167




A possible explanation for this observation is that when n is large, the relative 
value of sharing the fixed-cost investment increases, as its cost can be shared 
among  more  participants.  At  the  same  time,  for  large  n,  the  difference 
( ) ( ) n n k n P k n Q , , 1 1 − − −
54 tends to decrease, and converges asymptotically to zero, 
thus implying that less and less of the positive externality is needed to achieve full 
cooperation. This is shown in Figure 37. 
                                                 
54 With kn and kn-1 we denote here the optimal investments when the size of the coalition is n 






The simulations prove that in a model where the payoff functions are derived 
by the optimization of the costs and benefits of abatement, the introduction of 
green investments does not suffice to induce a larger coalition size in the game. 
To obtain larger coalitions, we need to assume that the countries that choose to 
cooperate have the opportunity to share some fixed costs of the investment. Such 
fixed costs could be for example the costs of R&D.  
This result seems in line with what other authors claim in the current debate on 
international  agreements  on  climate  change.  In  particular,  our  model  provides 
theoretical basis to the argument that probably the best way to reach effective 
international cooperation is an agreement based both on technology incentives and 
on abatement targets. Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    169
     
 
The relative magnitude of the R&D investment that is needed to induce larger 
coalitions seems in general to be quite small and decreasing both in the number of 
countries and in the absolute magnitude of the costs of abatement.  This happens 
because the properties of the benchmark model without fixed-costs sharing are 
such that the incentives to free-ride always decrease in the two parameters α  and 
N, due to the fact that abatement per country is reduced when more countries 
participate in the game and when the costs of abatement are higher. Because the 
incentives  remain  positive,  there  is  a  need  for  a  counterbalancing  positive 
externality,  but  its  relative  magnitude  decreases  as  the  incentives  to  free-ride 
decrease in the benchmark model. 170      5. Stable coalitions with green investments 
 
Appendices 
Appendix A: Optimal investment 
We assume that the objective function for a coalition of size m is given by the 
net benefits from abatement given investments, minus the investment costs which 
are made up of a fixed-costs part that can be shared by the members, (δ), plus a 
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Maximization of this objective function leads to the system of FOCs: 
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The outsider countries maximize instead their own net benefits from abatement 
given investments, minus the investment costs, which in this case is borne entirely 
by one country: 
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leading to the system of FOCs: 
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Adding up all the FOCs for insiders and outsiders we get one equation in k: 
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Substituting  in  the  original  system,  we  can  reduce  it  to  a  system  of  two 
equations in two variables: 
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with solution: 
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It is easy to check that the full-coalition and the Nash-equilibrium solutions are 
special cases of the PANE solutions and can be derived directly form the PANE 
solutions. 
Appendix B: deriving the payoff functions 
From the solution of the first order conditions we get the following system of 
expressions: 
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We can then substitute these results into the expressions for the payoff function 
for insiders and for outsiders:  
I:  
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Conclusions 
It has been our choice in this work to investigate from an economic perspective 
the  question  of  the  optimal  extent  of  climate  change  prevention.    We  have 
therefore chosen an abstract approach to analyze the problem of giving proper 
“rational”  foundation  to  the  choice  of  abatement  targets,  taking  into  account 
relevant  cognitive  and  cooperative  issues  that  characterize  the  climate  change 
problem.   
The  definition  of  “optimal”  abatement  targets  involves  two  conceptually 
different kinds of economic issues: determining the value of prevention on one 
side; and implementing international environmental agreements on the other hand.  
These  two  issues  are  deeply  correlated:  in  the  case  of  climate  change,  the 
perceived value of prevention for one policy actor depends among other things 
also on the degree of coordination expected at the international level; similarly, 
the attractiveness of cooperation depends crucially on the perceived costs and 
benefits from prevention. 
Methodologically, however, determining the value of prevention involves the 
use of very different instruments and concepts than the discussion on international 
cooperation.  For this reason the content of the dissertation can be divided into 
two parts.  Part one is made up by chapters 1 to 3 and it is dedicated to one-agent 
problems under uncertainty.  Part two to is made up by chapters 4 and 5 and 
concentrates on multi-agents models useful for analyzing the issue of international 
cooperation. 
 
In the first chapter, we have described some features of the climate change 
problem that we consider relevant from a cognitive point of view.  In particular, 
we  introduced  thresholds  in  the  utility  function  and  assumed  that  scientific 
knowledge about relevant aspects of the problem was incomplete.  We have then 
given  an  interpretation  of  the  precautionary  principle  as  a  special  decision 
criterion,  described  by  means  of  rank-dependent  utility  theory  with  convex 
weights.    This  mathematical  representation  of  the  preferences  of  agents 
concerning  risky  outcomes  has  the  property  of  reproducing  what  we  call  a 
“prudent”  attitude,  that  is,  an  attitude  where  more  attention  is  paid  to  worse 176      Conclusions
   
 
chances  rather  than  better  ones.    The  (meta-)  choice  of  implementing  such  a 
criterion ex-ante has consequences on the level of optimal prevention, and in this 
respect  results  are  not  unequivocal,  since  in  some  cases  imposing  “prudent” 
behaviour leads to higher levels of pollution.  The reason for this result is that 
given some parameter specifications it is very likely to cross threshold levels of 
pollution already for low consumption; in these cases, if the assessed impact of 
climate change is not too high it is possible that the most prudent decision is 
indeed to compensate the loss of environmental utility with more consumption.  
This  is  in  contrast  with  many  other  approaches  that  tend  to  interpret  the 
precautionary principle straight as a request for more prevention: our results imply 
that a conservative use of resources is not necessarily optimal when applying the 
precautionary principle ex-ante.  However, it is also clear from our simulations 
that for most parametric combinations, a “prudent attitude” determines a lower 
level of emissions than the benchmark expected utility model, and this is always 
the  case  when  scenarios  differ  only  in  the  assessed  impact  of  crossing  the 
threshold. 
Normatively,  these  results  stress  one  feature  of  convex-weighted  rank-
dependent utility: since more importance is given to the worse outcomes, a big 
issue becomes how the worst scenario is designed.  Making the precautionary 
principle operational translates then in a problem of identifying the appropriate 
state space, as suggested also by Henry and Henry (2002).  This stresses the major 
importance of geophysical parameters, such as l (expected damage from crossing 
the threshold) and π (describing the location of the threshold), and suggests that 
modelling  issues  (such  as  the  shape  of  the  utility  function)  are  relatively  less 
important.  
Our results also show that agents maximizing convex-weighted rank-dependent 
utility more often choose lower levels of emissions than inverse-S-shaped rank-
dependent  utility  maximizing  agents.    This  is  an  important  observation  if  we 
consider that actual decision makers show behaviour of the latter type in most 
experimental studies on individual choice under uncertainty.  If we believe that 
the precautionary principle should be put in place, implementing rank-dependent 
utility with convex-weights, and if we believe that in real life most people behave Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    177
     
 
as  inverse-S-shaped  rank-dependent  utility  maximizing  agents,  then  we  can 
conclude that most likely we observe too low levels of prevention in reality.   
We  have  thus  proceeded  in  chapter  two  and  three  to,  respectively,  build  a 
testable model, and test the behaviour of real agents.  To this purpose, we have 
included  in  these  tests  assumptions  that  reproduce  two  salient  features  of  the 
climate issue, namely the presence of thresholds in the outcomes and uncertainty 
regarding  the  location  of  the  thresholds.    We  have  then  tested  four  different 
theories:  expected  utility,  expected  value,  rank-dependent  utility  with  convex 
weights, and rank-dependent utility with inverse-S shaped weights. 
The model we have used is based on a simple model of harvesting choice 
without labour costs.  The link to climate change can be seen if we interpret the 
atmosphere as a pollution sink with a given (renewable) capacity: “harvesting” is 
then the act of using some of this capacity.  Thresholds are present in the outcome 
function because if harvesting is such that the remaining stock of the resource is 
below a critical level, the resource will not be productive in the future.   
In chapter two, we build up models to analyze the choice of the agent when we 
assume that the agent is risk-neutral, risk-adverse, or when we assume that the 
agent  wishes  to  avoid  bad  outcomes.    In  all  these  situations,  if  the  optimal 
harvesting  is  not  a  corner  solution,  the  models  predict  the  same  qualitative 
behavior  when  the  range  and  the  mean  of  the  distribution  of  the  unknown 
parameter  change:  if  the  range  of  the  distribution  increases,  meaning  more 
uncertainty, then it is optimal to harvest (= pollute) more; if the mean of the 
distribution increases, meaning that it is easier to cross the threshold, then it is 
optimal  to  harvest  less.    However,  often  the  theories  predict  corner  solutions: 
harvest all (= deplete the atmospheric regeneration capacity) or eliminate all risks 
(= use less of the resource than the minimum possible threshold value).  In these 
cases usually no reaction is expected when a slight change in the range and mean 
of the distribution occurs, and very sharp reactions are observed when the range or 
the mean of the distribution change more substantially.  If we believe that people 
behave in real life like these theories predict, then this conclusions mean that we 
can  expect  extreme  reactions  of  people  when  facing  outcome  functions  with 
thresholds.    We  also  can  expect  these  reactions  to  show  little  sensitivity  to 178      Conclusions
   
 
nuanced  changes  and  high  sensitivity  to  substantial  changes  in  the  perceived 
outcomes. 
In  chapter  three  we  actually  have  tested  each  of  the  models  of  extraction 
behavior in the presence of a stochastic extinction threshold that were presented in 
chapter  two,  plus  one,  namely  rank-dependent  utility  with  inverse-S  shaped 
probability weighting.  Using Selten’s (1991) measure of predictive success, we 
have found that rank-dependent utility with convex weights (RDUCW), which is 
the  most  “prudent”  of  the  models  suggested,  provides  the  best  fit  for  our 
observations.  This holds even when we allow for heterogeneity of the parameters 
of  the  model  across  individuals.    Hence,  our  experiment  shows  that  subjects 
facing extraction decisions in a setting with stochastic extinction threshold are 
best modelled as a population of rank-dependent utility maximizers with convex 
probability weighting functions and heterogeneous weighting parameters. 
The  result  of  our  experiment  is  different  from  what  observed  in  earlier 
experiments designed to compare different risky choice models: most other papers 
conclude that the inverse S-shaped probability weighting function provides the 
best overall fit.  A way to explain this difference is found noticing that previous 
experiments used very specific types of risky choice situations: mostly simple 
lottery choice tasks.  In order to assess behaviour in the face of climate change we 
choose instead to present our subjects with tasks that reproduce more closely a 
problem of renewable resource management.  In particular, subjects have more 
choices,  and  the  outcome  functions  present  thresholds.    We  have  introduced 
thresholds in a payoff matrix, so that our subjects can understand in an intuitive 
way the role the threshold plays in determining the uncertain outcome of their 
decisions.  The fact that our subjects give reasonable solutions to the tasks, while 
at the same time act differently from what normally subjects do in other types of 
experiments suggests that the type of decision task affects behaviour and this is 
reflected in the theoretical model that best fits observed choices.    
From an environmental policy point of view our results are not as good news as 
it might seem. Although we can interpret the behavior of our subject as “prudent” 
in the sense that they appear to weigh bad outcomes heavier than good ones, rapid 
extraction behavior is present. Our experiment, which was specifically designed to 
test behavior in situations with risk of extinction of a resource, shows that a large Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    179
     
 
majority of decision-makers do take the risk of extinction into account, but that 
does not always lead to extracting less of the resource.   
 
In  this  first  part  we  have  shown  that  optimal  policy  depends  on  risk-
preferences, on the perceived state-space (the set of all possible events), and on 
the structure of the decision task.  These observations all concerned one-agent 
decision tasks, that is, tasks where only one individual or institution is responsible 
for choice.  The issue of prevention becomes even more complex if we consider 
that climate change is a global pollution problem, and thus several governments 
have  to  coordinate  their  action  in  order  to  successfully  reduce  emissions  of 
greenhouse  gases  and  realize  prevention  goals.    In  the  second  part  of  the 
dissertation, including chapters four and five, we have therefore focussed on this 
kind of issues, concerning international cooperation, and for reasons of tractability 
have had to leave aside uncertainty and thresholds.  We have kept these issues in 
the back of our mind, though, and this has led us to make some considerations of a 
methodological  nature.    First  of  all,  a  high  level  of  uncertainty  means  that 
different countries may have a different perception of the very structure of the 
game:  we  have  argued  that  this  might  explain  why  Europe  and  USA  follow 
different strategies, without implying either position to be necessarily “irrational”.  
Secondly,  we  have  pointed  out  that  the  level  of  uncertainty  could  affect  the 
cooperation  game  in  such  a  way  that  a  cooperative  approach  to  coalition 
formation becomes impossible.  When a country withdraws from a coalition, the 
rest of the members have no interest in breaking apart and implementing a trigger 
strategy leading to complete lack of cooperation, as this would leave the chance of 
catastrophic outcomes open.  The possibility of committing to a trigger strategy is 
the founding element for the (γ-core) cooperative approach to coalition formation, 
and  therefore  given  the  lack  of  such  possibility,  this  approach  is  not  very 
appropriate in the framework of climate change.  This is very bad news, as we 
have argued in chapter four, because it implies that typically only a very small 
coalition of two or three countries forms in the end.  We have thus looked for 
mechanisms that can lead to enlargement of the coalition in a non-cooperative 
setting.  180      Conclusions
   
 
The first model we have looked at is one that introduces the possibility of 
investing in green-energy plants.  If a coalition forms, and if the countries in the 
coalition are allowed to share some of the costs of green investments, this can 
even lead to full cooperation.  The model in chapter four is very simple and based 
on  somehow  ad-hoc  hypotheses  on  the  shape  of  the  payoff  functions  for  the 
members and outsiders of a given coalition.  This simple representation, however, 
shows that investments in green technology and the participation in international 
environmental agreements are strategically interconnected in a positive way.  The 
intuition for this is that investments in green technologies reduce the incentives to 
free  ride and induce larger participation rates in the agreement.  Since in our 
assumptions  higher  participation  rates  require  more  abatement  effort,  it  then 
becomes more convenient to invest in green technologies.  This leads to a virtuous 
circle where technological change and cooperation enhance each other.   
As the success and extent of such a positive correlation of events depends on 
the  parameters  that  define  the  efficiency  of  the  green  technology,  it  can  be 
concluded  that,  under  our  assumptions,  knowledge  is  the  key  to  solve 
international negative externalities.  From a policy perspective this implies that 
research in the field of green technologies should be encouraged and facilitated, as 
its  value  lies  not  only  in  the  direct  effects  on  green  technology  but  also 
incorporates  the  indirect  effect  on  the  cooperative  attitude  of  countries.    The 
assumptions that lead to our results in this model, however, are not derived from 
any optimization process.  This makes the intuitive process clearer, but might cut 
out important relations among the variables of the model.  In chapter five we 
therefore turn to analyzing a model in a more standard optimizing setting, and find 
the conditions under which green investments can foster cooperation. 
The model in chapter  five is based on the maximization of net benefits of 
abatement, and the payoff functions are derived as a result of the optimal choice 
of abatement levels.  We have run simulations and have observed that in this kind 
of  model  allowing  for  green  investments  is  not  sufficient  to  induce  a  larger 
coalition size in the game.  More positive results have been obtained though, once 
we  have  assumed  that  the  countries  that  choose  to  cooperate  also  have  the 
opportunity to share some fixed costs of the investment.  Such fixed costs could 
be for example interpreted as the costs of R&D.  With this respect, our model Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    181
     
 
provides theoretical basis to the idea (until now only present in the empirical 
literature) that probably the best way to reach effective international cooperation 
concerning climate change prevention is an agreement based both on technology 
incentives and on abatement targets. 
The relative magnitude of the R&D investment that is needed to induce larger 
coalitions  seems  in  general  to  be  quite  small  and  it  is  decreasing  both  in  the 
number of countries and in the absolute magnitude of the costs of abatement.  
This  happens  because  abatement  per  country  is  reduced  when  more  countries 
participate in the game and when the costs of abatement are higher.  This implies 
that as the costs of abatement are higher, or the number of countries increases, 
then the incentives to free ride decrease, always remaining positive but tending to 
zero.    Because  the  incentives  remain  positive,  there  is  always  a  need  for  a 
counterbalancing positive externality, but its relative magnitude decreases as the 
incentives to free-ride decrease in the benchmark model, meaning that less and 
less of the fixed costs need to be shared in order to foster cooperation.  From a 
policy perspective this suggests that an agreement based on abatement targets and 
including  a  sufficient  number  of  countries  can  be  reached  if  the  participating 
countries are allowed to share the costs of research in green technology while the 
non-participating countries are not. Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    183
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Samenvatting 
Dit  proefschrift  behandelt  de  optimale  mate  van  preventie  van 
klimaatverandering  vanuit  economisch  perspectief.    Er  is  gekozen  voor  een 
abstracte  benadering  om  een  rationele  verklaring  voor  de  keuze  van  emissie 
reductiedoelstellingen te geven. Hierbij wordt rekening gehouden met relevante 
cognitieve en coöperatieve problemen die karakteristiek zijn voor het probleem 
van klimaatverandering. 
 De  definitie  van  optimale  emissie  reductiedoelstellingen  raakt  aan  twee 
conceptueel verschillende economische onderwerpen: aan de ene kant het bepalen 
van  de  waarde  van  preventie  en  aan  de  andere  kant  het  implementeren  van 
internationale milieuverdragen.  
Deze  twee  onderwerpen  hangen  sterk  met  elkaar  samen:  in  het  geval  van 
klimaatverandering is de verwachte waarde van preventie voor één beleidsactor 
onder meer afhankelijk van de verwachte mate van coördinatie op internationaal 
niveau;  tegelijkertijd  is  de  aantrekkingskracht  van  samenwerking  uitermate 
afhankelijk van de verwachte kosten en baten van preventie.  
In methodologisch opzicht vraagt het bepalen van de waarde van preventie het 
gebruik  van  geheel  andere  instrumenten  en  concepten  dan  de  discussie  over 
internationale samenwerking.  De inhoud van deze dissertatie is daarom in tweeën 
te delen.  Het eerste deel bestaat uit de hoofdstukken 1 tot en met 3 en behandelt 
problemen bij onzekerheid in modellen met één agent.   Deel twee bestaat uit 
hoofdstuk 4 en 5.  Dit deel concentreert zich op  modellen met meerdere agenten 
om het onderwerp van internationale samenwerking te analyseren.   
In  het  eerste  hoofstuk  worden  enkele  vanuit  congnitief  oogpunt  relevante 
kenmerken beschreven van het probleem van klimaatverandering beschreven. In 
het bijzonder worden drempels (thresholds) in de nutsfunctie geïntroduceerd en 
wordt aangenomen dat de wetenschappelijke kennis van relevante aspecten van 
het probleem niet volledig is. Vervolgens wordt een interpretatie gegeven van het 
voorzorgsprincipe als een bijzonder besliscriterium, beschreven door middel van 
de  rang-afhankelijke  nutstheorie  (rank-dependent  utility  theory)  met  convexe 
waarschijnlijkheidsgewichten.  Deze wiskundige weergave van de voorkeuren van 
agenten met betrekking tot risicovolle uitkomsten heeft de eigenschap om een 190      Samenvatting 
 
behoedzame houding te reproduceren.  Anders gezegd, een houding van agenten 
waarbij meer aandacht uitgaat naar slechtere uitkomsten dan naar de betere. De 
(meta) keuze om een criterium ex-ante te implementeren heeft gevolgen voor het 
niveau van optimale preventie.  In dit opzicht zijn de resultaten van dit hoofdstuk 
niet ondubbelzinnig, aangezien in sommige gevallen behoedzaam gedrag tot een 
hogere mate van vervuiling leidt.  De reden voor dit resultaat is dat voor sommige 
specificaties  van  parameters  de  drempelniveaus  van  vervuiling  gemakkelijk 
overschreden  kunnen  worden.  In  deze  gevallen  is  het  mogelijk  dat  het  meest 
behoedzame besluit inderdaad is om het verlies aan nut uit milieu te compenseren 
met een hogere consumptie. In tegenstelling tot de vele andere benaderingen die 
ertoe neigen om het voorzorgsprincipe te interpreteren als een rechtstreekse vraag 
naar meer preventie, zeggen de resultaten in dit onderzoek dat een spaarzaam 
gebruik  van  bronnen  niet  noodzakelijk  de  meest  optimale  is  wanneer  het 
voorzorgsprincipe  ex-ante  toegepast  wordt.    Daarentegen  is  uit  de  tests  ook 
duidelijk geworden dat bij de meeste parameterwaarden de behoedzame houding 
een lager niveau van uitstoot geeft dan het standaard model van verwacht nut.  Dit 
is  altijd  het  geval  wanneer  de  scenario's  alleen  van  elkaar  verschillen  in  de  
vastgestelde gevolgen van het overschrijden van een drempel. 
Normatief  gezien,  benadrukken  deze  resultaten  één  kenmerk  van  rang-
afhankelijke  nutstheorie  met  convexe  waarschijnlijkheidsgewichten:  aangezien 
meer waarde wordt gehecht aan de slechtste uitkomsten wordt de vraag hoe het 
ontwerp  van  het  'worst  case  scenario'  er  uitziet  van  belang.    Wanneer  het 
voorzorgsprincipe vervolgens in werking gesteld wordt, vertaalt dit zich in het 
probleem  van  de  identificatie  van  de  juiste  toestandsruimte,  zoals  dit  al  werd 
voorgesteld door Henry & Henry (2002). Dit benadrukt het enorme belang van 
geofysische parameters, zoals de verwachte schade bij het overschrijden van een 
drempel en de beschrijving van de locatie  van de drempel, en laat zien dat het 
vraagstuk  van  modellen  (zoals  de  vorm  van  de  nutsfunctie)  relatief  minder 
belangrijk is.  
 De resultaten laten ook zien dat agenten die rang-afhankelijk nut met convexe 
gewichten maximaliseren vaker voor lagere niveaus van uitstoot kiezen dan de 
agenten  die  rang-afhankelijk  nut  met  omgekeerde-S  gewichten  maximaliseren.  
Dit  is  een  belangrijke  observatie  indien  verondersteld  wordt  dat  de  eigenlijke Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    191
     
 
besluitvormers  zich  in  de  meeste  experimentele  studies  gedragen  volgens  het 
laatste  type.    Als  aangenomen  wordt  dat  het  voorzorgsprincipe  gebruikt  zou 
moeten worden, door het implementeren van rang-afhankelijke nutstheorie met 
convexe  waarschijnlijkheidsgewichten,  en  als  er  vanuit  gegaan  wordt  dat  in 
werkelijkheid  de  meeste  mensen  rang-afhankelijk  nut  met  omgekeerde-S 
gewichten maximaliseren, dan worden er hoogstwaarschijnlijk in werkelijkheid te 
lage preventie niveaus gehanteerd.  
In aansluiting hierop wordt in hoofstuk twee en drie een testmodel ontwikkeld 
om het gedrag van echte agenten te testen. In de test zijn aannamen meegenomen 
die twee opvallende kenmerken van het klimaatprobleem reproduceren, namelijk 
de aanwezigheid van drempels in de resultaten, en de onduidelijkheid over de 
locatie van die drempels.  Er zijn vervolgens vier verschillende theorieën getest: 
verwacht  nut,  verwachte  waarde,  rang-afhankelijke  nutstheorie  met  convexe 
waarschijnlijkheidsgewichten, en rang-afhankelijke nutstheorie met omgekeerde-
S waarschijnlijkheidsgewichten. 
Het  gebruikte  model  is  gebaseerd  op  een  eenvoudig  model  van  een 
hernieuwbare  hulpbron  zonder  arbeidskosten.  Het  verband  met 
klimaatverandering kan gezien worden als een interpretatie van de atmosfeer als 
een stortplaats voor vervuiling met een beperkte (vernieuwbare) capaciteit:  de 
oogst is dan het gebruik van een deel van deze capaciteit. Drempels zijn aanwezig 
in de oorzaak-gevolg relatie, want als na de oogst de overblijvende voorraad van 
de bron onder een bepaald kritisch niveau komt, dan zal de bron in de toekomst 
niet productief zijn.  
In hoofdstuk twee worden modellen ontwikkeld om de keuze van een agent te 
analyseren indien wordt aangenomen dat een bepaalde agent  risico-neutraal of 
risico-avers is, of indien aangenomen wordt dat de agent slechte uitkomsten wil 
vermijden.  In alle gevallen geldt dat als de optimale oogst  geen hoekoplossing is, 
de modellen dan hetzelfde kwalitatieve gedrag voorspellen wanneer de onbekende 
parameters veranderen: als de onzekerheid hoger is, dan is het beter om meer te 
vervuilen; als het makkelijker wordt om een drempel  te overschrijden, dan is het 
beter om minder te vervuilen. Daarentegen voorspellen de theorieën vaak extreme 
keuzes: de uitputting van het herstelvermogen van de atmosfeer of de eliminatie 
van  alle  risico's.    In  deze  gevallen  wordt  gewoonlijk  geen  reactie  verwacht 192      Samenvatting 
 
wanneer een kleine verandering in het aantal mogelijke uitkomsten plaatsvindt en 
zeer  duidelijke  reacties  worden  waargenomen  wanneer  het  aantal  mogelijke 
uitkomsten  en  het  gemiddelde  van  de  distributie  substantieel  veranderen.    Als 
ervan uitgegaan wordt dat mensen zich in werkelijkheid zullen gedragen zoals 
deze  theorieën  beweren,  dan  betekenen  deze  conclusies  dat  extreme  reacties 
verwacht  kunnen  worden  als  deze  mensen  geconfronteerd  worden  met  een 
oorzaak-gevolg relatie met drempels.  Er kan ook verwacht worden dat bij kleine 
veranderingen in deze relatie er weinig reacties zullen plaatsvinden en dat er veel 
reacties bij substantiële veranderingen plaatsvinden. 
In hoofdstuk drie wordt door middel van een experiment ieder model van het 
gebruik  van  een  hernieuwbare  hulpbron  uit  hoofdstuk  twee,  plus  de  rang-
afhankelijke nutstheorie met omgekeerde-S gewichten getest.  Gebruik makend 
van Selten’s (1991) maatstaf van voorspellend vermogen, is gebleken dat de rang-
afhankelijke nutstheorie met convexe gewichten, welke het meest “behoedzame” 
van  de  onderzochte  modellen  is,  het  beste  past  bij  de  bevindingen  in  dit 
onderzoek.    Dit  houdt  zelfs  stand  wanneer  individuen  heterogeen  zijn  in  de 
modelparameters.    Het  experiment  laat  zien  dat  proefpersonen  het  beste 
gemodelleerd kunnen worden als een populatie van agenten die heterogeen zijn in 
de  waarschijnlijkheidsgewichten  en  hun  rang-afhankelijke  nut  met  convexe 
gewichtsfuncties  maximaliseren. 
Het  resultaat  van  dit  experiment  is  anders  dan  de  resultaten  uit  eerdere 
experimenten  die  ook  verschillende  modellen  van  keuzen  onder  risico  wilden 
vergelijken:  in  het  grootste  deel  van  de  literatuur  wordt  geconcludeerd  dat  de 
omgekeerde-S gewichtsfunctie het beste past.  Een verklaring hiervoor is dat in 
eerdere experimenten zeer specifieke soorten problemen van keuzen onder risico 
werden gebruikt, meestal waren dit simpele loterij opdrachten.  Om te bestuderen 
hoe agenten omgaan met de risico’s van klimaatverandering is er in hoofdstuk 
drie voor gekozen om de proefpersonen taken aan te bieden die meer lijken op het 
probleem van het beheersen van een hernieuwbare hulpbron.  De proefpersonen  
hebben vooral meer keuzemogelijkheden en de oorzaak-gevolg relaties bevatten 
een drempel.  Via een beloningsmatrix beseffen proefpersonen op een intuïtieve 
manier welke rol de drempel speelt bij het bepalen van de onzekere uitkomst van 
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opdrachten, maar tegelijkertijd anders dan normaalgesproken proefpersonen doen 
in andere soorten experimenten: dit laat zien dat de vorm van de opdracht het 
gedrag beïnvloedt en dit is terug te zien in het theoretische model dat deze keuzes 
het beste beschrijft. 
Vanuit  het  standpunt  van  milieubeleid  zijn  deze  resultaten  enigszins 
teleurstellend.  Hoewel  het  gedrag  van  een  proefpersoon  als  "behoedzaam" 
geïnterpreteerd  kan  worden,  wordt  te  snel  geëxtraheerd.    Het  experiment  is 
specifiek ontwikkeld om gedrag te testen in situaties die het risico van leegvallen 
van een bron met zich meebrengen,  en het laat zien dat een groot deel van de 
besluitnemers wel rekening houdt met dit risico, maar dat het niet altijd leidt tot 
een verminderd gebruik van de bron.   
In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift wordt aangetoond dat optimaal beleid 
afhankelijk is van risico-voorkeuren, de verzameling van alle mogelijkheden en de 
structuur van de opdracht.   De waarnemingen richten zich op taken waar alleen 
een individu of instelling verantwoordelijk is voor de keuze.  Het probleem van 
preventie  is  nog  complexer  als  bedacht  wordt  dat  klimaatverandering  een 
probleem is van internationale omvang, en regeringen moeten dus samenwerken 
om er in te slagen het broeikaseffect te verminderen en preventieve doelen te 
stellen.  Het tweede deel van deze dissertatie, hoofdstuk vier en vijf, concentreert 
zich  op  internationale  samenwerking,  en  laat  onzekerheid  en  drempels  buiten 
beschouwing.  Deze issues blijven op de achtergrond wel aanwezig,  en dit leidt 
tot  enige  methodologische  overwegingen.    Ten  eerste,  een  hoog  niveau  van 
onzekerheid betekent dat verschillende landen een andere kijk kunnen hebben op 
de structuur van het spel: in hoofdstuk vier wordt beargumenteerd dat dit een 
verklaring kan zijn voor de verschillende strategiën van Europa en de VS.  Ten 
tweede wordt aangetoond dat het niveau van onzekerheid effect kan hebben op het 
samenwerkingsspel  zodat  een  coöperatieve    benadering  om  een  coalitie  te 
verkrijgen onmogelijk wordt.  Als een land de coalitie verlaat, hebben de andere 
landen geen interesse om uit elkaar te gaan, omdat dit het risico van catastrofale 
gevolgen  vergroot.    De  mogelijkheid  om  de  coalitie  te  breken  als  straf  voor 
overtreders is de fundamentele aanname van de (g-core) coöperatieve  benadering 
om  een  coalitie  te  verkrijgen,  en  als  deze  mogelijkheid  ontbreekt,  dan  is  de 
coöperatieve  benadering  dus  niet  goed  van  toepassing.    Als  gevolg  daarvan 194      Samenvatting 
 
kunnen alleen heel kleine coalities van twee of drie landen ontstaan.  Hoofdstuk 
vier onderzoekt dan een manier om de coalitie te verbreden in de context van een 
niet-coöperatieve benadering. 
Het model in hoofdstuk vier introduceert de mogelijkheid om te investeren in 
de  productie  van  groene  stroom.  Als  een  coalitie  ontstaat,  en  als  de 
samenwerkende landen een deel van de investeringskosten kunnen delen, dan kan 
dit leiden tot wereldwijde samenwerking.  Het model in hoofdstuk vier is heel 
simpel  en  gebaseerd  op  ad-hoc  aannamen  omtrent  de  vorm  van  de 
beloningsfuncties voor de deelnemers aan de coalitie en voor de buitenstanders.   
Deze  simpele  weergave  laat  zien  dat  investeren  in  groene  technologie  en 
internationale samenwerking op een positieve manier aan elkaar gekoppeld zijn.  
De intuïtie hierachter is dat investeringen in groene technologie de prikkel tot 
liftersgedrag verminderen en leiden tot bredere samenwerking.  Omdat er in dit 
model  van  uit  gegaan  wordt  dat  bredere  samenwerking  ook  meer  preventie 
inhoudt, worden investeringen in groene technologie nog waardevoller.  In dat 
geval  ondersteunen  technische  ontwikkeling  en  internationale  samenwerking 
elkaar. 
Indien aangenomen wordt dat de koppeling van technologie en samenwerking 
afhankelijk is van de efficiëntie van de groene technologie, kan kennis de sleutel 
tot oplossing van internationale negatieve externaliteiten zijn.  Vanuit het oogpunt 
van beleid betekent dit dat onderzoek in het veld van groene technologie moet 
worden ondersteund, omdat de waarde daarvan niet alleen in de directe effecten 
op de kosten van groene technologie ligt, maar ook in de indirecte effecten op de 
houding  van  landen  in  het  proces  van  samenwerking.    De  aannamen  die  ten 
grondslag liggen van het model in hoofdstuk vier leiden tot intuitief duidelijke 
resultaten, maar hebben als nadeel dat belangrijke relaties tussen variabelen van 
het model misschien onderbelicht worden.   
In hoofdstuk vijf  wordt de ad-hoc benadering van hoofdstuk vier losgelaten en 
wordt  de  relatie  tussen  groene  investerinen  en  samenwerking  met  een  meer 
standaard  benadering  geanalyseerd.    Dit  laatste  model  is  gebaseerd  op  de 
maximalisering van de netto baten van preventie.  De beloningsfuncties worden 
bepaald als gevolg van een optimale keuze van emissie  reductiedoelstellingen.  
Door  middel  van  simulaties  wordt  geconstateerd  dat  in  dit  soort  modellen  de Rossella Bargiacchi Modelling and testing behavior in applications to climate change    195
     
 
mogelijkheid om te investeren in groene technologie niet toereikend is om bredere 
coalities te laten ontstaan.  Echter, de samenwerking kan worden verbeterd  als 
wordt aangenomen dat landen in de coalitie ook de mogelijkheid krijgen om vaste 
investeringskosten te delen.  De vaste kosten zijn mogelijk te interpreteren als 
kosten  van  onderzoek  en  ontwikkeling.    Op  deze  wijze  geeft  dit  model 
theoretische steun aan het idee (tot nu alleen aanwezig in de empirische literatuur) 
dat  de  beste  manier  om  internationale  samenwerking  voor  klimaatbeleid  te 
bereiken een verdrag is dat gebaseerd is op zowel prikkels voor technologie als 
emissie reductiedoelen.   
 
 
 
 
 